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African states are increasingly engaging with China--politically, socially and 
economically--especially through the machinations of the Forum for China-Africa 
Cooperation (FOCAC). This dissertation asserts that Africans are willing partners of the 
Chinese, motivated by their state-centric belief that engagement with China is in their 
national interest. This assertion contradicts the assumption of most literature to date that 
appears to borrow from the logic of dependency theory and presents African nations as 
pawns, subject to the demands of a dominant and exploitative China, who is benefiting at 
Africa’s expense. Economic trends from the decade before the launch of the FOCAC and 
the 10 years following indicate that increasing engagement with China has not been 
detrimental to African economic development. Following the establishment of the 
FOCAC in 2002, Africa as a region is reporting significantly higher GDP growth rates, 
increased GNI, and GDP per capita. Additionally, African states and China have on the 
whole experienced a balanced trade flow with few exceptions of uneven balances not 
always in favor of China. Clearly African states are benefiting from their relationship 
with China. A case study of Nigeria in 2011 revealed that Nigerians are willing to 
experience a continued trade deficit with China in order to achieve other important 
objectives. Nigerians are looking to learn from China’s industrialization process and the 
  
economic policies that have resulted in higher growth rates and amelioration of poverty. 
Chinese investments in Nigerian and African infrastructure development are considered 
significant and relevant for economic and social development. The influx of affordable 
Chinese goods has increased the spending power of the average Nigerian and increased 
the profit margins for Nigerian retailers. Nigerians are engaging with China because it is 
in their best interest and as this relationship continues to grow, it will need to be managed 
in order to maximize the benefit to Nigeria. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
The recent growth of Chinese influence and enterprise across Africa has drawn 
world attention. As a result, both economic and political implications are emerging at the 
global level, raising concerns among actors in the world economy. Efforts to secure 
energy sources, among them oil, and to locate natural resources to meet increasing 
demands of China’s domestic industry have spawned an abundance of publications on 
China’s presence in Africa, attempting to address potential repercussions to the African 
populace, the estimated consequences to Western interests in Africa and overarching 
effects at the global level.  
By all accounts, it would appear that Africa is allowing China free reign. In 2008, 
Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) outflows to Africa have increased from 
USD$74.8 million in 2003 to $5.5 billion a 7,239 percent increase (Ministry of 
Commerce, People’s Republic of China, 2009). Simultaneously, the percentage of 
China’s outward FDI allocated to Africa rose from 2.6 to 9.8, a 277 percent increase. 
Obviously, Chinese FDI to Africa is rapidly accelerating, with more and bigger 
investments from Chinese enterprise. In 2007, FDI to Africa tripled from $519 million in 
2006 to $1.6 billion, and then more than doubled in 2008 to $5.5 billion (Ministry of 
Commerce, PRC, 2009).  
However, this assumption has not been proven empirically and no substantive 
literature looks at Africa’s “China policy.” This research intends to understand and 
2 
explain African motivations in allowing and increasing Chinese engagement. 
Additionally, it investigates and challenges widely held assumptions about Chinese 
exploitation and goes on to explore African perceptions of China’s involvement.   
Clearly, China’s investment in Africa may change the face of global economics. 
As Richard Behar writes, 
In just a few years, the People's Republic of China (PRC) has become the 
most aggressive investor-nation in Africa. This commercial invasion is 
without question the most important development in the sub-Sahara since 
the end of the Cold War – an epic, almost primal propulsion that is 
redrawing the global economic map (2008).   
China’s foray into Africa is cause for alarm, primarily because of its potential 
consequences on the global stage. In particular how China’s entry affects demand and 
supply of sub-Saharan African resources as well as regional political development. This 
concern has played out in the academic world, where scholars and political scientists are 
beginning to grapple with such questions as: 1) What, if anything, has been the impact of 
recent Chinese engagement in Africa? 2) What might be the long-term impacts of this 
Chinese “invasion?”  
This project argues that, to interpret China’s presence and impact, it is first 
necessary to understand what Africans are allowing China to do and why, and further 
posits that Chinese concerns have entered Africa because Africans want them there. In 
addition, this research argues that African countries are capable of acting strategically. 
This view is supported by Alden (2007) and Brautigam (2009), who both assert that 
Africans play a decisive role in Chinese engagement on the continent.  
3 
Using Nigeria as a case study, this project attempts to extrapolate the motivations 
and objectives of Africans who are increasingly engaging with the Chinese. The rationale 
behind the selection of Nigeria is discussed further in this chapter’s methodology section. 
This research also contends that a more complex relationship is at work, distinct from 
Africa’s previous pattern of international relations, and one that cannot be fully 
characterized through dependency theory. Although China is making a bid for African 
resources, its actions are being enacted on a different field, with different rules and thus 
different results. This view is supported by Ancharaz, who asserts that African agency, 
political motivations--and consequently, decision-making--are important factors in 
Africa’s new connection with China (2009). Conducted primarily in 2011, this research 
examines Nigeria’s current China policy to ascertain why Nigerians are engaging with 
China as well as reviewing policy over the last decade. However, the relevance of this 
study extends beyond Africa or China: it seeks to examine and reveal new relationships 
in international relations. 
Theories on Africa-China Relations  
According to dependency theory, Africans are engaging with China because 
China wants to engage with Africa. However, noted African scholars continue to stress 
that, while the Chinese may be driven by their own domestic demands, their activity is 
defined by the African governments and institutions with whom they wish to interact 
4 
(Brautigam, 2009; Alden, 2007
1
). As such, African motivations matter because they are 
at the core of China-Africa relations. African states and their institutions are taking a 
more active role than current literature gives them credit for. The reasons Africans seek 
relations with China affects the nature and levels of Chinese engagement within states’ 
borders. In addition, levels of monitoring and types of domestic policies play a key role 
in defining the character, impact and implications of China’s presence in African states. 
Unfortunately, the literature lacks explanations of African perspectives and offers 
minimal discussion of African actors’ roles in permitting and controlling China’s 
engagement. The cases of Zimbabwe and Sudan are alluded to as representative of 
African agency in Chinese-African relations (Alden, 2007; Manji and Marks, 2007). 
Robert Kagan (2006) goes so far as to argue that China is buttressing authoritarian rule 
and creating an “informal league of dictators” in Africa. However, not only are the cases 
of Zimbabwe and Sudan atypical of the rest of the continent, Alden (2007) asserts that 
Chinese engagement in Sudan and Zimbabwe has not provided the levels of support to 
authoritarian regimes that many scholars claim. While Zimbabwe’s autocratic President 
Mugabe has publicly attempted to woo China with proclamations of a “looking east” 
policy, China’s response to his advances has actually been minimal.  
Some studies claim that the impact of Chinese engagement in Africa, whether 
positive or negative, whether on a comprehensive scale or a small scale benefiting the 
elite, will be determined by African governments and their policies regarding China 
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 Their perspectives are also echoed by Askouri in Manji and Marks (2007) and Zhu (2010). 
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(Brautigam, 2009; Alden, 2007). While it is clear that African states have found a new 
partner for trade, aid and perhaps even political and diplomatic support to resist Western-
initiated policies and interventions, it is also apparent that to accrue any sort of lasting 
benefit, African states must actively manage their relationship with China. Existing 
research has yet to adequately address the motivations of Africans who choose to engage 
with China and African perspectives on this growing relationship. This study will attempt 
to address these questions in part by exploring Nigeria’s China policy.  
The Argument 
This research argues that recent China-Nigeria relations display a form of state-
centric realism that would be indicative of neo-classical economic theory and not 
dependency theory. Nigerian relations with the West (specifically the U.S. and the UK) 
are much like those of the rest of Africa and have often been depicted as and explained 
by dependency theory (Kalu, 2000; Ikejiaku, 2008; et al)
2
.  Dependency is a condition 
that evolves over time, in which a relationship--generally between two states--develops to 
the advantage of a dominant state at the expense of another (Prebisch, 1950). Ajakaiye & 
Kaplinsky, noting the importance of African agency and the consequences of African 
decision-making, warn against returning to dependency theory as the way to understand 
this new relationship, because it assumes Africa as a “quivering victim of external forces” 
(2009: pp. 483). They further argue that Chinese engagement in Africa is increasingly 
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 See also Patrick Bond’s Looting Africa (2006) and Walter Rodney’s How Europe Underdeveloped Africa 
(1972). 
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attractive, due in part to the novelty of the relationship and the aspiration for a different 
nature of engagement.  
Along the lines of Ajakaiye and Kaplinsky, I posit that, in a similar manner, 
Nigerians are attracted to the new opportunities China presents and assert that such a 
young relationship cannot be expected to exhibit reliable indicators of dependency. 
Chinese policy in Africa is driven by economic diplomacy and a businesslike relationship 
with minimal political interference, allowing the pursuit of arrangements aimed at 
producing mutual benefits (Alves in Alden et al, 2008; Moyo, 2009). Additionally, 
Chinese engagement in Africa has been marked by a significant investment in 
infrastructure in African states (Mutukwa, 1977; Alden, 2007). Increases in the amount 
and quality of infrastructure have been linked to positive economic growth and reduction 
in income inequality; Calderon and Serven go so far as to argue for the development of 
infrastructure as an effective method for ameliorating poverty (2004). With these factors 
in mind, it does not appear that a dependent relationship is developing between China and 
Nigeria. 
Dependency theory emerged in the 1950s as a way of understanding relations 
between countries, in particular those between more developed and less developed 
countries (Ferraro, 1996).
3
 Neoclassical economic theory, however, assumes that 
economic growth results in net benefit to all, though not always equal benefit, a condition 
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 Dependency theory was pushed forward through the work of Raul Prebisch, then-director of the United 
Nations Economic Commission for Latin America.  
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referred to as Pareto optimal.
4
 History has shown that despite developed nations’ 
recorded economic growth, developing (i.e. poorer, less wealthy) countries experienced 
lower levels of growth. In studying this phenomenon, Prebisch made the argument that 
economic growth in industrialized countries has negative impact on developing countries 
(1950)
5
. According to this logic, developing countries sell raw materials to developed 
countries that use those materials to create manufactured “value-added” products that are 
then sold back to the developing countries at a higher price. The finished goods cost more 
than the raw materials; thus, developing countries cannot accrue enough income to both 
pay for their exports and grow their economy.  This unbalanced exchange creates a state 
of dependency for developing countries where “dependency can be defined as an 
explanation of the economic development of a state in terms of the external influences--
political, economic, and cultural--on national development policies” (Sunkel, 1969: pp. 
23).  
Dependency theory provides an explanation of why developing countries stay 
poor while industrialized, developed countries become wealthier. However, dependency 
theory has since been discredited because it lacks cohesion and clarity (Harding, 1976; 
Chilcote, 1978; Snyder, 1980). More importantly, it fails to account for the influence of 
local elites’ political policies in developing countries and the resulting impact on 
economic growth (Smith, 1979; Smith, 1981; Sandbrook, 1993).  However, many of the 
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 Pareto Optimal resource distribution is that which betters at least one person and harms no one else. 
5
 The same argument was also made by Andre Gunder Frank (1969; 1975). 
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arguments made on the nature of economic relations between China and African states 
still borrow heavily from the logic of dependency theory. 
 Relations between China and Africa require close examination, and this project 
seeks to address two major issues. First, it intends to test and investigate whether or not 
dependency theory explains the nature of Nigeria and China’s relationship. Furthermore, 
it will address whether dependency theory can adequately describe this relationship. This 
research is supported by Dos Santos’ assertion that dependency is a “historical 
condition… in which the economy of a certain group of countries is conditioned by the 
development and expansion of another economy to which their own is subjected” (Fann 
and Hodges, 1971: pp. 226). I argue that China, like Nigeria, is a dependent-peripheral 
state
6
, with no dyadic history of dependence. At present, in its early stages, the 
relationship between China and Nigeria cannot definitively be characterized in terms of 
dominance and dependence, as dependency theory requires. In addition, if African states 
play a significant role in determining the nature and scope of their relationship with 
China to the extent that Brautigam and Alden allege, then dependency does not exist 
within this setting. Dependency theory dictates that peripheral, developing states (such as 
those in Africa) are pawns in a system enforced by powerful, dominant states that repress 
development (Smith, 1979).  If in fact African agency is at work, exemplified by rational 
behavior and decision-making, then it seems that dependency theory offers an inadequate 
framework for understanding this new relationship between China and Nigeria. 
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 Ferraro argues that the dominant (non-dependent) states are the advanced industrial nations in the 
Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) of which neither China or Nigeria are 
members, according to the OECD’s website: 
[http://www.oecd.org/document/58/0,2340,en_2649_201185_1889402_1_1_1_1,00.html]. 
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This study also attempts to determine and define Nigeria’s China policy and 
identify its specific objectives. Given this goal, this research fits within Van Evera’s 
classifications as a theory testing dissertation, in this case, testing dependency theory to 
see if it provides a sufficient framework for understanding Nigeria-China relations 
(1997). The majority of this research contributes to understanding the motivations of 
Nigeria’s engagement with China.  
The argument for a state-centric realist relationship between China and Africa 
stems from the apparent inadequacy of dependency theory to describe this relationship. 
Subsequently, the following hypotheses were generated in contradiction of dependency 
theory. Thus, if dependency theory holds true, then the data will reflect support for the 
null hypothesis. 
This study has one central hypothesis as follows: 
Nigerians are increasingly engaging with China because they believe 
it will result in a net benefit for themselves and for their country. 
This hypothesis is inductively generated from data collected from interviews, news 
articles, and published literature on Sino-African relations and Nigeria-China relations. 
Afrobarometer surveys on public opinion in Africa indicate that, despite the growing 
literature asserting that Chinese engagement in Africa is detrimental to Africans, most 
Africans and Nigerians view the Chinese with positive regard (Gadzala & Hanusch, 
10 
2010)
7
.  This dissertation intends to take those findings a step further, demonstrating that 
not only do Nigerians have a positive outlook towards China’s involvement, but also 
revealing the underlying rationale and motivations that drive the Nigerian side of Chinese 
engagement.  
China-Africa trade and investment continues to grow at exponential rates. In the 
same pattern, China-Nigeria trade and investment is also growing. Chinese outward FDI 
stock to Nigeria has grown at an average rate of 101.7 percent
8
 from 2003 to 2008 
(Ministry of Commerce, People’s Republic of China). In fact, in 2010, the bilateral trade 
volume between Nigeria and China was recorded at over $7.5 billion, according to the 
Chinese Consul-General in Nigeria (Okoh, 2011). This level of increasing cash flows can 
be expected to boost economic activity and increase economic growth rates in Nigeria, 
thereby making Chinese engagement more attractive to Nigerians. It is likely that this 
research will find that Nigerians are motivated to do business with China because it 
increases their revenue stream, leading to economic growth.  
Economic growth and benefit in Nigeria may also benefit from Chinese 
investments in infrastructure and Chinese aid to Nigeria. As a result of China’s tendency 
to attach aid agreements to larger business agreements, Nigerians can also be expected to 
show increasing interest in doing business with China (Brautigam, 2009). Regarding 
China’s approach to aid, Sahr Johnny, the Sierra Leonean Ambassador to Beijing said, 
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 This is especially true when economic engagement increases in general, and when African exports to 
China increase relative to Chinese imports in Africa in specific (Gadzala & Hanusch, 2008). 
8
 Author’s calculations based on Chinese outward FDI stock statistics to Nigeria, as reported by the 
Ministry of Commerce, People’s Republic of China (2010). 
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“The Chinese are doing more than the G8 in making poverty history. If a G8 country had 
wanted to rebuild the stadium, we’d still be here holding meetings. The Chinese just 
come and do it.” (Gadzala and Hanusch, 2010: pp. 2). Many others share similar 
sentiments. Sautman and Hairong argue, “China, unlike Western states, is not obstructing 
development in the world’s poorer countries” (2007: pp. 93). They are supported by 
Ching who notes that Chinese aid is distributed with a particular focus on infrastructure 
and human capital development (2005). The argument has been made that investments in 
infrastructure are vital to economic and social development, and the alleviation of 
poverty (Calderon & Serven, 2004). The Chinese have been noted for taking on 
infrastructure development projects in Africa (Ching, 2005; Gadzala & Hanusch, 2008). 
Chinese aid in the form of large public works projects can be expected to improve 
development in Nigeria and in Africa. Although corruption may exist in such agreements, 
following the logic of Calderon and Serven (2004), I argue that investments in 
infrastructure remain significant because they create an environment conducive to 
increased economic growth and therefore potential amelioration of poverty. 
China’s aid policy in Africa is interesting in its departures from the Western aid 
policies normally contingent on standards of governance and at times, human rights; 
recent Chinese aid has typically been supplementary to trade agreements and diplomatic 
endeavours rather than interfering with or limiting how governance occurs (Brautigam, 
2009). Chinese aid in Africa also differs from Western aid in terms of dollar value; 
Chinese aid is lower. Brautigam, who has decried the popular notion of China as a “rogue 
donor”, asserts that the Chinese provide policy prescriptions with no apparent need to 
12 
understand policy problems in Africa. As such, China does not claim to know what 
African development might require.  
Finally, information on Chinese aid to Africa is not comprehensively available, 
especially when aid is a part of a broader business arrangement; Brautigam points out that 
this lack of public information does not adhere to Western transparency standards (2009). 
In addition, China’s previous attempts at aid programs were unsustainable, but making 
changes in the types of programs and how they are operated might bring about 
sustainable net benefit to Africa, a true “win-win” situation where Chinese aid and 
infrastructure investment might lead to improvements in standards of living and reduced 
poverty in Nigeria (Brautigam, 2009). However, the veiled nature of Chinese aid makes it 
difficult to determine its precise impact. To add to lack of transparency, aid sometimes 
takes the form of commercial credit, forming the financial base that allows promotion of 
Chinese exports in African countries. The building of the Tanzania-Zambia Railway, 
often cited as an example of Chinese aid to Africa, was “financed by selling Chinese 
consumer goods through Zambian and Tanzanian state trading organizations; a 
commodity credit agreement provided for the importation of Chinese goods during the 
period of construction of the rail link” (Yu, 1975: pp. 135). This raises the issue of 
credibility of Chinese aid based on the general understanding of what constitutes aid 
versus what doesn’t.  
If in fact the capacity of Chinese aid falls short of expectations, the question 
remains: does the actual investment in infrastructure outweigh the adverse impacts of the 
trade agreements that sometimes come packaged with Chinese aid? Following Calderon 
13 
and Serven’s notion that investment in infrastructure leads to economic growth and 
reduced poverty, it is reasonable to assert that, while total benefits may be reduced due to 
corruption or mislabeled aid, it is rational for Nigerians to expect improvement in their 
economy and standard of living-- as long as investment in infrastructure continues 
(2004). 
Chinese engagement with Africa follows the same parameters as Chinese aid to 
Africa; the Chinese have adopted a policy of non-interference, based on the recognition 
of the sovereignty of African states. This project argues that China’s policy of non-
interference allows African governments to deal with their own problems without 
undermining attempts at developing good governance. China’s approach has permitted 
partnerships and allows African states to be active participants in the development 
process (Brautigam, 2009). Akin to Weiss et al., I argue that active participation can 
foster sustainable growth and exceed the benefits of structural adjustment programs and 
prescriptive policies forced upon African states as pre-conditions for Western aid and 
loans from international financial institutions like the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund (Weiss et al., 2009; Armstrong et al, 2007; Barnett and Finnemore, 
2004). While Chinese engagement in Africa may not be the saving grace of the continent, 
I contend that the more active African states and governmental actors become in their 
own development process, the greater success will be evident in addressing not only the 
symptoms of poverty and underdevelopment but also their root causes. 
In support of the central hypothesis, this research reveals that Nigerians believe 
engagement with China is to their benefit. Interview respondents noted that China is an 
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increasingly significant global actor and that Nigerians at all levels of society are looking 
to learn from China’s example in order to improve their present situation. Although the 
current trade relationship is heavily imbalanced in China’s favor, Nigerians are 
purchasing more Chinese-manufactured products. This research examines this growing 
relationship to identify the drivers of increasing Nigerian engagement and expects to find 
evidence in support of the central hypothesis that Nigerians are engaging with China 
because they believe it will further Nigerian objectives and result in a net benefit. 
An Overview of the Methodology 
This project has two main objectives: first, to examine economic trends to see if 
increasing economic engagement with China through trade has adversely affected 
African economic performance, as would be expected in a state of dependency. Second, it 
presents a case study of Nigeria with the goal of revealing the drivers behind increasing 
Nigerian engagement with China.  
Dependency theory dictates that China would be the main and perhaps sole 
beneficiary of increasing economic engagement. Accordingly, much of the literature on 
Chinese engagement in Africa insinuates that a dominant China is engaging with African 
states in a manner that maximizes its own benefits while minimizing those of Africans, 
even causing some degree of harm. To test these assertions, this study looks at measures 
of economic performance, in particular, gross domestic product (GDP) growth rate, gross 
national income (GNI), and GDP per capita. Viewing Africa as a regional entity, this 
study examines twenty years of economic trends: the decade prior to the launch of the 
15 
Forum on China-Africa Cooperation and the decade immediately following. Borrowing 
from Kaufman, Chernotsky & Geller’s propositions defining the indicators of high 
economic dependency, this study examines these economic trends to see if, as in a 
dependent relationship, aggregate Africa is exhibiting low rates of economic growth and 
an unfavorable trade balance with China (1975). This study asserts that African states 
should post higher economic growth rates after the launch of FOCAC and that the 
China/Africa trade balance between China and Africa should be even (or nearly even), 
lending credence to the view this that dependency theory is an inadequate framework to 
understand or explain growing Sino-African relations.  This study attempts to see if 
conditions of dependency as defined by literature exist, and does not attribute changes in 
African economic growth solely to the entry of China. Included in this economic trend 
analysis is an examination of Sino-Nigerian relations to see if economic trends would 
support the idea of a dependent relationship. This researcher posits that as Nigeria 
increasingly engages with China, economic performance indicators like GDP growth rate 
and GNI as well as GDP per capita will increase and fail to support the argument of a 
dependent relationship. However, this study expects to find--in support of a dependent 
relationship--a considerably unfavorable balance of trade to the benefit of China. 
This study expects that examination of economic trends will provide an 
inconclusive picture of the nature of the relationship between Nigeria and China. In order 
to better understand Sino-African relations, an in-depth case study is required. This 
research uses a Nigerian case study in to better comprehend the nature of Sino-African 
relations. This study argues that, not only is dependency theory an inadequate framework, 
16 
but that identifying motivators for Africans who engage with China is crucial in 
understanding Sino-African relations. To this end, fieldwork was conducted in Nigeria, 
primarily during the months of July and August 2011
9
 utilizing a strategic case-study 
approach that employed an open-ended interview format.
10
 A case study was necessary to 
understand new phenomena that have not previously been addressed by scholarship. In 
sum, approximately 130 interviews (informal and formal) were conducted with Nigerian 
that engaged with China. Engagement with China was operationalized as any sort of 
interaction with China and Chinese people. There were 62 formal interviews conducted. 
To be considered formal, an interview required a signed informed consent form
11
 and was 
usually voice-recorded. Interview respondents included government officials, politicians, 
lobbyists/policy specialists, business and industry representatives, market traders, and 
academics, as well as Chinese industry representatives and a Chinese diplomat. To get a 
better picture of Nigerian engagement with China, interviews were conducted in multiple 
geographic locations and strong efforts were made to speak with a varied selection of 
Nigerian ethnic groups. Data collected through these interviews were then coded to 
identify themes in responses to the questions posed, the most significant of which is: 
Why are Nigerians engaging with China? To validate the findings of this study, the 
researcher relied on interviews with and peer reviews by Nigerian academics and political 
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 Fieldwork on this project commenced in January, 2011, but the bulk of the data was amassed in July and 
August. 
10
 The interview protocol is included in Appendix A. 
11
 The informed consent form used for this research is included in Appendices C through E. 
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scientists. The methodology used for this case study and the ascertained themes are 
discussed in greater detail in Chapter 5. 
Outline of Chapters 
The following is a breakdown of the chapters in this dissertation and a summary 
of their content. Chapter 2 presents an overview and critique of the literature on China-
Africa relations since the 1980s, paying particular attention to the recent permutation of 
Chinese capitalism in Africa. Chapter 2 also outlines China’s African policy – how it is 
being realized and perceived — and its proposed impact on African states.  
Chapter 3 examines dependency theory in Africa, noting that its logic has been 
applied to much of the literature on Chinese engagement in Africa. The chapter begins 
with a discussion of dependency theory, its roots and development, followed by an 
interpretation of the current state of affairs in Africa and Nigeria, and a discussion of the 
relationship with China viewed through the lens of dependency theory. The chapter then 
presents state-centric realism as a more adequate framework through which to understand 
and evaluate China-Africa and China-Nigeria relations, in particular African and 
Nigerian aspect of engagement with China. 
Chapter 4 tests dependency to see if increasing engagement with China has been 
detrimental to African economic development as dependency theory suggests. It 
examines economic trends in Africa from the ten years prior to the first FOCAC 
conference and the 10 years immediately after to see if increasing engagement with 
18 
China has an observable detrimental impact to African economies as measured by gross 
domestic product (GDP) growth rates, GDP per capita and gross national income (GNI) 
figures. It also explores balance of trade data to see who benefits the most from China-
Africa trade. At a micro level, this chapter also investigates trends in Nigeria-China 
economic relations from 1995-2009, in view of broader Nigerian economic trends over 
the same period.  
Chapter 5 examines Nigerian agency and tests the central hypothesis of this study. 
This chapter looks to see if Nigerians are indeed pursuing increased engagement with 
China because they believe it will result in a net benefit for themselves and for their 
country. It examines the motivations of Nigerians in their growing engagement with 
China, answering the questions of who in Nigeria is engaging with China and why.  
The sixth and concluding chapter discusses the findings of this study and their 
potential implications, ending with a call for continued research in this increasingly 
relevant issue area. 
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Chapter 2: Chinese Capitalism in Africa 
 
The purpose of this literature review is to summarize the scholarship on Chinese 
engagement in Africa and to illustrate its apparent focus on the Chinese perspective and 
the absence of an African perspective in regard to China’s engagement in Africa.  Most 
of the literature examines Chinese objectives in Africa over the last 20 years. Much of the 
information on recent Chinese engagement in Africa is contained in journalistic accounts, 
some of which are in-depth book-length reports, and growing scholarship in this area 
relies heavily on these accounts. While these perspectives advise how African states 
should approach Chinese counterparts, the literature does not speak explicitly to whether 
or not an African policy on China exists, nor does scholarship define present African 
motivations. This chapter first critiques the scholarship on recent Chinese capitalism in 
Africa, looking at the noted drivers of Chinese engagement, and paying particular 
attention to allegations of an imperialist China in Africa. The next section examines the 
literature on Chinese aid in Africa, illustrating some of the ways in which China chooses 
to distinguish itself from the West. Finally, this chapter attempts to extrapolate the main 
arguments in the literature on Africans’ motivations for engaging with China, noting the 
scarcity of scholarship in this area. In all, this literature review points to the need for 
systematic study into Africa’s engagement with China, and in particular demands new 
research investigating the primary motives of Africa’s new democracies as they continue 
to engage with China. 
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I. The New Imperialists 
Recent Chinese engagement in Africa builds on the foundation established by 
Sino-African relations during Africa’s independence period in the 1960s (Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs PRC, 2006)
12. China’s recent effort to woo African leadership and the 
general populace has included making significantly larger investments in education and 
infrastructure (Shelton & Paruk, 2008). Some scholars suggest that the emergence of 
China in Africa insinuates a larger campaign for world dominance, and that China has 
entered Africa in the role of neo-colonialist (Kagan, 2006; Tull, 2006; 2008). Others 
argue that China’s presence is no different than Western predecessors in misappropriating 
natural resources (Segal, 1992; Chan-Fishel, 2007). Kagan expresses concerns that China 
is striving to develop and support a global network of autocracies and like-minded 
dictators (2006). In support of Kagan’s view, China’s Beijing Consensus has been well 
received by African elites in light of the abject failure of the Washington Consensus. Yet 
many other scholars disagree, maintaining that China is only interested in Africa’s 
abundant natural resources, most specifically oil (Pan, 2006; Taylor, 2006; Rocha, 2007; 
Taylor, 2007; Brookes, 2007; Alves, 2008). However, this relationship is more complex 
as well as more vulnerable to an array of intervening factors; thus, its implications for 
Western interests are perhaps less extreme than some of the assertions of the literature. 
Some scholars, among them Snow and Thompson, depict Chinese engagement in 
Africa as a study in soft power (Snow, 1988; Thompson, 2004; Thompson, 2005). 
Historically, China has sought to interact with Africa through diplomacy to establish its 
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 China’s Africa Policy document issued by the People’s Republic of China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs is 
included in Appendix F. 
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own superiority as a kingdom of civilized and sophisticated people (Filesi, 1962). The 
earliest recognized mention of engagement with Africa was made in the T’ang Dynasty 
by Tuan Cheng-Shih who died in AD 863 (Filesi, 1962). According to Philip Snow, even 
in early relations, the Chinese took care to minimize their impact and interruption of 
African life in their quest (1988). Snow notes that the Chinese, unlike the Western 
colonialists that came after them, saw the exchange of goods between African coastal 
states and Chinese ambassadors as a tribute, indicating allegiance with China and a fitting 
obeisance to the superiority of the Chinese empire:  
“The exchange of goods was laden in Chinese eyes with a symbolic 
significance far outweighing the value of the goods themselves. By trading 
with the fleet, the African coastal states were paying the Ming emperor the 
homage they owed him as the sovereign of the world (1988: pp. 27). 
 
This diplomatic style of interaction carried on through the 1960s which saw a 
more active form of Chinese engagement in Africa. Taylor and Segal note that as China 
sought to liberate itself from Soviet influence, it found sympathetic partners in African 
states pursuing independence, which led to the development of China’s Five Principles of 
Peaceful Coexistence (Segal, 1992; Taylor, 2006). Regarding foreign relations, the Five 
Principles defined the following directives:  1) reciprocal respect for territorial integrity; 
2) non-aggression; 3) non-interference in one another’s internal affairs; 4) equality and 
mutual benefit; and 5) peaceful co-existence (Taylor, 2006 pp. 940). Application of these 
principles has remained consistent even in the face of China’s recent and more business-
like approach in Africa.  
Scholars such as Games and Marks claim that China’s grab for African resources 
has led to both Western and African accusations of neo-imperialism and neo-colonialism 
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(Games, 2005; Marks, 2006). They argue that the industrial revolutions of China and the 
West led to an intensified presence of both on the African continent and China-African 
trade relations reflect familiar Western traits with African resources used to fuel 
technological advancements (Marks, 2007). As had previously occurred with the West, 
African raw materials are sold to China in exchange for processed, valued-added Chinese 
goods (World Trade Atlas, 2011; Manji and Marks, 2010). China’s persistently low 
production costs have allowed access to luxury goods previously too costly for Africans 
(Liang, 2005; Taylor, 2008). However, Marks notes that this lower cost of luxury goods 
has devastated some sectors of African industry (Marks, 2006). The example cited by 
Alden and Liang, among others, is the closure of South African and Nigerian textile 
mills, resulting in job losses for thousands of Africans (Liang, 2005; Alden, 2005). This 
impact has raised concerns among African politicians and scholars that if this relationship 
remains unchanged, Africa will no more industrialize under China than it has under 
Western influence. Worse yet, African natural resources may be further depleted, 
snuffing any chances of African industrialization (Marks, 2006; 2007).  
European colonialists and entrepreneurs set up shop in Africa, and established 
businesses that exploited their access to African resources and ties to foreign markets 
(Bristow, 2007).  Bristow notes that, in a manner likened to former European settlers, an 
influx of Chinese migrants has impelled competition with African businesses (Bristow, 
2007). The competitive advantages of these migrants, in particular their ties to other 
economies and other markets overwhelm would-be domestic competitors in Africa 
(Bristow, 2007). For instance, Africans and Chinese may import Chinese-manufactured 
products but the Chinese, with a cultural and language advantage as well as ties (often 
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familial) to manufacturers in mainland China, may be able to reduce their supply costs 
and thus market prices, thereby undercutting domestic competitors in the African 
marketplace (see also Brautigam, 2003). In other cases, Chinese manufactured imports 
sold by Chinese migrants may be less expensive than domestically produced versions of 
the same products, making it difficult for African businesses to compete with Chinese 
counterparts.  From the open air African marketplace to manufacturing and industry, it is 
clear that Chinese presence in Nigeria and in the rest of Africa is growing (Bristow, 
2007).   
Alden and Marks suggest that, while some aspects of China-Africa relations may 
lead to neo-imperialist interaction, Chinese efforts may simultaneously lend equal voice 
to their African partners and has potential to establish a more equitable partnership. 
(Alden, 2007; Marks, 2007). Thompson asserts that Chinese relations are the result of 
persuasion rather than through the heavy-handed approach of Western colonialism and 
more recently Western-directed international financial institutions (Thompson, 2004). 
Certainly African states have their work laid out for them should they attempt to manage 
their relationship with China to maximize benefits to their constituents (Thompson, 
2004).  
Despite the claims of a neo-imperialist China in Africa, substantial differences 
exist in China's approach to Africa, noted by Snow and Marks, when compared to the 
West and these differences have been entrenched over time (Snow, 1988
13
;Marks, 2007). 
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Ages they sought a “gesture of symbolic acquiescence in the Chinese view of the world” (pp. 29), 
different from the Europeans who came to conquer Africa. 
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Along these lines, according to Tull and Kagan this increased interaction between China 
and Africa appears to threaten Western interests on the continent (Tull, 2006; Kagan, 
2008). However, Richard Behar points out that, while others paint China in Africa as a 
greater evil than its Western predecessors (namely the U.S. and British and French 
colonial powers), there may be little difference in terms of the end game for China and 
the West in Africa (2008). Ultimately, Behar states, 
“the sub-Sahara is now the scene of one of the most bare-knuckled resource grabs 
the world has ever seen… In describing China’s exploits, it’s tempting to evoke 
the image of a benign, postcolonial West being outfoxed by a ruthless and 
unscrupulous neo-communist power…The American track record in modern 
Africa has been deplorable -- a half-century of backing strongmen, turning a blind 
eye, and taking what we can get with little or no regard for the health and welfare 
of the locals” (Behar, 2008).  
 
Behar supports the view that “today’s global economy has an insatiable need for 
raw materials. That’s as true for China’s rise as it is true for the maintenance of 
America’s economy” (Behar, 2008). Carmody and Owusu agree, noting that as Chinese 
engagement has increased, so has the American presence in Africa, and China’s recent 
economic expansion appears to be a somewhat obvious aim to dilute the power and 
influence of U.S. hegemony in the region, as much as to acquire African resources 
(Carmody & Owusu, 2007). This upturn appears to corroborate Klare’s claim of the 
geopolitical revival in the rush to secure scarce resources (2005). No doubt, Africa 
presents a new and interesting battlefield for Western and Eastern global politics. 
Clapham puts forth the notion that trade is already shifting from a “Global North” to a 
“Global East” orientation. Not only is China flooding the African market with goods, it is 
also buying up oil, minerals and various other raw materials from African states (2005). 
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Carroll observes that, with the continued expansion of China’s industry and economy, 
China’s demand for industrial resources continues to climb, and resource-rich Africa has 
the potential to meet this need (Carroll, 2006). 
While oil remains a central focus of the literature addressing China’s African 
resource grab, Rocha points out that the Chinese have been just as diligent in their 
pursuit of base metals: aluminum, copper, iron ore, nickel and zinc to name a few 
(2007). Chinese demand for copper has driven up global prices from $1,319/tonne in 
2001 to $8,800 in 2006 (Kaswende, 2005; The Economist, 2005, 2006). By 2005, 
Chinese firms had invested $170 million into the copper mining industry in Zambia 
(Lyman, 2005). China also signed a US $1.3bn agreement that for its investment in 
energy, it would gain access to Zimbabwean chrome (BBC News, 2006a). Additionally, 
Carmody and Owusu point out that 90 percent of the world’s chrome reserves are found 
in Zimbabwe and South Africa (2007). In Gabon, a Chinese consortium won sole rights 
to exploit massive untapped iron ore reserves (Terradaily, 2006). The Chinese agreement 
with Gabon also included oil, two timber-processing plants and an industrial fisheries 
firm.  
Beyond the industries mentioned, Chinese investments in Africa are increasingly 
dedicated to agricultural development not only to promote food security for African 
states, but also to ensure China’s food sources (Carmody & Owusu, 2007). However, 
Cotuela and Vermeulen disagree, stating that Chinese agricultural interests in Africa aim 
to exploit business opportunities and “to secure access to non-food resources where 
Chinese demand outstrips domestic supply” (2009: pp. 1,236, 2011; see also Brautigam 
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& Xiaoyang, 2009). As China continues to urbanize and industrialize, the ability to 
support local demands has been threatened as land and resources are repurposed. 
Carmody and Owusu argue that China sees in Africa the potential to alleviate the 
increasing deficit from Chinese agricultural producers (2007). 
Carmody and Owusu also highlight China’s differing approach to Africa, noting 
that the U.S. treats Africa primarily as a “site of humanitarian intervention, resource 
extraction and security threat,” while China views Africa as more a strategic economic 
space (2007: pp. 506). True to form, China has been engaging with African states in a 
largely business-focused manner (French 2004; Moyo, 2009). Specifically, in discussing 
China’s approach, a Nigerian government official asserted, “China is engaging Nigeria 
seriously. They understand us. They know our problems.”14 This official is not alone in 
this view; several scholars agree that Chinese projects in Africa have been noted for their 
comparative suitability for African conditions (James, 2002; Liang, 2005; Carmody and 
Owusu, 2007). Another unique element of Chinese engagement has been the employment 
of payment-in-kind strategies to finance Chinese loans, reducing African states’ financial 
burdens and encouraging African exports to China (Carmody and Owusu, 2007). For 
example, in Zimbabwe, tobacco exports are used to pay off the balance on Chinese loans 
to state agencies (Hilsum, 2006).  
By entering into negotiations with African governments, some scholars claim, 
China affords them legitimacy and acknowledges both their sovereignty and ability to 
make independent decisions (Hongwei, 2005; Rocha, 2007; Alden 2007). In contrast, 
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Western influence and capital has often been used to force developing countries into 
accepting Western policy prescriptions (Ellis, 2005; Carmody and Owusu, 2007). 
However, again the Chinese approach is noted as less domineering, with China even 
going so far as to agree to limit exports to protect the domestic industries of African trade 
and economic partners (Hall, 2006; Marks, 2007). This behavior supports the notion that 
China is in fact pursuing a long-term strategy in Africa. 
Carmody and Owusu argue that Chinese behavior is indicative of objectives to 
dilute Western influence in the global economy; they identify the following as motives 
for Chinese engagement beyond access to critical natural resources: 1. investment of 
China’s significant foreign exchange reserves; 2. continuing development of Chinese 
multinational corporations; 3. locating markets for Chinese products;  4. developing 
African agriculture to provide food and non-food products for Chinese consumption; and  
5. establishing a cadre of African professionals and knowledge workers to support 
Chinese objectives of global economic transformation (2007). China has recently 
invested quite heavily in developing a skilled African workforce (FOCAC 2004k; 
Servant, 2005; FOCAC, 2006c; 2008; 2009e; 2009g). This workforce development, noted 
by many scholars, serves as an important component of China’s African aid policy (King, 
2007; Shelton & Paruk, 2008; Brautigam, 2009; Taylor, 2011). Thompson argues that 
these skilled workers are a part of China’s plan to overhaul the current economic system 
(2004). By developing a skilled and intellectually prepared African workforce, China and 
Africa are equipped to offset the “unjust and inequitable world order” that has routinely 
marginalized the interests of non-Western states. This intellectual partnership provides a 
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means to draw focus to issues pertinent in developing countries to combat Western 
dominance of world politics (Efande, 2003; Muekalia, 2003).  
The argument that China has routinely sought to establish a relationship and then 
partner with African states (or kingdoms and tribes) to promote its domestic political 
agenda has some merit--and a long history. In the Middle Ages, goods procured from 
African states indicated the excellence of the Emperor and the approval of the sovereigns 
(Filesi, 1972). Scholars agree in the 1960s, the People’s Republic of China needed the 
support of African states to assert itself in the global community and thereby discredit the 
legitimacy of Taiwan, and to separate itself from the Soviet Union and earn recognition 
in the United Nations (Yu, 1988; Segal, 1992). As the Chinese economy grew in the 
1990s, China again turned to Africa to find resources to satisfy its booming industry and 
to meet increasing domestic demands (Rotberg, 2008). Daniel Large asserts 
…there is greater reason than ever before to suggest that more than an 
ephemeral phase, China’s engagement with Africa will persist and 
deepen and that the present phase represents a departure from its past 
involvement. Observers considered that the PRC was in Africa to stay 
in the 1960s; some even dismissed its importance in Africa in the early 
1990s. However, the context of relations has importantly altered. A 
progressively interdependent China, the future of whose Communist 
Party state is now more firmly linked to its performance at home, must 
continue to engage in order to guarantee essential supplies to maintain 
its development.  
China needs, and will continue to need, African resources more 
than previously. (2007: pp. 157). 
 
According to Smith and Larimer, rational choice theory dictates that states or at 
least state actors will always act in a manner that promotes their self-interests (2009). 
China's foreign policy in Africa can be viewed as a direct function of ruling elites’ 
strategy to remain in power, and in the process guarantee control over domestic politics.  
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Five decades ago, African states had the votes necessary to seat the People’s Republic of 
China at the United Nations (Segal, 1992). Today Africa still has the numbers necessary 
to protect Chinese interests on the world stage.  
Some scholars, among them Pádraig Carmody and Francis Owusu, support the 
view that China is seeking to reset the global economy and the politics that surround it 
(2007). This is supported by a significant push by Nigeria and South Africa for African 
representation on the United Nations Security Council.
15
  Not only does Africa possess 
the raw materials and resources to sustain China’s economic climb, African states have 
the voting power to shift a currently Western focus to a more inclusive perspective 
undoubtedly more favorable to China (Kagan, 2006; Carmody and Owusu, 2007). 
Following the fall of the Soviet Union, the April 1990 Chinese publication ChinaAfrica, 
was quoted as stating, “[The] vast number of Third World countries [will] surely unite 
with  and  stand  behind  China  like  numerous ‘ants’ keeping the ‘elephant’  from harm's 
way”  (Taylor, 1998: pp. 459). Clearly, China has intended to use a contingent of ‘small’ 
developing states as a shield. However, Chinese global objectives today transcend simple 
defense. It appears that Beijing intends to use this army of “ants” to gain additional 
leverage at the global level.  
What the literature makes clear is that China is pursuing its own interests. Yet, an 
exhaustive empirical study has yet to be conducted, proving that China either is or is not 
exercising an imperialist agenda in Africa. A major shortcoming of the literature is that it 
                                                          
15
 According to multiple interviews with Nigerian government representatives during this research process 
and corroborated by an address by Mr. Olusegun Obasanjo, President and Commander-in-Chief of the 
Armed Forces of the Federal Republic of Nigeria at the 10th Plenary Meeting of the 54th Session of The 
United Nations General Assembly, Thursday, 23 September 1999 (included in Appendix L). 
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is a collection of points of view, and despite the diversity in arguments concerning 
Chinese motivations in Africa, the claims made by many of the scholars are simply that: 
claims that lack supporting evidence. These arguments, though logical and reasonable, 
have yet to be substantiated through rigorous empirical scholarship. Many of these 
scholars’ assertions stem from journalistic and newspaper accounts of Chinese 
engagement with Africa. Despite the growing collection of literature on Chinese 
engagement in Africa, it is quite clear that there is room for research development. Much 
of the available literature is anecdotal and normative in language, with uncorroborated 
judgment on the positive or negative impact of engagement with China. Many studies 
also approach Chinese engagement in Africa as an isolated activity unaffected by 
international politics or external shocks. In addition, most of the literature on 
China/Africa relations originates from Western-based scholars and journalists, such as 
Alden, Behar, Brautigam, Large et al, Michel & Beuret, Tull, many of whom have 
adopted a zero-sum game mentality on China’s increasing presence and its repercussions 
for Western interests .  
 
II. Chinese aid to Africa 
A growing area of focus in the literature on Chinese engagement in Africa is aid, 
now attracting attention because it differs sharply from Western aid (Brautigam, 2003). 
Western aid with policy prescription seeks to shape African states within a certain 
framework; it affords a form of legitimacy but also constrains and limits states’ behavior. 
In contrast, the Chinese express their interest in empowerment and emancipation of 
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African states (Carmody, 2007). Chinese aid pales in comparison to Western aid in terms 
of dollar amounts; Western aid to Africa is much larger (Brautigam, 2009). A profound 
difference in Chinese versus Western aid is its secrecy; China’s aid is not subject to the 
transparency standards Western aid imposes (Brautigam, 2003). This shrouding of aid 
packages means that very little is truly known--and therefore understood--about the 
nature of Chinese aid to African states. As such, a number of unsubstantiated claims have 
been made. For example, Chinese aid has been characterized as “untied aid” because it is 
not subject to standards of governance and Western human rights principles, while 
Western aid is contingent upon certain conditions (Moyo, 2009).  Additionally, Chinese 
aid is typically supplementary to trade agreements and political maneuverings, again free 
of Western contingencies, including transparency (Brautigam, 2009). This difference is 
likely due to Chinese political preferences. Aid and trade with African states is predicated 
on their recognition of the One China policy, which symbolizes respect for China’s right 
to determine its own domestic policy, and China reciprocates with its policy of non-
interference (Brautigam, 2009).  Brautigam argues, with merit, that Chinese aid is a 
function of Chinese foreign political policy more than economic policy (2011). 
China’s policy of non-interference and absence of policy conditionalities has 
earned it the label of “rogue donor”. However, Brautigam posits that Chinese aid’s 
differences from Western aid does not equate it as rogue (2009). The Chinese do not 
claim to understand policy problems in Africa, nor do they claim to know what is 
necessary for African development; Chinese aid and policies reflect this. On the other 
hand, Western aid policy is notably prescriptive, with policy solutions that have a track 
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record of failure in Africa (Brautigam, 2009). Perhaps the most significant difference 
between Western and Eastern aid in Africa has been the demand-driven versus donor-
driven dynamic. Western aid in Africa has been largely donor-driven (Brautigam, 2009). 
Western countries and policy makers outside of Africa decide to donate aid to African 
states, yet in many ways are out of touch with the circumstances Africans face.  Still, 
Western donors persist in determining aid policy objectives and designate aid 
accordingly. A marked example of this disconnection is in the agricultural sector. The 
Western practice of agricultural dumping under the banner of aid and humanitarian 
principles has not always found a welcome mat (Easterly, 2006). Zambia drew great 
criticism from the global community from an executive decision in 2002 to ban 
genetically modified maize, a decision that kept U.S. food “aid” out of Zambia (BBC, 
2002; Manda, 2003; Henriot, 2010). China, in contrast, has worked with African states to 
dispense aid in ways that African elites see fit, often investing in infrastructure 
development (Shelton & Paruk, 2008; Gadzala & Hanusch, 2010). 
Chinese aid also differs from Western aid in scope. Western aid is often 
associated with grand, large-scale projects across Africa. The Chinese often engage in 
smaller projects: building a single hospital or clinic staffed by Chinese professionals, 
constructing a school or road, providing professionals to consult with African 
counterparts on specific issues (Brautigam, 2009). The argument can be made that these 
smaller-scale, community-specific projects are more likely to result in sustainable 
change. Sautman and Hairong assert that these characteristics of Chinese aid make its 
contributions less susceptible to exploitation and corruption (2007):  
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“Chinese aid is often dispensed in such a way that corrupt rulers cannot 
somehow use it to buy Mercedes Benzes…. [It] is often in the form of 
infrastructure, such as a railroad network in Nigeria or roads in Kenya and 
Rwanda. Or in the form of doctors and nurses to provide health care to 
people who otherwise would not have access. China provides scholarships 
for African students to study in its universities and, increasingly funds to 
encourage its businessmen to invest in Africa” (Ching, 2005; as quoted by 
Sautman and Hairong, 2007: pp. 87). 
 
These arguments have done nothing to assuage concerns of China’s critics who 
note the secretive nature of Chinese aid and the inaccuracy of the “untied” label. 
Moreblessings Chidaushe cautions that, because the general public has no access to these 
aid agreements, the possibility of hidden conditionalities exists in Chinese aid, rather than 
the widely exhorted “no conditionalities” or “untied aid” (2007).  In this Chidaushe is 
correct; it is erroneous to assume that compounding political conditionalities in Western 
aid therefore means that Chinese aid lacks conditionalities. While Chinese aid does veer 
away from political conditionalities, the fact that it is often attached to larger trade and 
economic agreements indicates that it is laden with economic conditionalities 
(Brautigam, 2009).  These economic conditionalities mean that some Chinese aid tends to 
appear more often in the form of debt cancellation and loans as opposed to the Western 
system of grants (King, 2007; Brautigam, 2009). Farzad argues that loans are perhaps 
better suited for African needs (2007). Chinese loans are notably cheaper that Western 
loans and China offers Africans the opportunity for payment-in-kind arrangements, a 
‘working off’ of their debt (BBC News, 2006a; Carmody and Owusu, 2007; Chidaushe, 
2007). Logically, grants and donations can create a situation of dependency that 
undermines the capacity of Africans to develop the systems and programs necessary to 
34 
fend for themselves in the long run. Some of the blame for increased poverty in Africa 
has been cast on development aid and its ineffectiveness (Easterly, 2006; Chidaushe, 
2007). The veiled nature of Chinese aid makes it difficult to assess or predict the full 
impact of aid agreements, but Shelton and Paruk argue that in general, Chinese 
engagement--perhaps due to its differences from Western activities in Africa--plays a 
positive role in Africa’s development (2008). 
A major shortcoming of the literature on Chinese aid in Africa is that only one 
major scholar has achieved specific expertise in this area: Deborah Brautigam. However 
there is emerging scholarship
16
 on the issue of Chinese aid to Africa, especially viewed 
through the framework of the Forum on China-African Cooperation (FOCAC). FOCAC 
has become a platform for increased engagement between China and Africa and its 
conferences a place where Chinese aid commitments are increasingly publicized. An area 
of concern with FOCAC and scholarship thereon is that much of the information on the 
FOCAC conferences and ensuing policies are official statements released by the Chinese 
government. In the case of the FOCAC conferences, the agreements made public often 
appear to be Chinese promises of aid to African states, as well as vocalizations of 
political support in the call for UN reform (King, 2007).  
However, like the details of other major agreements, economic or otherwise, aid 
agreements between China and African states are not fully publicized. The release of 
Chinese aid agreements can be construed as a continued ploy to curry African favor. 
What remains evident is that specific elements of Sino-African economic and political 
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relations, including administration of aid
17
 continues to be inaccessible. The challenge of 
not only defining Chinese engagement, but ascertaining its unique impact, persists.  
Without clear and complete information it is hard to assess the impact of Chinese aid in 
Africa. This deficit is further exacerbated by the fact that Chinese aid is offered in small 
amounts and aid agreements publicized through FOCAC are project based, with a 
continental focus: 50 schools in Africa, as opposed to 1 school per African state (Davies, 
2007). Brautigam warns that, just as “sensationalism and rumors cloud our ability to 
understand China’s growing engagement in Africa” (2011: pp. 1), significant 
misinformation on Chinese aid in Africa lingers, noting that some of this misinformation 
stems from erroneous media reports, some is government-generated and inadequately 
measured and analyzed. What remains indisputable is that Chinese influence in Africa is 
growing. This condition then introduces the question: why are African states increasingly 
engaging with China? 
III: Scholarship on African Engagement with China: Why the draw for African 
states? 
Chris Alden and Deborah Brautigam contend that Africans play a central role in 
increasing Chinese engagement on the continent (2007; 2009). As such, the motivations 
of African actors in Chinese engagement matter, not only because these motivations drive 
the process, but because they determine the nature of the relationship between China and 
African states. Rocha puts it well when he asks, “What is the driving force behind 
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Africa’s sudden economic interest in China? Is it part of a well-calculated approach to 
unlock the continent’s true economic potential or is it merely a meek response to an 
unfolding development?” (Rocha in Manji and Marks, 2007: pp.31). Though posed by 
several scholars, these questions have yet to be adequately addressed by empirical 
research. It is unclear whether or not a ‘win-win’ relationship18 is at play between China 
and Africa, as China’s president, Hu Jintao claims (FOCAC, 2006b). Alden, Shelton and 
Paruk, among others, assert that Africa’s governmental leadership needs to exploit the 
opportunities afforded by China and the West (Alden, 2007; Ajakaiye & Kaplinsky, 
2008). To do so, government actors must have human and financial capital, as well as 
adequate project management and policy implementation protocols to apply the proffered 
resources to benefit citizens (Ajakaiye & Kaplinsky, 2008). In discussing China’s 
relationship with Zimbabwe, Karumbidza asserts, “On the whole, it would not be fair to 
blame the Chinese for acting to further their interests. It is incumbent upon the 
government of Zimbabwe and its people (and any other African country for that matter) 
to put in place a programme and strategy for chanelling [sic] funds and direct investment 
in a way that contributes to the growth of its own economy” (Karumbidza, 2007: pp. 87-
88). However, published works to date have failed to sufficiently address the motivations 
of African states and measure either their intent or capacity to maximize on this win-win 
opportunity. 
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Some research exists on the benefits of engagement with China to Africa.  Rocha 
observes that increasing economic engagement with China has raised market prices of 
certain African commodities, which in turn has led to additional revenue and economic 
growth for African states (Rocha, 2007). Furthermore, Chinese investment in African 
infrastructure development is increasingly noticeable across the continent (Michel & 
Beuret, 2009). Private Chinese firms are winning bids to develop public works, build 
roads and dams, and renovate airports and railways. In Sudan, a Chinese-built 
hydroelectric dam is expected to double the country’s electricity output, which in turn 
should have a positive impact on oil exportation (Crilly, 2005). As a part of an agreement 
for sole rights to Gabonese iron ore reserves, the Chinese government committed to 
building a new railway from the mines to the seaport, and also pledged to build a new 
hydroelectric dam to provide power to the mines (TerraDaily, 2006). In deals signed with 
Nigeria in the early part of the 2000s, the Chinese government agreed to develop the 
country’s oil refineries and power plants and to renovate the railway system (African Oil 
Policy Initiative Group, 2001; Lyman, 2005). Further south in Angola, the Chinese have 
done the same: renovated and developed the roads and railway systems and installed a 
fiber optic network (Mark, 2006). Many of these infrastructure development projects are 
part and parcel of larger Chinese trade agreements with African states. Some of these 
initiatives are the direct result of FOCAC ministerial conferences while others are the 
culmination of the Chinese government’s efforts to encourage Chinese enterprise to 
embrace the African market. Chinese investments in infrastructure are to the benefit of 
African states and the African people. 
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Beyond the short literature on the advantage to Africa of engaging with China, 
there is a growing argument on Africa’s attraction to China as the source of a different 
model for development. This section of literature is perhaps the best attempt at deducing 
African motivations. Stephen Marks makes the argument that China exemplifies and 
instructs on an alternative for African development (Marks, 2007). Seemingly 
independent of Western methods, the Chinese have expanded their economy and raised 
standards of living for the general population (Guerrero, 2006; Marks, 2007). This non-
Western route has been termed the “Beijing Consensus,” or, the anti-thesis of the 
Washington Consensus
19
. China ignored the principles of the Washington Consensus to 
stabilize, privatize and liberalize; as other developing states displayed economic demise, 
the Chinese economy rather shockingly expanded at an exponential rate (Sautmann & 
Hairong, 2007).  
According to Thompson, the so-called Beijing Consensus as China’s way to 
recent economic success is under consideration by African elites and policy-makers as a 
potential path to African development and economic growth (2005). There is no doubt 
that the Beijing Consensus has--on paper--improved the living conditions, economic, and 
social welfare of the Chinese people, in pure statistics. As of 2006, China was the “fourth 
largest economy in the world… [and] market reforms and China’s opening to the global 
economy gave millions of people there an increased standard of living” (Guerrero, 2006). 
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 The Washington Consensus was the name given to an economic policy package designed to promote 
economic development and democracy in developing countries. The Washington Consensus contended 
that economic growth could and would be achieved when government intervention in economies and 
market systems was minimalized. Through privatization, liberalized trade and macro-economic stability 
(essentially “free markets”) economic growth was theorized as achievable. Washington Consensus was 
ultimately considered a failure by scholars and policymakers (Stiglitz, 1998; Gore, 2000; Mkandawire, 
2005; Adesina, 2006; Adesina, Graham & Olokushi, 2006; Rodrik, 2006; Easterly, 2009). 
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Weisbrot observes that over the last three decades, the Chinese economy has been the 
fastest growing in the world, especially during a period when other economies were in 
substantial decline (2011).  Even after the global economic crisis of 2008, the Chinese 
economy has continued to post remarkable growth rates and is now ranked second in the 
world
20
, lending credibility to the potential of China to teach Africa a thing or two about 
development (Weisbrot, 2011). This Chinese model decries the importance of 
privatization and instead touts sophisticated but low-cost technology appropriate for 
African countries, focusing on alleviation of poverty as well as development of micro, 
small and medium-sized enterprises (Liang, 2005). 
According to Rocha, it is quite likely that neither the Beijing Consensus Model 
nor the Washington Consensus Model is the way forward for Africa. The uniqueness of 
the circumstances that face individual African states makes it hard to believe that a single 
policy package could adequately address such a range of problems. Rocha asserts, 
“There is also a growing realisation that traditional relations and 
partnerships with the West have not helped Africa overcome the 
structural obstacles to eradicating poverty and reversing its economic 
marginalisation. Rather than develop, Africa is haemorrhaging while 
the rest of the world accumulates wealth at its expense through the 
unbalanced exploitation of its natural resources and the enforcement of 
a distorted international economic system. Logically, strengthened 
cooperation with China is seen as a way of addressing some of these 
structural imbalances” (John Rocha in Manji & Marks, 2007: pp. 17) 
 
Perhaps Rocha has in this statement noted the most pressing issue: that the 
prevalence of China in Africa, has afforded African states new leverage in relations with 
the West. Not only does China provide a new market for African goods, driving up the 
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 April 2011 projections by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), has the Chinese economy surpassing 
that of the USA to be the world’s largest economy by 2016.  
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prices of commodities, Chinese goods are also competing with Western goods, with 
Chinese goods reputably more affordable (Taylor, 2008). In addition, increasing Chinese 
influence can be accurately seen as a threat to Western influence (Manji & Marks, 2007; 
Rotberg, 2008; Alden et al, 2008). The Chinese have made it obvious to the African elites 
that progress, whether economic growth, increased political influence or even sovereignty 
and autocracy can be achieved independently of Western protocols and policy 
recommendations (French, 2004). Based on this logic, there is no doubt that the growing 
influence of the Beijing Consensus could become worrisome for longstanding Western 
interests on the African continent (Campbell, 2007).  
Still, the literature does very little to specifically address African motivations. 
Even though Brautigam, Rocha and Alden make valid arguments on the perceived 
benefits to African states, like much of the rest of the literature on Chinese engagement in 
Africa there is a dearth in empirical data supporting the arguments of the scholars and 
pundits. So while there are observable benefits to African states, there is no evidence to 
demonstrate that these benefits are the drivers for growing African engagement with 
China. A growing body of literature from the African Economic Research Consortium 
(AERC) out of Nairobi, Kenya examines the economic impact of Chinese engagement in 
Africa, specifically the impact of trade, investment and aid. These studies present 
empirical data that display the potential of benefit to African states, but while they call 
for better management on the African side of engagement with China, they again do not 
speak specifically to African motivations (Ajakaiye, 2006; Ademola, Bankole & 
Adewuyi, 2009.). A glaring hole in the literature on African motivations to engage with 
China remains. If, as notable African scholars including Alden, Brautigam, Ajakaiye and 
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Kaplinsky allege, African motivations factor prominently in this new iteration of 
international relations, and this relationship has potential global consequences, there is a 
pressing need for research that addresses Africa’s motivations. 
 
Conclusion 
  In sum, most existing literature fails to adequately address why Africans choose 
to engage with China. A growing body of work by the African Economic Research 
Consortium (AERC) is beginning to address the African perspective on China-African 
relations
21
 (Ajakaiye & Kaplinsky, 2009). Ajakaiye and Kaplinsky note that these 
economic analyses, including scoping studies and detailed case studies, have fallen short 
of revealing agency on the part of Africans (2009). Other research focuses on the Chinese 
perspective, speaking to China’s possible motivations and policies in Africa (See Tull, 
2006; Alden, 2007; Broadman, 2007; Large et al, 2008; Behar, 2008; Rotberg, 2008; 
Brautigam, 2009; Michel & Beuret, 2009). The running assumption among scholars and 
analysts seems to be that the Chinese are in Africa because they can be and want to be. 
These observations seem to allege that China’s involvement in Africa is a modern 
iteration of dependency, in which China’s economic growth and development as a result 
of engagement with Africa will have a retarding effect on Africa’s own growth and 
development. Accordingly, most published literature appears to base assessments of 
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 There are a number of articles and studies published by AERC. AERC was established in 1988 and its 
publications on Chinese engagement in Africa have been published over the last few years, ranging from 
country-specific economic analyses to regional, industry and development analyses. These studies assess 
the scale and impact of increasing engagement with China. 
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Chinese engagement on the assertion that Africans have no choice and instead are pawns 
of China’s foreign policy; Tull is perhaps the best example of this view (2006; 2008). 
From early accounts of Chinese engagement in Africa during the Middle Ages, 
most existing literature has concerned itself primarily with the Chinese perspective of this 
relationship. However, noted scholars have reiterated the importance of African agency 
in the current permutation of Chinese engagement in Africa. Observations that the 
Chinese have had to curry African favor to promote their businesslike, non-interfering 
style of engagement indicate that the specific motivations of African actors matter. This 
view appears to directly contradict the arguments of other scholars and pundits who 
suggest that Africa is an unwitting pawn in Chinese foreign policy, with no influence or 
say in the relationship. Regardless of how well developed or logical any of these 
arguments may be, they remain unsubstantiated by rigorous empirical research. This 
researcher contends that to fully understand Chinese-African relations, the African aspect 
of the relationship must also be studied in greater detail. An exploration of Africa’s China 
policy, especially in the case of non-authoritarian African states, is missing. China is 
engaging with Zimbabwe and Sudan, and also with many other African states, including 
Nigeria, a regional economic giant. The question remains: what benefits await African 
states that engage with China?  
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Chapter 3: Dependency Theory in Africa 
 
This chapter explains dependency theory and comments on its many forms. The 
discussion examines the applicability of dependency theory in explaining 
underdevelopment in poor countries. The chapter also addresses whether dependency 
theory can define the nature of Chinese relations with Africa and Nigeria, observes 
China’s reliance on soft power to win over African states, and asks whether dependency 
theory relates to China’s need to develop an international economic regime. Following 
the discussion of dependency theory, an alternative theoretical framework through which 
to understand and evaluate China-Africa and China-Nigeria relations is presented, with 
the assertion that China-Africa and China-Nigeria relations fall short of defined 
requirements for dependency and instead display an identifiable form of realist national 
self-interest.  
Current literature on recent Chinese political and economic interaction with 
African states (either on individual or aggregate levels) has yet to adequately describe, let 
alone analyze, the inscrutable nature of relations between China and Africa. As the 
previous chapter described, most of the literature focuses on two disparate views: the 
anti-China in Africa delegation and the view that supports new opportunities/partnerships 
for Africa and China. The anti-China scholarship, with its own proponents
22
, notably 
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 The first voice of caution and warning of a negative outcome of Chinese influence on the African 
continent is probably Emmanuel John Hevi, who studied medicine in China for 18 months from 1960-
1962, under a scholarship provided by the early communist Chinese government. Disillusioned by his 
experience, Hevi cautioned African elites to think for themselves and reason through circumstances to 
make decisions with Africa’s best interests at heart; he encouraged Africans to learn from the foreigners 
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Kagan, Tull, and Behar, has exercised less restraint by broadcasting perceived impacts of 
increasing Chinese engagement in Africa and posing possible reasons for increased 
African collaboration (2006; 2006; 2008). The new opportunities perspective is best 
represented by the works of Alden and Brautigam, who offer rather conservative 
discussions of the potential impacts of Chinese engagement (2007; 2009). Most of the 
literature along this vein reports on Chinese activity in Africa—both positive and 
negative--and reiterates new opportunities afforded African state actors concerned with 
development and economic growth. But despite a somewhat positive outlook, 
dependency theory fails to critically and empirically assess the impact of China’s 
activities in Africa. 
In many ways, the analysis of China’s impact in Africa reads like the literature 
on underdevelopment. The logic is laden with neo-imperialist concepts borrowed from 
dependency theory: the idea of a passive Africa, inconsequential except for its usefulness 
as an economic pawn for China’s sole benefit. These assertions, however, are not clearly 
or always attributed to dependency theory.  
Dependency Theory 
Dependency theory is an economics system theory that seeks to explain 
why rich countries become richer while poor countries become poorer. Dos 
Santos defined dependency as:  
                                                                                                                                                                             
but to accept offers only after critical consideration. (Hevi, 1966). It is important to note that most of 
Hevi’s disdain for the Chinese 1960 African policy was aimed specifically at China’s radical push for an 
African revolution (Ya-chun, 1981; US Congressman Lawrence P. McDonald in Pearson, 1977) 
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“...an historical condition which shapes a certain structure of the world 
economy such that it favors some countries to the detriment of others and 
limits the development possibilities of the subordinate economics...a 
situation in which the economy of a certain group of countries is 
conditioned by the development and expansion of another economy, to 
which their own is subjected” (Dos Santos, 1971: pp. 226)23. 
 
Dependency theory also suggests that, despite increased trade with poorer 
countries, the international system is controlled by dominant (richer) states 
seeking to maximize their benefits at the expense of poorer states (Smith, 1979).  
Ultimately the poorer states are rendered powerless and subjected to economic 
policies that will always favor the interests of richer, dominant states.  
Dependency theory, then, provides the framework for understanding why 
developing countries stay poor while the industrialized developed countries 
become wealthier. Dependency theorists made the argument that dominant 
developed countries had established a world economic system that they controlled 
and it was the machinations of this system that allowed wealthy countries to 
prosper and poor countries to suffer (Smith, 1979). 
Initially, dependency theory emerged as a critique of neoclassical economic 
theory that assumes economic growth results in net benefits to all, though benefits are not 
always equal (Ferraro, 1996). In other words, neoclassical economists expected that trade 
would automatically have a positive effect on all participants. However, dependency 
theorists showed that although developed nations recorded economic growth, developing 
countries did not grow at similar rates (Prebisch, 1950; Ferraro, 1996). 
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The primary and most oft-cited study establishing dependency theory is Raul 
Prebisch’s examination of Latin America. In attempting to extrapolate the rationale 
behind the poor economic performance of Latin American countries, Prebisch, then 
executive secretary of the UN Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA), 
divided states into two sections of the world economy: states with established 
industrialized centers and less industrialized peripheral countries, the purveyors of raw 
materials and primary products. Prebisch argues that the industrial capabilities and 
technological advancements of the center states such as the United States and Western 
European countries provided a distinct advantage in the ability to amass greater 
proportions of net benefit of trade with peripheral states like Latin American nations 
(Prebisch, 1950). Thus, increased trade on the part of peripheral states was unlikely to 
result in growth in their local economies. In fact, according to this logic, “an increase in 
the traditional exports of a typical Latin American country might well produce no 
increase in national income” (Booth, 1975: pp. 55).  
This explanation was without a doubt an alarming but plausible reason for the 
absence of economic growth in Latin American and by extension all developing countries 
including African countries that fit the same criteria. To even the playing field, 
protectionist policies were urged by dependency theorists to cushion domestic industry 
from damaging competition (Smith, 1979). Scholars argued that these policies only 
served to further exacerbate the inequitable situation, increasing peripheral countries’ 
dependency on outside capital and external actors (Booth, 1975; Bernstein, 1979). The 
ECLA’s idea of center-periphery relations and a structuralist approach to 
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underdevelopment served as the foundation for the emergence of various dependency and 
underdevelopment theories (Snyder, 1980). 
The straightforward logic of dependency theory asserts that developing countries 
sell raw materials to developed countries who use those materials to create manufactured 
“value-added” products which are then sold back to the developing countries at a higher 
price (Ferraro, 1996). Finished goods cost more than raw materials; thus developing 
countries cannot accrue enough income from their exports to pay for their imports, 
resulting in debt and decrease of economic growth (Ferraro, 1996).  This imbalance 
creates a state of dependency for developing countries where “dependency can be defined 
as an explanation of the economic development of a state in terms of the external 
influences--political, economic, and cultural--on national development policies” (Sunkel, 
1969: pp. 23). 
The economic North’s control of the world economy created a state of neo-
colonialism for the southern states. Neo-colonialism refers to the Western domination of 
the world market and economic policies affecting non-Western states that have allowed 
unequal economic growth benefiting Western industrialized capitalists, at a significant 
cost to the non-industrialized world (Bosch, 1997). The North’s control of the global 
economic system was such that, even when industrialization emerged in developing states 
that manufactured finished goods, they remained under the influence of multi-national 
corporations in the developed North (Cardoso, 1972; Cardoso, 1973). The 
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dependentistas
24
 central argument asserts that underdevelopment is a function of 
imperialism, which “changes in form but not in fact” (Smith, 1979: pp. 250)25.  
Dependency theory emerged in the 1950s as a way of understanding relations 
between countries, in particular relations between more developed and less-developed 
countries (Ferraro, 1996). However, beyond this core argument, multiple versions of 
dependency theory have risen out of the intellectual and political tradition of Marxism, 
especially during the 1970s. Not all permutations can be characterized as Marxist 
(Snyder, 1980), primarily because dependency theory attempts to explain and understand 
variations in the economic performance of countries in capitalist systems within a 
capitalist world society. Despite booming success for developed countries during the 
same period, a group of disadvantaged countries—African states serve as obvious 
examples--saw little or negative economic growth: the rich got richer and the poor got 
poorer in a system that advertised success for all.  
Snyder (1980) argues that most of the underdevelopment and dependency 
theorists did not subscribe to an empirical approach to social science. Instead they 
followed the logic of Marxian political economy, employing the notion of successive 
approximations, which “consists in moving from the more abstract to the more concrete 
in a step-by-step fashion, removing simplifying assumptions at successive stages of the 
investigation so that they may take account of and explain an ever wide range of 
phenomena” (Sweezy, 1968: pp. 11). Consequently, the importance of context rather than 
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 See also Theotonio Dos Santos’ “The Structure of Dependence.” 
49 
statistical rigor is particularly heightened because it allows for a more comprehensive 
understanding of the phenomena under study. For dependency and underdevelopment 
theorists, the significance of context is evident in the value and emphasis placed on 
history and socio-economic elements that define social reality, asserting that historical 
context determines varied interpretations of reality (Thomas, 1974). Thus, when applying 
dependency theory it is important to employ a holistic approach, reinforcing the stance 
that a better understanding at the macro level allows for a better understanding at the 
micro level (Frank, 1969; 1975).  
Dependency theorists have attempted to answer the question, “dependency for 
whom?” understanding that pursuing dependency theory’s logic may result in very real 
political conclusions—i.e., the lessons and conclusions of dependency theorists 
influenced the policy process, and did not always have a positive outcome (Smith, 1979; 
Ferraro, 1996). In addition, dependency theory is by nature normative; the key terms of 
development and underdevelopment are largely subjective. Quite naturally, a moral 
rhetoric has become a part of dependency theory because it seeks to discern 
circumstances leading to underdevelopment in order to improve the status quo (Snyder, 
1980; Bosch, 1997).  “Dependency theories articulate the interests of particular groups or 
classes and simultaneously embody preconceptions, raise questions and propose 
explanations” (Snyder, 1980: pp.744). The normative and subjective nature of 
dependency theory has led to multiple permutations of dependency concepts. 
Despite a body of published work categorized as dependency theory and the 
consistency of language addressing unequal development and economic growth, 
dependency theory essentially lacks theoretical coherence and has resulted in notable 
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political inefficacy (Snyder, 1980). “There is no such thing as a single unified body of 
thought called dependency theory,” Harding states. (Harding, 1976: p.3). Chilcote puts it 
more bluntly, “no unified theory of dependency yet exists” (1978: pp.55; see also Fagen, 
1977).  Chilcote argues that dependency theory was at its best a heuristic model, not a 
formal theory of modernization (1978).  Since a heuristic model is largely an explanatory 
tool which describes use and action, dependency theory has been applied to explain the 
discrepancies in economic growth between nations; to this end dependency theory has 
shown itself a heuristic. But a theory attempts to do more than a heuristic, not only by 
explaining a current state of affairs but by predicting and analyzing the conditions leading 
to one action or another. Following this logic, dependency theory can hardly be 
characterized as a theory. Not only is there no comprehensive dependency theory, Smith 
argues that the concepts readily claimed by dependency theory lack explicit and concrete 
definitions and their interpretation differs from one scholar to the next (1981). Even 
among dependency theory scholars, discord persists concerning its purpose. Regardless 
of increased attention from academia, dependency theory has remained “ambiguous” and 
“fragmentary” (Snyder, 1980). As such, dependency theory is perhaps at its best an 
approach or even a framework and, despite its name, not a theory (Duvall, 1978; Snyder; 
1980). 
This research is not intended to discredit dependency theory. The dearth of recent 
publications in this review of dependency theory serves to illustrate the fact that 
dependency theory as a means of understanding international political economy, world 
systems and the effects of the relationships between industrialized and less-industrialized 
countries has fallen into disrepute. Further examination reveals that dependency theory 
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inaccurately overemphasizes the impact of economic processes
26
 and does not account 
for other influences in assessing development. Thus, it fails to note that chronic 
underdevelopment is not simply a function of unequal exchange and external decision-
making but a direct consequence of the political decision-making patterns of local elites 
(Smith, 1979; Smith, 1981). According to Gabriel Almond “One cannot escape the 
conclusion that the dependency movement …may have been intellectually 
counterproductive” (1990: pp. 253). James Caporaso disagrees, asserting that 
“Dependency theory died out more from neglect than frontal criticism” (1993: 470). 
Regardless, dependency theory as a means of interpreting international relations or 
explaining economic relationships has lost traction in academia, and has for the most part 
been abandoned.  
While dependency theory has been phased out of scholarship on 
international/political economy, its influence remains. The argument can be made that the 
most important contributions of dependency theory are its normative stance on global 
economic influence on politics and the constant call to action. These influences are clear 
in the literature on Chinese engagement in Africa. It is quite easy to see how the expected 
impact of Chinese engagement in Africa can be framed using the language and logic of 
dependency theory. Moeletsi Mbeki, deputy chairman of the South African Institute of 
International Affairs, referring to trade relations between China and South Africa, states, 
"We sell them raw materials and they sell us manufactured goods with a predictable 
                                                          
26
 “[Dependency Theory] holds that economic processes are the basic structural force of history, and that 
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trade, later in its financial and today in its multinational guises) that has been history’s locomotive” 
(Smith, 1981: pp. 756). 
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result--an unfavorable trade balance against South Africa" (as quoted in Mooney, 2005). 
This resonates with Cox and Jacobson, who assert that, in a state of dependence, 
“Economic growth is skewed so as to induce and perpetuate balance of 
payments deficits, to distribute income and wealth in a highly unequal 
manner, and to increase marginality in society. The relationship of 
dependency is created and maintained by a coalition of individuals in 
both the dominant and subordinate states who benefit from it and who 
act to insure that their states pursue appropriate policies. The overall 
system, however, provides greater benefits for the dominant states than 
for those in subordinate positions (1974: pp.1)” 
 
If, as implied by Mr. Mbeki and supported by Cox and Jacobson, dependency exists in 
Sino-African relations, then we can expect the following: 
1. Increased economic engagement with China should result in little, no or reverse 
economic growth for African states. Cox and Jacobson argue that in a dependent 
system dominant states benefit most (1974) because they control the world 
economic system (Smith, 1979). It is important to note that Cox and Jacobson fail 
to clarify the nature of this benefit, whether it is economic or political. 
2. China is the main and arguably the only driver in Sino-African relations. 
Dependency theory is inherently a systems theory. A major critique leveled 
against dependentistas, is their inability to account for the actions of the parts 
(individual actors) in their drive to explain the whole. The actions and motivations 
(agency) of Africans are not a significant influencing factor in this relationship. 
However, existing evidence cannot evaluate whether these expectations are borne out. To 
begin with, characterizing Sino-African relations as dependent seems inaccurate. A 
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significant element of the explanatory power of dependency theory is built on the basis of 
a shared history (Dos Santos, 1971). Historical context is a necessary standpoint to 
determine if dependent relationships are imposed upon peripheral, resource-rich states. 
Dos Santos argues that conditions of dependency are not immediately impressed upon 
peripheral states but are instead developed over long periods of time (1971). While they 
have persisted through centuries, Sino-African relations have largely consisted of 
diplomatic interactions devoid of the political and economic characteristics that 
dependency theorists argue influence the emergence of dependent conditions. Sino-
African relations have only recently begun to develop significant political and economic 
traits that may over time culminate in conditions resembling dependency. The last 15 
years have marked this new relationship with the FOCAC conferences commencing in 
2000, which have catalyzed increasing relations.  China and Africa’s shared history is 
really only now being written. In light of this more visible relationship, it is problematic 
to contend that present relations show Africa’s dependency even though the possibility 
exists that a dependent relationship may develop over time.  
However, quoting Samir Amin, who states “the starting point, as always, is 
imperialism,” Peter Evans suggests, “imperialism remains the frame for the analysis of 
dependent development” (Evans, 1979: pp. 16; Evans, 1979, pp. 50). As with the general 
claim of dependency, as yet no empirical research or evidence has adequately depicted 
the recent Chinese foray into Africa as imperialistic or colonialist. Even though some 
insist that China is pursuing a neo-colonialist agenda in Africa, these claims have not 
been rigorously examined. Furthermore, what is known of Chinese engagement in Africa 
does not fit Kwame Nkrumah’s definition of neocolonialism, where “the state which is 
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subject to it [neocolonialism] is, in theory, independent and has all the outward trappings 
of international sovereignty. In reality its economic system and thus its political policy is 
directed from outside” (1966: pp. ix). Without a historical foundation rooted in 
imperialism, as asserted by proponents of dependency theory, it appears that the present 
permutation of Sino-African relationship is not a dependent one 
In addition, characteristics of dependency theory are typically defined as 
vulnerability to external forces, lack of autonomy, trade imbalance (Smith, 1979). 
Chinese trade with Africa is at the aggregate level fairly balanced; at the individual level, 
some of the dyadic relations are imbalanced in favor of China and others are imbalanced 
in favor of the African country, e.g. Angola or Sudan. Chinese policy in Africa has been 
labeled “economic diplomacy” (Alves in Alden et al, 2008), and Moyo points out that 
Chinese policy in Africa adopts a decidedly business-like tone (2009), without political 
interference
27
, which allows for the pursuit of arrangements that, if properly executed, 
have the potential for positive results. African states do have autonomy in their 
engagement with China; they are active participants that choose this relationship. While 
the literature has not fully addressed the motivations of African elites and the African role 
in increasing engagement with China, there is little question that African approval and 
agency is necessary for this relationship (Alden, 2007; Brautigam, 2009). It can also be 
argued that engagement with China has reduced African vulnerability to external forces 
as the Chinese option has afforded African elites new leverage in their dealings with 
other states and external actors. In addition, the Chinese have shared technology with 
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55 
African states and are increasingly recognized for their efforts in the development of 
infrastructure (Mutukwa, 1977; Alden, 2007). Theoretically speaking, these activities 
could result in economic growth, increased standards of living, and poverty amelioration, 
which run counter to expected indicators of underdevelopment or dependency (Calderon 
and Serven, 2004). It does not appear that Chinese-African relations can be appropriately 
characterized by dependency theory.  
Today, international politics faces new conditions, and the changing global puzzle 
requires new theories, ideas and frameworks to provide adequate understanding of 
international relations and political economics. While Africa’s history with the West fit 
quite well with the story and explanation presented by dependency theory, this logic can 
no longer be automatically superimposed on Africa’s relations with China. Chinese 
forays into Africa have introduced and shared new capital and technology that has diluted 
and diminished Western control of those resources. According to Evans, this control of 
capital and technology plays a significant role in the development of dependency 
relationships (1979). If China is not developing a dependent relationship with African 
elites, it is logical to infer that China is developing a new international economic 
relationship to address the changes in the global political economy.  
State-centric Realism 
Dependency theory was developed around and during the period of the Cold War; 
the influences of realism and idealism are apparent in the literature. Realism refers to the 
individual’s quest for self-interest. Gilpin notes that following the end of the Cold War 
there has been a shift from Marxist economic doctrines like dependency theory and an 
increasing adoption of liberalism (2001).  The influence of neo-liberalism in the 
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structural adjustment policies of the Washington Consensus is evident. Neo-liberalism 
argues that economies grow best when the market is free of limiting state interventionist 
policies (Gilpin, 2001). However, the reduction of the state in the market, and the 
promotion of free market economies in the manner proposed by the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund, have failed to attain sustainable economic growth for 
African states. Tukumbi Lumumba-Kasongo also contends that “after the end of the Cold 
War, it has become intellectually and philosophically more difficult, using the dominant 
paradigms in international relations, namely realism and idealism, to predict the behavior 
of actors and structures of actions in international relations” (1999: pp. 1). Gilpin presents 
a different perspective for analyzing international political economy, state-centric 
realism. State-centric realism identifies the state as the principal actor in international 
affairs motivated by national interests, and not a system of states influenced by the 
distribution of power as Waltz's neo-realism argued (Waltz, 1979; Gilpin, 2001). Gilpin 
therefore suggests "the interests and policies of states are determined by the governing 
political elite, the pressures of powerful groups within a national society, and the nature 
of the 'national system of political economy'" (2001: pp. 18). In part, Gilpin's idea of 
state-centric realism marries the constructivist perspective and the realist perspective, 
acknowledging that social constructs, ideas, and human volition--like nationalism--allow 
for agency, and play an important role in state behavior and international affairs (Gilpin, 
2001). The analytic perspective of state-centric realism accounts for African agency in 
Chinese engagement in Africa; it supports the arguments made by key African scholars 
that the motivations of African state actors matter. 
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This study asserts that, just as dependency theory inadequately describes 
underdevelopment in Africa and the role of the West therein, it is even more unsuitable 
for explaining current Sino-African relations. It argues instead that growing Sino-African 
relations can be viewed as African states’ self-interests, exercised in the pursuit of 
political and economic objectives as much as China’s interests, a realist pursuit of 
national interest. This research is most concerned with African agency and asserts that 
Africans are increasingly engaging with China not because of a systems theory of 
dependency that paints Africans as “powerless” pawns.  Ajakaiye and Kaplinsky warn, 
“A reincarnation of dependency theory, in which Africa was seen as a quivering 
victim of external forces, must be abandoned, both in order to understand better 
what is happening and why it is happening, and in helping Africa to make the best 
of the opportunities opened up by the rapid emergence of the Asian Driver 
economies and the consequent restructuring of the global order in the twenty-first 
Century” (2009; pp. 482). 
The argument this author promotes is that the phenomena at hand more closely resemble 
Gilpin’s state-centric realism. In other words, African states are trading with China in a 
way that resembles inter-state relations. 
As demonstrated in earlier chapters, scholars of African politics are adamant that 
Africans are significant actors in their engagement with China but they stop short of 
discussing the precise role of African states and the drivers behind growing engagement 
with China. This project argues that, contrary to dependency theory that assumes African 
states are passive players, African states choose to engage and in particular to trade with 
China for the same reasons that all states trade with each other: because as liberal 
economic theory and a state-centric realist perspective support, international trade is in 
their national interest.  Stephen Krasner argues that the four basic state interests are 
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economic growth, aggregate national income, political power and social stability (1976). 
Growing African engagement with China can be argued as a means to attain all four of 
these objectives.  That is, African states chose to engage with China because it is a path 
to increasing economic growth, accruing aggregate national income, improving social 
stability and leveraging political power in the global arena.  
African states are increasingly engaging with China because they believe it is in 
their national interest and will result in increased aggregate national income and 
economic growth. Trade has perhaps been the most noticeable demonstration of Africans’ 
increasing engagement with China. This research argues that the presence of China as a 
new market for African exports, even more significant because China buys African 
products at market prices, has the potential to add to aggregate national income. 
Consequently, an increase in national income is positive economic growth. This is 
because China is a new trade partner for African states, in addition to and not in lieu of 
prior trading partners. Thus, trade with China provides marginal income, an additional 
revenue source for African economies. African states can earn more because they can sell 
more. As a result they will accrue more income and this will in turn lead to economic 
growth, thereby meeting two of Krasner’s basic state interests. In addition, Chinese 
foreign direct investments in African economies have provided important capital that has 
the potential to contribute to sustainable economic growth.  
This study contends that the ability of the Chinese to fill some of the needs of 
African society is an important motivating factor for Africa’s increasing engagement with 
China. Chinese manufactured products are cheap and affordable; thus, trade with China 
has made luxury goods more accessible and increased the spending power of the average 
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African
28
. Combined with Chinese investments in infrastructure development, this higher 
spending power has the potential to make significant improvements to living standards 
and the amelioration of poverty and under-development in Africa. The previous chapter 
highlighted the proclivity of Chinese aid towards the construction or rehabilitation of 
public service works, large scale projects like the construction of roads, hydro-electric 
power stations, telecommunication systems and lesser projects like schools, hospitals and 
skills training, all necessary for economic growth and the reduction of poverty (Calderon 
& Serven, 2004). The argument can be made that improvement in living standards can in 
turn lead to a happier and less volatile society.  A more satisfied society, therefore, can be 
expected to be a more stable one.  
In addition to trade and aid, the previous chapters also noted increasing political 
collaboration between African states and China. With the end of the Cold War and 
current U.S. involvement in two expensive wars, China’s influence is growing as the 
Chinese economy flourishes; Lumumba-Kasongo claims that as China’s influence 
increases so does uncertainty at the global level. Theories applied to international 
relations fall short of addressing current events in general, and in particular, Africa’s 
demand for global change (1999).  
With increasing globalization, the nature of state interaction is shifting, influenced 
by advances in communications and information technology that has the power to change 
the face of international relations.  Gilpin asserts that there are three types of change: 
systems change, systemic change and interaction change (1981). The argument that this 
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 Based on interviews with Nigerian respondents and observations of the researcher. 
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study advances is that Africans are engaging China to effect change, in particular 
interaction change. African engagement with China has been noted as markedly different 
from typical African foreign relations, in particular with Western states; it is a 
relationship with a distinctly business-like tone, laden with negotiation aimed at the 
realization of mutual objectives and mutual benefit. The Chinese government has 
implemented incentives that encourage Chinese businesses to engage in Africa
29
.
30
 
Through the machinations of international organizations, Chinese support and 
South-South solidarity can also draw attention to issues that concern Africans.  The 
Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) is an international organization with a 
framework that has allowed consideration of African concerns. Additionally, with its 
policy of non-interference and adherence to the recognition and respect for state 
sovereignty, China allows African states to play a role in their own policy process. This 
was demonstrated in the address then-President of Egpyt Hosni Mubarak made at the 
fourth FOCAC Ministerial Conference,  November 8, 2009 that presented African ideals 
and principles in increasing  Africa-China engagement (FOCAC, 2009d)
31
.  
This study argues that the nature of engagement between African states and the 
Chinese, through strategic partnerships and negotiated agreements, creates an 
environment that compels Africa states to become determinants and decision-makers in 
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 Informal interview with a Chinese diplomat in the Commerce sector of the Chinese consulate, July 15, 
2011, Abuja. 
30
 In addition, a major part of FOCAC conferences (held every 3 years) is trade meetings and agreements 
between Chinese and African entities. 
31
 President Mubarak’s Ten Principles of Africa-China Cooperation is included in Appendix G. 
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their own development process.  By playing an active role in its own policy and 
development process, a greater possibility exists for Africa to realize sustainable change 
and growth, especially when the outside policies of international financial institutions 
such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank have blatantly failed to 
improve African economies (Weiss et al., 2009; Armstrong et al, 2007; Barnett and 
Finnemore, 2004). Engagement with China positions Africans as important players that 
form a prominent part of the solution and policy process. This new role indicates a 
significant shift in African international relations, and one that fits Gilpin’s concept of 
interaction change. This shift has the potential to culminate in global change, an overall 
shift in the way African states interact with all other states, a transformation that, 
Lumumba-Kasongo posits, Africans demand (1999). This study therefore asserts that 
African states are engaging with China because they believe a different method of 
interaction, one with increased African particiaption will lead to an increase in political 
power, with the capability to change the way African states interact with others. 
There is sufficient reason to believe that state-centric realist African states are 
choosing to engage with China because it allows them to realize their interests in 
increased aggregate national income, greater economic development, improved social 
stability and expansion of political power, internally and on the world stage. To test the 
argument that Africans are choosing to engage with China because it is in their national 
interest, a case study of Nigeria was conducted.  The following are the hypothesis to be 
tested in this study: 
 Nigerians are increasingly engaging with China because they believe it 
will result in a net benefit for themselves and for their country. 
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This hypothesis first examines Gilpin’s argument for state-centric realism by 
investigating the notion that Nigerians who engage with China are motivated by national, 
cultural or societal ideals. It aims to determine if Nigerian governmental actors identify 
national interest (or ideals that would fall under the purview of national interest) as 
motivating factors in Nigeria’s increasing engagement with China. These interests 
include: Nigerian belief that Chinese investments in infrastructure and Chinese aid will 
lead to improvements in standards of living and a reduction in poverty; and, Nigerian 
belief, especially by governmental actors, that engagement with China reinforces their 
sovereignty and affords them new international legitimacy. 
This study further examines Krasner’s specific areas of national interest, in 
particular aggregate national income and economic growth, as well as Krasner’s national 
interest of social stability, examining the argument that Nigerians believe that increased 
engagement with China will improve the lives of the Nigerian people. This argument 
suggests that the improvement of standards of living will in turn lead to happier citizens, 
resulting in a comparatively more stable society. This hypothesis tests whether or not 
Nigerians believe that political power or some new form of leverage in the international 
political arena will accrue as a result of increased engagement with China. The argument 
that this hypothesis explores is that Nigerians believe the presence of China as a strategic 
partner and potential alternative to Western states creates a condition in which these 
countries (Western states) must change the way they interact with Nigeria or at least 
indicate an interest in addressing international issues of concern to Nigeria. This study 
tests whether Nigerians believe they can realize these objectives through increased 
engagement with China.  
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The next chapters test the central hypothesis of this study to see if, as argued, 
dependency theory is an inadequate descriptor of growing Sino-African relations and if 
Africans, in particular Nigerians are choosing to increasingly engage with China because 
they believe that it is in their best interests and in-line with national interests. 
 
Conclusion  
Dependency theory emerged as a way to understand the phenomenon of rich 
states getting richer and poor states getting poorer at a time when liberal economic theory 
purported that increased trade would lead to economic benefit for all. Presently, political 
economists have abandoned dependency theory. Although it has explanatory power, 
dependency theory fails to account for other factors that influence economic growth, in 
particular the effects of elite decision-making. However, the influence of dependency 
theory has persisted in underdevelopment literature, and more recently in the literature on 
Sino-African relations, especially from those who accuse China of neo-colonialist 
behavior in Africa. These claims have yet to be rigorously examined through empirical 
research. Furthermore, evidence of economic growth in African states due to China’s 
increased demands for African products, as well as increasing agency on the part of 
African actors, indicates that a relationship unlike that described by dependency theory is 
at work.  
This study argues that state-centric realism is the phenomenon at work in growing 
engagement between China and African states. In a context of state-centric realism, all 
actors are driven by their own interests and act in pursuit of them. The motivations of 
both sides are important determinants of the nature of the relationship. As most literature 
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on Chinese engagement in Africa has explored the issue from the Chinese perspective, 
this project is concerned with understanding the African side of this relationship. This 
study argues that African states matter because their behavior in this iteration of 
international relations is motivated by a belief that engagement in China will result in the 
realization of national interests. These national interests, as identified by Krasner, include 
aggregate national income, economic growth, political power and social stability (1976). 
The next chapters explore the argument that dependency theory is not an adequate 
descriptor of growing Sino-African relations and test the hypotheses that state-centric 
realist African states are engaging with China because they believe that it is in their 
national interest, with primary focus on Nigeria as a case study.   
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Chapter 4: An Economic Win-win? 
 
Introduction 
If applied to current Sino-African engagement, dependency theory asserts that, 
despite increasing trade, African states will not benefit and are instead insignificant 
pawns subject to the demands of Chinese objectives. However, demonstrable economic 
benefits to African states support this project’s central argument that dependency does 
not adequately describe the relationship between China and African states. This chapter 
explores the idea that African dependency results in adverse economic conditions in 
Africa and in Nigeria, particularly in the areas of economic growth and trade balance
32
. 
To investigate these indicators, the following chapter seeks to determine any evidence of 
mutual economic growth as trade increases between African states and China, and 
assesses levels of benefit from trade.  To accomplish this, economic growth and trade 
balance are measured at two levels: the aggregate level (all of Africa as a single entity) 
and the individual state level (Nigeria case study). This chapter does not assert that 
positive economic trends are due to increasing engagement with China, but instead 
asserts that the economic trends do not indicate a state of dependency for African states. 
The first half of this chapter focuses on Africa and is split into two sub-sections. 
The first subsection looks at Africa’s aggregate economic growth, noting trends in gross 
domestic product (GDP) growth rate, gross national income (GNI), and gross domestic 
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 See previous chapter for all indicators of a dependent relationship. 
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product per capita during the ten years preceding the first Forum on China-Africa 
Cooperation and the ten years following (1990-2009). The second subsection 
concentrates in particular on the balance of trade between China and Africa from 1995-
2009 to reveal any indicators of dependency. The second section of this chapter examines 
economic trends between Nigeria and China from 1995 to 2009 to see if dependency 
theory is a fitting framework for understanding growing China-Nigeria relations.  
Testing dependency theory is a challenging undertaking. As Vengroff asserts, this 
difficulty results from the numerous and diverse approaches by scholars to empirically 
examine dependency theory (1977; 1977b). Kaufmann, Chernotsky and Geller allege that 
many of these studies intended “to build and illustrate dependency theory, rather than 
subject it to the possibility of disproof” (1975: pp. 303).  Just as scholarship on the 
ideology behind dependency theory lacked cohesion, so do empirical analyses of 
dependency theory as a subset of underdevelopment literature. Although dependency 
theory is viewed as an economics systems theory, scholars hold that there are different 
kinds of dependency: economic, political and military. Further still, each scholar 
operationalizes dependency differently (Kaufman, Chernotsky & Geller, 1975; Vengroff, 
1977b). For example, Kaufman et al. operationalized economic performance within 
dependent conditions in the following manner: 
“1: Countries with high levels of economic dependency are likely to have low rates 
of economic growth. 
2: Countries with high levels of economic dependency are likely to have an 
unfavorable balance of trade. 
3: Countries with high levels of dependency are likely to have unstable, 
fluctuating growth patterns” (1975: pp.308).” 
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Such attempts at empirical analysis of dependency theory have generated mixed results, 
including Vengroff’s, which examined dependency in Africa (1975; 1977b).  Vengroff’s 
analysis of newly independent African states failed to demonstrate a negative relationship 
between dependency and economic performance, which the author attributed to 
methodology problems as opposed to “fundamental inadequacy of the theory,” asserting 
that the “analysis has provided at least a partial confirmation of dependency theory”  
(1977b: pp. 630).  Kaufman and others were more blunt, leveling critiques against 
dependency theory later echoed by Tony Smith, noting “the concept of dependency… 
requires refinement and redefinition” and further still, declaring that dependency theory 
needs to account for the influence of political, social and cultural factors that can 
influence economic performance (175: pp. 329). As illustrated in the previous chapter, 
dependency theory fell out of favor amongst scholars; therefore this chapter does not look 
to test dependency.  
The argument for state-centric realism posed by this study suggests that 
dependency is not at work between China and Africa, but instead that state leaders and 
individuals are engaging with China because it is in their best interest. Though a lot of the 
literature and research reveals the benefit for China of African trade
33
; this section 
focuses instead on whether or not African states are demonstrating growth despite 
China’s more obvious profit.  
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 See Gu & Humphrey (2006) and Alden, Large, and Soares de Oliveira (2008b). 
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Sino-African Relations— Mutual Economic Benefit 
In 2000, the first FOCAC conference in Beijing formally marked the start of 
burgeoning trade between China and Africa. Over the next 10 years, the FOCAC 
conferences have served as an engine for growing Chinese engagement in Africa, thus 
indicating the significance of FOCAC as a chronological marker of Chinese engagement 
in Africa (Shelton & Paruk, 2008). This study relies upon the start of the FOCAC 
conferences as the indicator of the Chinese economic partnership with African states. 
Trends prior to 2000 the year of the first FOCAC conference show African economic 
activity without Chinese interaction and trends after indicate the perceived influence of 
the Chinese. A 20-year period will be examined, first exploring limited Chinese 
interaction (1990-1999), and then increasing Chinese interaction (2000-2009). Economic 
trends for China are indicated on the same graphs to illustrate China’s positive economic 
performance over the same 20-year period, although discussion dwells on African 
economic performance.  
If indeed economic engagement between China and Africa is producing favorable 
outcomes for both sides, borrowing from the framework provided by Kaufman et al., the 
following propositions will be tested: 
1: Africa should exhibit higher economic growth rates in the decade after the first 
FOCAC conference (2000-2009) than the preceding decade (1990-1999).  
2: Africa should have an even or nearly even balance of trade with China. 
These propositions challenge Kaufmann’s first two assertions regarding the 
relationship between dependency and economic performance, and unfavorable trade 
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balance in countries with high rates of dependency. This chapter’s research posits 
positive trends due to the absence of a dependent state. Examining economic trends to 
test these propositions can reveal empirical results to support or discredit the argument of 
a dependent relationship between China and Africa. If the evidence supports these 
propositions, no dependent relationship is at work; if the evidence shows no support for 
these propositions, then it would appear there is some merit to the claim of a neo-
imperialistic China promoting a dependent economic relationship with African states. 
This chapter does not attribute African economic growth to increased engagement with 
China, noting that there are a number of other factors including African’s continuing 
engagement with the West, in particular the USA
34
 that influenced economic 
development in the region. The purpose of this chapter is to determine if a state of 
dependency exists for African states. 
Mutual Economic Growth 
The first indicator of economic performance is growth in gross domestic product. 
According to Fig 4-1, aggregate African GDP growth rates prior to the 2000 launch of the 
Forum on China-Africa Cooperation stayed close to global growth rates. After 2000, 
however, African growth rates maintain an approximate 2 percentage point lead over 
world growth rates for the following decade with the exception of 2004, which 
demonstrated a 4 percentage point difference. The following graph illustrates that, after 
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 In 2000, the US government also introduced the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) which 
“offers tangible incentives for African countries to continue their efforts to open their economies and 
build free markets” (see www.agoa.gov for more information). Though not maximally exploited by 
African states, it has increased the US trade deficit with African states over the same time that FOCAC 
has been in operation. 
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the launch of the recent iteration of Sino-African relations as defined by the FOCAC 
Summit of 2000, African economies on average fared well as China’s economy grew at 
higher rates than the rest of the world. This is likely due to the increase in the price of 
commodities over the 10 year period, partly driven up by increased Chinese demand. 
This distinct separation between the African growth rate and that of the world 
after the launch of FOCAC may lend credibility to the notion that a mutually beneficial 
relationship driven by state-centric realism is displayed. This following graph indicates 
that all engaging African states and China experience mutual benefit and economic 
growth as reflected in GDP rates. 
Figure 4-1. Real Gross Domestic Product Growth Rates of Africa, China and the 
World, 1990-2009 (percentages) 
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For the purposes of this study, gross national income (GNI) serves as another 
indicator of mutual economic benefit. China’s gross national income and aggregate 
Africa’s GNI is depicted in the following graph (Figure 4.2). China’s willingness to 
purchase African raw materials at market prices has provided a new market for exports 
and given African countries an additional revenue stream. This added income can then be 
invested as Africans see fit, for example, into economic stimulus to bolster growth of 
local economies or to develop infrastructure. From 1990 to 1999, Africa posted an 
average GNI of USD$515,491.81 million dollars. As the figure below (4-2) illustrates, 
this amount nearly doubled over the next decade, when the average GNI reached 
USD$954,692.79 million. Figure 4-2 displays this significant change in the growth rate 
of GNI following China’s formal entry into Africa.  
Figure 4-2. Gross National Income of Africa (Aggregate) and China, 1990-2009 
(Millions of US Dollars) 
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Examining mutual economic benefit at the per capita level, GDP per capita in 
Africa appears to mirror the same trends displayed by GNI over the 20-year period. As 
shown in Figure 4-3 below, in the ten years preceding the first FOCAC conference and in 
the five years that followed, the African GDP per capita fell below $1,000. However, 
after 2004, per capita income experienced steady growth, topping $1,610 by 2008 and 
falling only slightly to $1,489 by 2009. Notably, per capita GDP almost doubled that of 
the previous decade (1990-1999) when it hovered at an average of $751.44. 
Figure 4-3. Gross Domestic Product Per Capita of Africa and China, 1990-2009 (US 
Dollars) 
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 Asserting that these significant gains in indicators of African economic growth 
have directly resulted from increasing Sino-African political and economic relations 
would be incorrect. Such a conclusion makes the brazen assumption that China-Africa 
relations exist in a vacuum, and Sino-African trade is the major variable in African 
economic growth, immune to other external variables. Though China is quickly 
becoming Africa’s top trading partner, Africa is also trading with others, including the 
United States, the EU, and to a lesser degree other African states. However, the figures 
represented in these graphs clearly display that within the first decade of active 
engagement with China, African states do not appear to have suffered the economic 
setbacks anticipated within a dependent relationship.  
China-Africa Balance of Trade 
Figure 4-4. below illustrates the rapid and steady growth of trade between China and 
Africa over time. The blue bars show the value of goods from Africa purchased by China 
and the pink bars show the value of Chinese products purchased by Africans, 
demonstrating benefits accrued by aggregate African states compared to China’s. As 
depicted here, trade volume does not significantly lean in favor of one side over the other.  
Figure 4-4 also illustrates changes in trade volume  between China and Africa 
during the two decades (1995 to 2009). At its onset, trade between China and Africa 
appears imbalanced; Chinese exports are nearly double African imports. However, as the 
total trade volume climbed, Chinese imports from Africa have for the most part kept pace 
with Chinese exports to Africa, with the significant exception of 2009. During this year, 
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the overall trade volume retracted as a result of global financial crises; Chinese exports to 
Africa measured approximately $5.5 billion over imports from Africa.  
According to WorldTrade Atlas, during this 15-year period, aggregate imports 
from Africa to China totaled US$233.3 billion, while Chinese exports to Africa totaled 
$239.8 billion, a difference of US$6.5 billion, or approximately 1.4 percent of total trade 
activity over the same period (2011). 
Figure 4-4. Volume of Trade between China and Africa, 1995-2009 (Billions of US 
Dollars) 
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This means that trade between China and Africa at the aggregate level cannot be 
construed as being significantly imbalanced if at all; trade volume between China and 
Africa measured in terms of monetary value is fairly balanced and even. Although 
aggregate trade might indicate a more even trade balance between China and African 
states, it would be erroneous to assume that this equity is characteristic of trade at the 
individual state level. In certain cases, for example, some countries (among them Sudan, 
Congo and Angola) have shown significant positive trade balance with China (see Table 
4-1). Most of these states are notably resource-rich, and their exports to China consist 
almost exclusively of crude oil (WorldTrade Atlas, 2011). Others, like Nigeria (as 
discussed later), have a trade balance tipped in favor of China, despite Nigeria’s large oil 
supply base, and the fact that crude oil accounts for approximately 75 percent of 
Nigeria’s exports to China (WorldTrade Atlas, 2011). On the individual [African] state 
level, significant trade imbalances exist, that do not favor African states but also do not 
favor China. This means that analyses of Sino-African economic relations that address 
Africa as a single entity do not accurately depict the relationship that individual African 
states have with China, and so, overarching claims on the impact of China in Africa, may 
not be supported by the evidence. As Figure 4-5 and Table 4-1 illustrate, both China and 
Africa are winners and losers in terms of trade balance in their increasing economic 
engagement.  
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Figure 4-5. Trade Balance between China and African states, 1995-2009 (Millions of 
US Dollars) 
 
 
According to the data presented by Figure 4-5 and Table 4-1, it appears that trade 
between China and Africa does in fact result in mutual economic benefit. As illustrated in 
Figure 4-5, the trade balance between China and most African states hovers fairly 
consistently around zero from 1995 to 2009.  This consistency is supported by Table 4-1, 
which shows trade balances by African country over the same period. Figures in red 
show years when the balance favored an African state. Balance of trade data has often 
been relied upon by scholars to indicate and empirically demonstrate economic 
dependency. 
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However, this table (4-1) brings to light an interesting trend: as trade between China and 
African states increases, more African states are experiencing a positive balance of trade.  
In other words, for some African countries, increasing trade with China may actually bear 
greater benefit for the African state than for China. An example is Angola (represented 
by the brown dot in Figure 4-5), which over the 15-year period posted a positive trade 
balance every year.  
As evidenced in Table 4-1, it is important to note that the countries are ranked by 
the absolute value of their 2009 trade balance rather than total trade volume with China, 
i.e., the figures in the table are the result of subtracting the value of goods procured from 
China from the value of goods sold to China. They are then ranked by their absolute 
value, which is the magnitude of value whether positive or negative. This means that the 
states are ranked by the degree of trade imbalance in 2009, from highest to low, and 
states with more even trade balances place closer to the bottom of the table. As a result, 
the figures in this table do not reflect the actual volume of trade between China and 
African states. For instance, South Africa falls lower in Table 4-1, although it is one of 
China’s biggest African trading partners (WorldTrade Atlas, 2011). The lower ranking of 
South Africa would indicate that trade between South Africa and China is close to even 
but the magnitude of Chinese trade with South Africa cannot be ascertained from Table 
4-1.  However Table 4-2 presents China’s top trading partners in Africa in 2009 and their 
volume of trade. 
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Table 4-2. China’s Top 10 African Trading Partners, 2009 
Country Total Trade  
(Imports + Exports, Millions of USD$) 
Share of Africa Total 
Trade 
Africa $ 90,006.64 - 
Angola* $ 17,045.77 18.94% 
South Africa* $ 15,138.88 16.82% 
Nigeria $ 6,373.94 7.08% 
Sudan* $ 6,363.80 7.07% 
Egypt  $ 5,858.06 6.51% 
Libya*  $ 5,163.30 5.74% 
Algeria  $ 5,126.20 5.70% 
Morocco  $ 2,500.95 2.78% 
Congo*  $ 2,105.46 2.34% 
Benin  $ 2,046.34 2.27% 
Source: World Trade Data 
*Countries with a positive trade balance in 2009 
 
The previous table presents trade data on China’s top ten African trading partners 
in 2009. Together these ten states account for 75.24 percent of total trade between China 
and Africa. Half of the top ten partners posted positive trade balances with China in 2009. 
These data lend support to the claim that a mutually beneficial relationship driven by 
state-centric self-interest is developing between China and Africa. These findings 
challenge the notion of Africa’s dependency on China. The evidence presented here does 
81 
not support dependency as defined by various scholars, including Kaufman et al (1975). 
If Africa is benefiting from bilateral trade as much as China--and in some cases more--an 
argument for state-centric realism, not dependency, perhaps has merit.  
A major argument put forward by dependency theorists is that economic 
dependency creates a condition in which, even with increased trade volume, dependent 
states do not record significant (if any) economic growth. Booth asserts, “an increase in 
the traditional exports…might well produce no increase in national income” (1975: pp. 
55). These traditional exports are raw materials and natural unprocessed resources, 
notably Africa’s primary exports to China. As the following graph (Figure 4-6) 
illustrates, this trend is increasingly corroborated over time.  
Figure 4-6. Chinese Imports from Africa by Category, 1995-2009 (Millions of US 
Dollars) 
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Clearly, exports of raw materials are the main driver for a balanced trade relationship 
between China and African states at the state level. The reason for this is two-fold: China 
is paying high market prices for African commodities and Africans are paying low prices 
for cheap Chinese products.  
Contrary to dependency theory, where profit margins from value-added products 
increase economic benefit to dominant states while impeding benefit to dependent states, 
China-Africa trade appears to follow a different trajectory. China pays more for African 
exports and Africans pay less for Chinese exports (Alden, 2004). China purchases raw 
materials from African countries at current market prices, which has boosted the 
economies of African states; profit margins of Chinese manufactured goods are rather 
minimal. Without a doubt, current economic conditions are quite different from the 
conditions that provided the foundation for the development of dependency theory. Part 
of the logic of dependency theory is that developed countries as sole providers of finished 
goods could sell at premiums over market value.  
However, China’s entrance as an additional supplier has not only drawn market 
prices down as a result of increased supply: Chinese methods of under pricing goods 
meant that profit margins and net gains to China have been minimal (Carmody and 
Owusu, 2007). In the case of Chinese-produced goods, the impact of “value-added” on 
net returns and subsequent trade benefit is not adequately explained by the dependency 
theory framework, despite continued focus on Chinese finished goods as initiating 
lopsided economic development. It is also important to note that some caution is required 
when dealing with raw trade data, because a percentage of the total value of a finished 
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good comes from imported inputs, including raw materials acquired from African states. 
Xing and Detert assert, “conventional trade statistics greatly inflate bilateral trade deficits 
between a country used as export-platform by multinational firms [China] and its 
destination countries” (2010: pp. 9). Domestic value-added for Chinese manufactured 
products vary by product from as little as 10% of the wholesale value of the imported 
good to 65% (Dean et al, 2007; Xing and Detert, 2010). This means that although trade 
data may show significant benefit of trade to China, not all of that benefit is actually 
accrued to China. 
Over the last decade of increased engagement with China, African states have 
posted observable increases in economic growth. While the research presented here has 
noted that this growth has occurred parallel to increased engagement with China (in 
particular exponential growth in bilateral trade) it does not allege that these changes in 
economic trends are directly attributable to the China/Africa relationship. African states 
do not trade solely with China; their economic activity is influenced by other factors, 
including trade with other nations, shocks to the world economy and policy decisions of 
domestic state actors. A growing body of literature by African scholars from the African 
Economic Research Consortium attempts to examine the impact of Chinese engagement 
in Africa. Researchers note the dearth of empirical research, as well as data to promote 
further research (Ajakaiye & Kaplinsky, 2009; Oyeranti et al., 2010).  However, current 
data indicates that Chinese engagement in Africa offers opportunities, expanding 
infrastructure and service provision, which ultimately improves the welfare of the African 
people (Oyeranti et al., 2010). Empirical studies of Chinese engagement in Africa 
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contradict the popular rhetoric of a disadvantageous relationship with a dependent Africa. 
By most measures, Africa is gaining observable economic benefits by engaging with 
China, pointing to a nondependent relationship.  
Case Study: Nigeria 
Nigeria is heavily populated compared to other African countries, making up 20 
percent of the total African population. It is also a consumer nation, in which domestic 
industry, with appropriate management, might successfully compete with Chinese 
imports. Recent news articles cite Nigeria as having the highest population of Chinese in 
an African country which lends credence to the assumption that a comparatively higher 
level of engagement and trade can be expected between China and Nigeria as compared 
to other African states (Yisa, 2011). With Nigeria’s significant political influence on the 
continent, the argument can also be made that Nigeria’s engagement with China might 
have a ripple effect on other African countries subject to China’s exploitation. A key 
purpose of this project is to determine the nature of China-Nigeria relations and to 
ascertain Nigerian motivations in this engagement.  
Oil influences Nigeria’s characterization as a resource-rich country, and it would 
be easy to assume that China is interested in Nigeria because of its oil. While that 
assumption may be accurate, it does not tell the full story of China’s interest. Nigeria 
does provide oil for China and factors significantly into China’s resource grab in Africa. 
In 2005, Nigeria and China signed an $800 million crude oil sale agreement (Onyebuchi, 
2005). However, while Nigeria is a leading producer of crude oil in Africa, Nigeria is not 
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a leading supplier of African oil to China (Rocha, 2007). Figures from WorldTrade Atlas 
indicate that Nigeria was China’s 7th ranked supplier of African crude oil35, supplying 
only 2 percent of the African crude oil purchased by Chinese entities
36
 from 1995 to 2009 
(2011). China’s relationship with Nigeria differs from most other African states, as 
engagement with Nigeria was marked early on by the exchange of information and 
technology, where Chinese know-how contributed to the development of local industry 
(Brautigam, 2003). Alden  notes that Nigerian traders still say that they learn and adopt 
Chinese practices and methods in industry and manufacturing (2007).  
Nigeria is also in many ways a political anomaly in Africa, a regional and 
continental self-determined powerhouse that has, since independence, adopted and 
maintained a policy of political neutrality in foreign relations. Because of its influence, 
Nigerian significance in Africa is arguably necessary for  any actors looking to make a 
strategic power play, economic and otherwise, on the continent. Nigeria’s influence in 
West Africa, active role in peacekeeping efforts, as well as in development and 
governance make Nigeria a key player in African politics. Chinese efforts to collaborate 
politically with African states on the global level can no doubt be bolstered with 
Nigeria’s support. Where one in every five black Africans is a Nigerian, the Chinese 
cannot afford to overlook Nigeria if they aim to be players in Africa.  
                                                          
35
 China’s leading supplier of African crude oil is Angola which accounted for 52% of the African crude sold 
to China from 1995 to 2009.  Sudan (16%), Congo (9%), Equatorial Guinea (7%), Libya (7%) and Algeria 
(2%), account for another 42% of the total crude purchase over the same time period. 
36
 The US Department of State notes that the United States is the leading trade partner for Nigeria,  
bolstered by American purchase of Nigeria crude oil. The Department of State estimates that 
approximately half of Nigeria’s daily production of crude oil is acquired by American firms. 
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The selection of Nigeria as a case study is based on both political and economic 
contexts. The influx of Chinese goods into Africa, particularly inexpensive textiles, has 
hurt domestic industries in Nigeria, leading to the loss of several thousand jobs and 
diminishing the added value associated with the sale of finished goods (Alden, 2007). 
Nigerian policies regarding China have shown the influence of local business, which has 
been active in provoking the government to adopt or at least promote the protection of 
domestic industry (Alden, 2007). They have also shown the influence of  public opinion. 
A case in point: consumers rallied the government to reopen Chinatown in Lagos for 
access to cheap Chinese goods after it was closed down due to quality concerns raised by 
local business regarding counterfeit and subpar products (Alden, 2007). The Nigerian 
government’s responsiveness to concerns with Chinese engagement, though not perfect, 
has yet to be adequately addressed by literature on growing Chinese engagement in 
Africa.  
 
Trade 
Trade between Africa and China has grown at a rate of nearly 44 percent each 
year since 2000 (Moore, 2011). Chinese manufactured products are ubiquitous--from the 
USD$1 plastic sandals and chintzy-looking fabric flowers to steel security doors and 
generators of all sizes. In 2010, trade volume betweeen the two nations reached US$7.5 
billion (Okoh, 2011; Williams, 2011). As of 2011,
 
the Chinese completed 117 projects in 
Nigeria, worth $2.1 billion; Chinese contract  investments had already reached $13.3 
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billion by November of 2010 (Williams, 2011). According to the president of the China 
Institute of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), Nigeria is China’s fourth 
African trade partner and the second largest African export market. Though largely 
focused on oil reserves, Chinese investments also targeted natural gas, agriculture and 
steel processing (Moore, 2011; Daily Champion, 2011). At present, the Chinese are 
building an economic free trade zone in Lagos as a part of recent trade agreements with 
the Nigerian government. Chinese investment can be seen across the country in 
infrastructure development: communications technology, road development and 
construction, to name a few.  
Though Chinese trade with Nigeria is booming, a glance at export and import 
values shows that the trade balance heavily favours China (see Figure 4-7 and Table 4-3 
below). The apparent imbalance, for all intents and purposes looks like textbook 
dependency theory in action. However, based on calculations using World Trade Atlas 
and UNCTAD data, Chinese exports to Nigeria from 2000 to 2009 grew 871.08 percent, 
an approximate average annual growth rate of 40 percent, with the exception of 2009 
when the value of Chinese exports fell below that of 2008 (WorldTrade Atlas, 2011; 
UNCTAD, 2012).  On the other hand, Nigerian exports to China grew by 206.64 percent 
during the same period, at an average annual growth rate of 62.71 percent. This growth 
rate statistic does a poor job of demonstrating that Nigerian exports to China fluctuated 
tremendously during this period, with extreme rates ranging from -47.3 percent to 
+545.35 percent. While this may give the appearance of a dependent relationship 
uncontrolled by Nigeria, this author argues instead that this volatility demonstrates the 
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novelty of the trade relationship and exists because China was not yet a major buyer of 
Nigerian exports. 
Table 4-3. China’s Trade with Nigeria, Imports and Exports and Percentage 
Change, 2000-2009 
Year Imports from Nigeria 
(Millions of US$) 
Percentage 
Change 
Exports to Nigeria 
(Millions of US$) 
Percentage 
Change 
2000 292.93 60.52% 563.88 42.40% 
2001 227.44 -22.36% 917.15 62.65% 
2002 121.31 -46.66% 1,047.09 14.17% 
2003 71.68 -40.91% 1,787.49 70.71% 
2004 462.58 545.35% 1,719.27 -3.82% 
2005 527.06 13.94% 2,305.28 34.08% 
2006 277.75 -47.30% 2,855.67 23.88% 
2007 537.49 93.51% 3,800.19 33.08% 
2008 509.92 -5.13% 6,758.13 77.84% 
2009 898.23 76.15% 5,475.71 -18.98% 
Source: World Trade Data 
 
As the bar graph below indicates, Chinese exports to Nigeria grew at a faster rate 
than Nigerian exports to China. In speaking of Nigeria-China economic relations, a 
government official remarked, “Our engagement with China…has not been as fruitful as 
it should be. We have not exploited; instead it’s [trade balance] tilted towards China. The 
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only thing is, we sell them oil.”37 Even with the increasing sales of oil to China, as Figure 
4-7 shows, there remains a somewhat significant imbalance in favor of China. 
Undoubtedly, the trade data do not present a full picture of the economic and political 
relations that exist between China and Nigeria, and do an even poorer job of displaying 
the impact of Chinese engagement with Nigeria.   
Figure 4-7. Chinese Trade with Nigeria, 1995-2009 (Millions of US Dollars) 
 
 
Further still, this graph does not adequately demonstrate the degree of China’s 
significance and magnitude in Nigeria’s overall trade.  Examining this data from another 
perspective by including Nigeria’s overall trade balance over the same period, it appears 
that, overall, increased imbalance of trade with China may not have had an adverse an 
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 Interview with Nigerian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Bilateral Relations officer, August 11, 2011, Abuja. 
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effect on Nigeria, at least in the short term, because China’s trade with Nigeria is 
substantially overshadowed by Nigeria’s overall trade balance much less Nigeria’s total 
trade (See Figure 4-9 below). Trade with China still only accounts for a small portion of 
Nigeria’s total trade activity. Aggregate Nigerian trade balance has continued to show 
positive growth with a few exceptions, the most notable in 2009 when a global recession 
affected the performance of many countries.  
Figure 4-9. China’s Trade with Nigeria, and Nigerian Aggregate Trade Balance, 
1995-2009 
 
A closer look shows that the trade between China and Nigeria pales in 
comparison to Nigeria’s overall trade balance which would indicate that trade with China 
may not yet have a significant impact on Nigerian economic development. Furthermore, 
the recent positive economic trends may not directly relate to engagement with China.  
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According to the Washington-based Emerging Capital Partners (ECP), Nigeria has been 
noted as having economic growth prospects, as a result of growth in new technologies 
and sectors such as television over internet, insurance and real estate (Abiodun, 2011). 
Nigerian government officials have done their part to attract foreign investors, 
including the Chinese to Nigeria. In 2011, then Nigerian Minister of State for Commerce 
and Industry, Josephine Tapgun encouraged Chinese businesses to invest in Nigerian 
industry, in particular agricultural development (Bello, 2011).  In Calabar State, the 
Calabar Free Trade Zone and Tinapa resort have been recently developed, and local and 
federal governments are seeking outside investors. The governor of Calabar State, Liyel 
Imoke, has hosted Chinese delegations and in a meeting with the General-Consul of 
China, extolled the economic potential and opportunities that the Free Trade Zone has to 
offer Chinese investors (Inyang, 2011). In Lagos State, a new free trade zone is under 
development. The Lagos Chamber of Commerce and Industry organizes an annual 
international trade fair where investors and entrepreneurs are recruited through efforts of 
the LCCI, as well as the other investment promotion agencies and foreign embassies and 
networking organizations. In all, these efforts have been successful, as evidenced by 
growing Chinese enterprise and population in Nigeria. More and more Chinese are 
making big money in Nigeria, but Nigerians are also pursuing trade with the Chinese. 
It is important to recognize that true economic impact is made in the long-term. 
Because China’s presence on the continent and in Nigeria has increased so recently, the 
argument can be made that it may be too soon to guess--much less gauge--what the real, 
far-reaching economic impact of Nigeria-China trade will be. Chinese exports to Nigeria 
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(and many of the other countries on the continent) are not just mass quantities of cheap 
little manufactured plastic products and textiles but also expensive equipment used to 
construct roads, railways, and factories. In other words, a significant amount of Chinese 
exports to Nigeria includes the necessary components for successful infrastructure 
development in the country. Such equipment is helping build power generation facilities 
like dams, refineries, telecommunications towers, satellites, etc. Still, the argument has 
been made that, despite investments in infrastructure development, the influx of cheap 
Chinese products is leading to the de-industrialization of Nigeria’s indigenous enterprises 
especially textile manufacturing (Akinrade and Ogen, 2008). While the view presented 
by Akinrade and Ogen is valid, increased efforts by the Nigerian government to improve 
monitoring of imports into Nigeria, as well as investing more heavily in domestic 
economic development may offset the anticipated negative impact of trade with China. 
Although Nigeria is presently running a substantial trade deficit, there is no evidence that 
the Sino-Nigerian dynamic will remain this way, particularly given China’s movements 
to increase oil imports from Nigeria. Increased oil importation from Nigeria to China, 
coupled with increased sourcing of other raw materials by Chinese corporations, 
including but not limited to natural gas, solid minerals, gold and other metals. 
Conversely, while most of Nigerian imports have been spread across many categories
38
, 
the top three products are telecommunications equipment, motorcycles and generators.  
In fact, approximately 80 percent of the top 20 product categories in 2009 can be 
construed as capacity-building imports, not comprised entirely of finished goods; 
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 According to the WorldTrade Atlas, Nigeria’s biggest import category from China is telecommunications 
equipment and that accounts for 5.2% of Nigeria’s total trade with China 
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approximately half of these categories were identified as ‘parts39’ (WorldTrade Atlas, 
2011).  It can be argued that continued investment and trade between China and Nigeria, 
under appropriate management, can and should promote industrialization in Nigeria. 
While this may not be the picture of industrialization as emblazoned by the West some 
time ago, China presents an opportunity for economic development in Nigeria and 
forward social progress. 
OIL 
Although oil may comprise a significant portion of Chinese imports from Nigeria, 
the Chinese purchase of Nigerian oil exports is significantly overshadowed by other 
international players, in particular the United States, which occupies the number one spot 
as the primary trading partner in sub-Saharan Africa. The U.S. buys about 50 percent of 
Nigeria’s daily production, which account for nearly 10 percent of the total U.S. supply40. 
The US Energy Information Administration reports Nigeria as the US’s 4th largest oil 
supplier in 2010
41
. According to the U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of African 
Affairs, the U.S. trade deficit with Nigeria in 2010 was $26 billion, largely due to crude 
oil; Nigeria’s imports from the U.S. were valued at just over $4 billion in the same year 
(U.S. Department of State, 2012).  
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 These range from automobile parts, non-identified engine parts, construction equipment etc. 
40
 Source: http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2836.htm,  
41
 Source: http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=3050 
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Notably, while China is a growing partner for Nigeria, (economically, politically 
and otherwise), it is not the only international player in Nigeria. Calculations of the 
International Trade Centre (ITC), based on UN COMTRADE statistics, rank China as 
Nigeria’s second highest (by U.S dollar value of imported wares) supplying market in 
2010, constituting 16.56 percent of total Nigerian imports and as the fourteenth largest 
import market for Nigerian exports, or 1.66 percent of Nigerian total exports (2012). The 
ITC also ranked the United States as the leading importer and exporter to Nigeria. 
Although this information differs from that provided by the U.S. Department of State’s 
rankings above, they both serve to illustrate the point that the effects of trade with China 
on Nigeria will be challenging to isolate for a number of reasons (2012).  
China and Nigeria do not interact within a vacuum; Sino-Nigerian relations and 
economic activity are vulnerable to outside influences and the behaviors of other players 
and other markets. Additionally, there are so many other players and factors in Nigerian 
economic activity that may or may not fall under the direct influence of China. 
Supporters of the position heralding China’s neo-imperialist agenda in Nigeria must then 
also address the issue of China’s diluted impact. If China is pursing the same objectives 
as other actors in Africa as Behar argues, how then can specific impacts and outcomes be 
attributed to China (2008)? While the Chinese are increasingly significant trade partners, 
it is important to assess Chinese engagement and impact in context, acknowledging that 
they make up a part and not the whole, of a much greater picture.  
China/Nigerian trade’s rapid growth, especially in the informal sector, is largely 
due to Nigerian traders’ recognition that business with Chinese suppliers and enterprises 
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provides higher profit margins. The U.S. State Department’s Bureau of African Affairs, 
in its review of Nigeria and Nigerian-American engagement, also notes that the Nigerian 
economy’s informal sector--which is grossly unmeasured--is increasingly significant in 
propelling the entire Nigerian economy forward. The Bureau states specifically, “the 
economy continues to witness massive growth of ‘informal sector’ economic activities, 
estimated by some to be as high as 75% of the total economy.” Having spent a 
considerable amount of time in Nigeria, I would venture that the 75 percent may be too 
low an estimate. In every office space I entered, formally employed individuals with what 
would be considered good jobs also engaged in informal business ventures. Examples: a 
cultural attaché renting out living space, a fully promoted
42
 government employee selling 
laptops and electronics from business trips and raising chickens and catfish in the 
backyard. Outside the Chinese embassy, I came across a trader, Mary, waiting to pick up 
her travel documents and approved visa
43. As a market trader, Mary’s income is self-
reported and her income tax derived from the figures she provides the government. While 
Mary’s integrity is not relevant here, it is important to note that self-employed individuals 
have the opportunity to under-report earnings, and when enterprises are not registered 
businesses, they can choose not to report those earnings at all.  Mary travels to China six 
times a year, for her business also stopping in Thailand and Indonesia, to buy mother and 
baby care products. After every trip to Asia, she nets N 4 million (or approximately 
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 At the highest pay-grade of government employees. 
43
 Interview with market trader Mary, outside the Chinese embassy, waiting on travel documents, July 18, 
2011, Abuja. 
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USD$$26,666.00)
44
 in profit after all expenses. With six trips a year, Mary pulls in a total 
of ₦ 24 million (or USD$160,000) annually by doing business with the Chinese. These 
figures do not take into account the additional profits from her biannual trips to the U.S. 
and the United Kingdom, also for her business. Her husband is formally employed for the 
Power Holding Company of Nigeria (PHCN) and brings in a steady paycheck of 
approximately USD$30,000 per year as senior management. His paycheck is likely the 
only accurately measured household income for their family and is tracked statistically by 
the government and other interested agencies, and factored into income per capita figures 
used to assess the economy. Such figures present a false picture of Nigeria’s economic 
situation, and lead to inaccurate results, including assertions that most Nigerians live on 
less than USD$2 a day. While this story seems to portray an atypical face of the informal 
sector at work in the Nigerian economy, it really is not unique. A different market trader 
noted that if he spent ₦3 million purchasing goods in China, after expenses were 
accounted for, he was sure of about ₦1.6 million in profit. Clearly, the degrees of 
profitability and earnings from the informal sector differ from person to person. 
Nonetheless, huge sums of untracked cash are flowing through the market system and the 
informal sector, and a growing population of unmeasured nouveau riche individuals in 
Nigeria has recognized the opportunities presented by China and are working hard to 
exploit them to maximize personal gains. 
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 Nigerian Naira to US $ exchange rate has wavered around N150 to $1. Bloomberg Business Week 
reports the Naira to Dollar exchange rate at N150.01 to $1 on October 24, 2011 
(http://www.businessweek.com/news/2011-10-24/nigeria-naira-weakens-as-bank-fails-to-meet-
demand.html). 
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Nigeria-China’s State-Interest Driven Engagement 
At the onset it might appear that Nigeria’s engagement with China is indicative of 
a dependent relationship with a dominant country. However, limiting China’s 
engagement with Nigeria to an “unequal relationship” is to belittle and dismiss the 
greater objectives that drive this relationship. The rest of this chapter is therefore focused 
on discussing aspects of the Nigeria-China relationship that demonstrate that what is at 
play in this dyad is a state-centric realist relationship driven by national interest. 
Value-Added Chinese Goods 
Chinese finished goods are noted as affordable and sold at very low prices, so low 
that the value added and profit made on the Chinese produced finished goods is minimal, 
and in some cases likely negative. A Nigerian interview respondent asks, “How do you 
import shoes from China to come and sell it for N150 in Nigeria? […] It’s about USD$1. 
So what kind of material is that? And I have not talked about shipping. So was the shoe 
produced for 50¢?”45  This question describes many Chinese goods in the Nigerian 
markets. Market traders assert that since China has become a major source of 
manufactured products in Nigeria, prices of consumer goods have for the most part 
halved and remain at half of what they were years ago. Similarly an interview with an 
industrial engineer from an investment bank
46
 revealed a case where Chinese 
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 Phone interview with Nigerian US Consulate Officer, April 6, 2011, Washington DC. 
46
  Interview conducted January 6, 2011, Kaduna. 
98 
manufacturers sold industrial equipment for a fifth of the cost charged by a German 
supplier
47
. 
Inexplicably low Chinese price points beg the question: what is the actual value-
added ultimately accrued to the Chinese? Pricing levels made possible through under-
valuation of the Yuan would imply that Chinese value-added on the manufacturing 
process is somewhat limited. That the Chinese purchase raw materials from Africa, 
including Nigeria, at market or close to market price has been noted in the general rise in 
income for most African countries as a result of engagement with China. With the end 
product of Chinese-manufactured goods sold at low prices, it stands to reason that the 
domestic Chinese value-added on a Chinese manufactured product may actually be less 
significant in monetary worth than the domestic value-added of African raw materials. 
Note also that the Chinese value-added to the manufacturing process is of a lower 
monetary value for two major reasons. First, it is measured in Yuan, and as previously 
mentioned, Yuan is strategically undervalued in global currency markets. Second, 
Chinese labor is readily available and cheap, so the overall cost of production in China is 
comparatively less than cost of production elsewhere. Therefore, with most Chinese 
manufactured products, the highest domestic value-added is most likely from the raw 
materials used in the manufacturing process.  
In accordance with this reasoning, if the African value-added is more significant 
than the Chinese value-added, then this hardly looks like a situation of dependency. In a 
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 This particular Chinese firm previously supplied the German firm with the same equipment but was 
locked into a contract that did not permit sales to other parties. Once the contract was up, the firm was 
free to sell the equipment on their own.  
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dependent relationship, the dominant state has more at stake because the accrued benefit 
is greater than it is to the dependent state. In this situation, because raw materials have the 
highest value-added, Africans stand to benefit even more from trade with China than the 
Chinese do, comparatively speaking, assuming that Africans are producing the raw 
materials, or are at least managing the production of the raw materials. As such, in the 
context of value-added, it would appear that this economic relationship is not heavily 
imbalanced in favor of the Chinese. 
This argument only stands, however, if Africans are producing raw materials. 
Unfortunately, in many cases of Chinese engagement in Africa, this is not the case. The 
Chinese have been noted, by scholars as well as journalists, for controlling the major part 
and in some cases the entire process of production, often because the Chinese secure 
African government contracts to extract raw materials. Where labor management and 
employment laws are lax, the Chinese bring in their own workers, and with Chinese 
equipment and resources, extract the resources that they need, then export the materials to 
China to produce finished goods. As long as the Chinese control the production of raw 
material for manufacturing, they stand to benefit the most from relationships with African 
states. If the Chinese win contracts from African governments and as such pay only 
market price for the raw materials, deducting their costs of extraction, it is highly possible 
that in these circumstances a dependent relationship could emerge.  
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In their efforts to support African attempts towards development and 
industrialization
48
, the Chinese have stressed education and training as a significant part 
of their non-economic relationship with Africa. The Chinese are in many ways living up 
to their promise to assist Africans, especially Nigerians.  In northern Nigeria, a mining 
company’s sign proudly proclaims “Technical Assistance from China Minerals and Metal 
Cooperation and Yunnan Copper Group”; the bold letters say “Nigeria-China” in English 
and Chinese characters. Though this is actually a Nigerian firm, they are just a few miles 
away from another mining company that clearly has some significant Chinese ties: 
Zhonghao Ziyuan Development Ltd, Minerals Exploration and Exploitation. The Chinese 
foreman at the Nigerian mining firm has been in Africa for over ten years working in 
mining and raw materials industries in many countries, including Côte d'Ivoire, Zambia, 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Zimbabwe, South Africa and now, Nigeria. He states
49
 
that this mining company, a joint venture with the state (provincial) government, is 
incorporated with a Chinese firm tasked with developing the company until it is able to 
conduct all aspects of the production process: prospecting, exploration, exploitation, 
processing and export. Once its local employees have mastered these procedures, the 
company will be left in the hands of Nigerians to continue and increase production. The 
company currently employs 11 Chinese workers, a number that will grow to 30 once 
construction of the new plant is completed. Presently, the company employs 30-50 
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 A look at any of the speeches as well as any of the action plans of any of the four Forum on China-Africa 
Cooperation (FOCAC) conferences, as well as China’s African Policy document published in 2006, 
supports this assertion.  
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 Phone interview with Chinese manager of a Nigerian-Chinese mining company, August 10, 2011, 
Zamfara. 
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Nigerian workers dependent on workload; two are managers. This number is expected to 
increase to 300 once the enterprise is fully realized. The company is currently operating, 
but due to limited facilities and lack of skilled employees--as well as equipment and 
technology--the company is focused on the second stage of mining, exploration, 
producing gold concentrates and crystals. These products are sold to a Chinese company 
that processes the material into gold bars. Eventually, the company in Zamfara intends to 
produce and export fully processed, 99.999 percent pure gold bars. 
Unfortunately, the training of Nigerian employees has been stalled by the 
challenge of the language barrier. Chinese managers do not speak English; their Nigerian 
employees have just as poor a grasp of English. To get around this, the Chinese foreman 
is having his translator tutored in Hausa, the local language, a step that is bound to help 
improve communications with his Nigerian workforce, but does little to help workers 
read the controls on equipment they operate that are labeled with directions in Chinese.
50
 
Although Zamfara state is significantly mineral-wealthy, as is evidenced by the sight of 
multiple mining companies along the major highways that cut through the state, very 
little has been done to develop this industry. As with most of the states in the Nigerian 
Federation, the state’s economy was left dependent on allotment from oil revenues.  
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 Michel & Beuret (2009), in China Safari: On the Trail of Beijing’s Expansion in Africa also mention the 
challenge of Chinese equipment and technology, for African employees who do not recognize or read 
Chinese characters. Clearly equipment manufacturers can switch to English labels to get around this 
problem, or individual companies can  re-label their equipment or train some of their employees in basic 
Chinese. However Chinese equipment and technology  has been noted as being comparatively simpler 
and more accessible to Africans and so the language issue may not pose a significant problem to African 
machine drivers and/or engineers. 
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Though interview respondents note the intent of the government to invest in 
developing other aspects of the Nigerian economy, continued governmental focus on oil, 
has created much opportunity for exploitation and unchecked corruption in the 
exploration and production of raw materials, especially in the sparsely populated but 
resource-rich north.
51
 The entry of the Chinese provides chances to increase the 
productivity and economic output and growth in this underdeveloped region. Interview 
respondents in this study demonstrated a great belief in Nigerian ability to produce but 
also an understanding of some of Nigeria’s latent issues, (for example, corruption), that 
have limited innovation and development. Nigerian businessmen, lobbyists and 
academics as well as informed government officials all agree that Nigeria has the 
capacity to produce and meet some of the demands of the local market, but in light of 
challenges to industrial development, Nigeria needs to focus on improving its 
technological base by borrowing and learning technology from China.  
Chinese training has not been limited to technical skills and expertise or even 
higher education. There is a select cadre of businessmen who are making their money by 
bringing the successful Chinese business model, Tianshi, to Nigeria. Tianshi is a Chinese 
version of a pyramid selling (also known as network marketing, and referral marketing) 
agency that employs a multi-level marketing strategy, where salesmen are independent 
self-employed contractors earning on a commission basis. Through selling products 
(health products, in this instance), their income increases with every unit they sell, and 
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when contractors recruit new salespersons, they earn an additional commission from the 
recruited individuals’ sales. This particular Chinese-run company is primarily based out 
of Kaduna, in northern Nigeria, although it is expanding to new cities around the country. 
Salesmen are recruited through current Nigerian employees as well as through classified 
ads in newspapers. Nigerian employees stated that all management positions at this 
company are held by Chinese nationals; however, as the company is still young they are 
hopeful for promotion. In interviews with a number of Nigerians employed by this 
company, all noted that the most significant draw with this business was the autonomy it 
allows. With such flexibility, employees are able to determine how much they want to 
work and therefore their take-home income, and they also receive bonuses on a regular 
basis. An employee of just a few weeks stated that he had made approximately $200 in 
his first month, roughly enough to cover his initial cost of joining the agency; a more 
established employee noted that he had developed his sales program to the point that he 
was taking home USD$800-$1000 every month, and could now afford to quit his formal 
employment. These employees indicated that not only through this new business model, 
but on the whole, the entrance of the Chinese into the Nigerian marketplace has created 
competition which is forcing Nigerian counterparts to improve their operations processes 
and increase efficiency.  
Even though cultural differences exist and interpersonal relations between the 
Nigerians and the Chinese are not ideal
52
 and, may not exist beyond the financial aspect, 
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engagement with the Chinese has afforded new opportunities for employment. A 
government official in the Federal Ministry of Information and Communications assigned 
to the bilateral relations desk, and specifically China, states, “China has opened doors in 
Nigeria for Nigerians.”53Nigerians are learning how to be just as shrewd as the Chinese, 
if not more; they are by nature entrepreneurial and are known to exploit any opportunity 
to improve their circumstances. According to data gathered through this research, the 
influx of low-quality Chinese goods into Nigeria has a greater Nigerian dynamic than is 
known. Some Nigerian entities actually go to China to source the lower quality goods, 
thereby reducing the expenses to the manufacturers and also themselves, ultimately 
increasing their profit margin. 
It is possible that some are likely to persist in asserting that the Nigeria-China 
relationship fits within the parameters of a dependent relationship. However, the level of 
probable dependability comes into question. Over the course of history, the West has 
typically had a monopoly in Africa, especially as the marketplace for African 
commodities and raw materials. The arguments surrounding dependency theory and 
underdevelopment assert that dependency is a condition that is developed over a long 
period of time (Dos Santos, 1973; Ferraro, 1996). The West’s relationship with Africa 
has arguably followed the dynamic, with both sides in the same roles since the 
colonialization of Africa, which intensified particularly in the 19th and early 20th 
century. The West has remained “master” and “commander” and Africa “servant” and 
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“purveyor” of raw materials and vast riches providing support and growth to western 
economies. The Sino-African relationship differs greatly because China
54
 needs African 
political support, which arguably was the impetus for the initial development of 
significant Sino-African relations during the 1960s. Distinct effort was made to develop 
relationships of partnership between developing (Third World) China and developing 
Africa. Despite the fact that China’s recent industrial revolution has vaulted it past Africa 
in terms of development and measures of a developed state and economy, China’s return 
to Africa following its emergence from isolationism was built on the foundations of 
1960s Sino-African relations, partnership and mutual benefit. As such, the Chinese 
government has had to go to additional, cost-inducing lengths to make sure that there 
were clear indicators of the benefits of this budding relationship on both sides. Towards 
that end the Chinese are building schools, hospitals, roads and hydro-electric plants 
which undoubtedly will assist African states on the road to development and help assuage 
some of the poverty and poor living standards. Even then, China, much like the West, 
makes efforts to retain some of the value of aid contributions. A Nigerian foreign service 
officer shares,  
“The effect of Chinese engagement in Nigeria can be measured in so 
many ways. In the educational sector, the Chinese came and they were 
building us model primary schools, granting us aid here and there, small 
aid. They are going to build another edifice in Nigeria, the Nigeria-China 
Friendship Association Building. It’s a cultural building. […] during our 
fifth bilateral joint commission for bilateral cooperation, they amassed $25 
million for that. That $25 million, more than half of it will go back to 
China because the design of the building will be done by Chinese 
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architects, some of the workers and the consultants will have to be 
Chinese.
55.”  
The argument here asserts that at the aggregate level, Chinese infrastructure built 
across Africa is an essential part of the required foundation if sustainable development 
and industrialization are to be realized across the continent. However, concerns have been 
voiced--not in regard to the benefit of Chinese development of infrastructure but instead 
on the reliability and dependability of Chinese construction. For many years news reports 
have highlighted problems with quality control that have plagued Chinese manufacturers 
and contractors following industrialization. These domestic issues have spilt on to the 
world stage and have affected the reputation and perceived value of the “Made in China” 
label. Nigerian regulators and government agencies, primarily the Standards Organization 
of Nigeria (SON) and the National Agency for Food and Drug Administration and 
Control (NAFDAC) have had to impress upon their Chinese counterparts the need to be 
more diligent in monitoring the quality of products that leave China for foreign markets. 
Market traders and businessmen with extensive ties to China assert that, while there are 
products for every price with quality diminishing as the price declines, good quality 
products can be had from the Chinese. In multiple interviews, Nigerian traders and 
businessmen noted that higher quality products manufactured in China were typically 
reserved for European and North American markets. Therefore, if the Chinese habitually 
reserve higher quality products for other markets, how much stock should then be placed 
in the actual and long-term value of their investments into African infrastructure?  
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An economist at the African Development Bank
56
 notes that the Chinese are 
winning a lot of contracts in Africa (especially in construction) because they are almost 
always the lowest bidder. However, when the Chinese win bids, they employ imported 
Chinese labor, which does nothing to improve conditions for indigenous workers, 
inducing a negative impact on the Nigerian (and African) labor sector. In addition, recent 
reports and articles have begun to call into question the efficiency and efficacy of 
Chinese construction in Africa, with growing concerns for quality and the observation of 
standards. Chinese projects nearing completion are exhibiting tendencies toward delays 
and questions are rising on whether or not they will be completed properly and 
punctually. These allegations call into question the value of Chinese investments in 
infrastructure in Africa and whether they will have a true positive impact. It is important 
to note that these concerns have yet to either be corroborated or dismissed by evidence. In 
truth, as stated by this research, little empirical research has been published with regards 
to Chinese engagement in Africa (including Nigeria) and its resultant impact. The 
relationship is still young and as yet it remains difficult to attribute specific developments 
in Africa solely to the influence of the Chinese. Concurrently, most of the literature on 
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Chinese engagement in Africa has been limited to largely normative arguments- clearly 
more research is needed. Only time will tell whether or not Chinese investments in 
infrastructure in Africa will play a decisive role in African development--or lack thereof.  
The AfDB economist continues, asserting, “If you're going to really unlock the 
potential within Africa, then infrastructure should be a top priority. Infrastructure 
development. And for that reason, we have what we call core priority areas for 
interventions. Infrastructure is number one. Private sector development, agriculture, 
health, in basically the social sector. But if we're really going to unlock the potential in 
the whole continent for economic development, infrastructure is key, there's no question 
about it. And in Nigeria it is even more critical."
57
 Nigeria’s underdeveloped 
infrastructure, in particular the unreliable power supply, insufficient water, bad roads, and 
poor transportation systems (such as the decaying rail network), have proved to be 
catastrophically limiting to the development of Nigerian industry. It is not that there are 
no Nigeria manufacturers but instead that Nigerian manufacturers are under a lot of strain 
and often fail under the burden of very high overhead (expensive generators to power 
factories and fuel costs to keep generators running) and no easy way to get their products 
into the hands of consumers domestic and foreign. Although not all Nigerian 
manufacturers have floundered, the high costs of operations create a situation in which 
Nigerian-made products, though of good quality, are significantly more expensive than 
imported alternatives. This means that consumers who would rather buy locally made 
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more durable, better-quality products than the Chinese imports, find that these Nigerian 
products are too expensive.  
Assessing Africa’s development in the light of the recent entry of the Chinese into 
Africa, but solely under the lens of the dyadic relationship between African states and 
China, does give weight to claims of exploitation and the development of a dependent 
relationship between China and Africa. However, this perspective also quickly dismisses 
the significant overt and covert influence of the West in African affairs. Despite the 
Nigerian government’s continued efforts to stress its policy of nonalignment, adopted and 
upheld since Nigerian independence in 1960, a government official stresses that Africans 
are not that easily separated from the West. During the research process for this study, a 
conscious decision was made to remove reference to Western engagement with Africa in 
the official questions posed to interview respondents. However, comparisons of the West 
versus China would organically materialize; in many ways Chinese engagement in 
Nigeria has differed from that of the West. Taylor notes that Chinese engagement in 
Nigeria is largely in fixed assets, providing examples like refineries and factories; these 
sorts of investments are not characteristic of Western enterprise in Nigeria (2007).  
The draw of the Chinese has stemmed from the differences in the ways they have 
chosen to relate to African states, especially when compared to their western 
counterparts. The Chinese are actively pursuing engagement with African states, while 
Nigerian government officials note that on the whole the U.S. and European states do not 
seem to be reaching out to African states in the same manner. The West has presumed 
upon Africa and made policy prescriptions on African development that by and large 
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have had disastrous effects across the continent. The Chinese are diplomatically non-
imperial and, best of all, appear willing to share their technology to assist African states 
in catching up to the rest of the world. Also, the Chinese economy has very quickly gone 
from relatively non-significance to very high significance in the global arena. The 
extreme growth rate of the Chinese economy especially in the light of the recent global 
recession has many African states (Nigeria included) taking notice, hoping to learn a trick 
or two from the Chinese. 
The Nigerian government recently made a rather bold decision in choosing to 
convert 10 percent of its $33-billion in foreign reserves into Chinese currency, the Yuan 
(Nyagah, 2011). This strategic move was intended to boost growing trade relations 
between both countries but also to safeguard the Nigerian economy and foreign reserves 
from the economic downturn in Europe and the United States.  The ingenuity of this 
decision by the Nigerian government speaks not only to the intentionality of Nigerian 
decision-makers in engagement with China, but the timing of it also shows a side of 
African international politics not often showcased in the media or even in scholarship on 
international relations and comparative politics. China’s economic explosion has been 
largely due to the decision of its centralist government to under-value the Chinese 
currency system, the Renminbi. Undervaluing their currency has meant that Chinese 
exports to the rest of the world continue to undercut market prices and remain 
inexpensive. On the domestic front, an undervalued currency system has led to expensive 
imports for Chinese consumers and manufacturers and this has led to a need for creativity 
to meet and support burgeoning demand. While this economic policy was arguably 
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necessary to extricate Chinese economy and industry from the deplorable conditions that 
launched the Cultural Revolution and produced the economic powerhouse that it is today, 
it is not a policy that can be maintained indefinitely. The actual value of the Chinese 
currency is much higher than the present government controlled rates. Government 
control of currency exchange rates is not sustainable and when the Renmibi’s Yuan soars 
up to its true market value, 10 percent of the Nigerian government foreign exchange 
reserves will soar with it. These policy moves by the Nigerian government indicate an 
element of intentionality in the Nigerian aspect of Chinese engagement in Nigeria. They 
demonstrate a relationship motivated by national self-interest rather than dependency 
because of the very active role that Nigerians across all spheres of society are taking in 
this relationship and also because of the levels of learning and mutual benefit that are 
inherent in this relationship.  
Conclusion 
Dependency theory as a means of understanding international (economic and 
political) relations between developed and developing countries, and the 
underdevelopment of the latter, lacked cohesion conceptually and this made evident in 
the operationalization of dependency theory. Scholars differed in their tests of 
dependency, and critics noted that tests of dependency theory were used to bolster the 
arguments of dependency theorists and not to test the soundness of the dependency logic 
as a theory. Most studies centered on the argument that indicators of dependency, in 
particular economic dependency, were related to poor economic performance. An 
examination of economic trends in Africa in the 10 years preceding the FOCAC 
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conferences and the ten years following the first conference would dispel the notion of an 
economically dependent Africa. This chapter looked at real growth domestic product 
(GDP) growth rates, gross national income (GNI), and GDP per capita. In all of the 
measures examined, there appeared to be no detrimental effect to African economic 
trends following the establishment of the FOCAC. In fact it appears that following the 
FOCAC, African states have experienced better economic performance. Balance of trade 
data between China and African states from 1995 to 2009 also show that African states 
and China have a fairly even balance of trade at the aggregate level.  This is in direct 
contradiction to dependency theorists who hypothesized that dependent countries would 
exhibit unfavorable balances of trade (Kaufman et al, 1975). 
A look at Nigeria as a case study presents a different picture. Chinese trade with 
Nigeria is heavily imbalanced in favor of China but Chinese proportion of total Nigerian 
trade dilutes the impact of trade imbalance. Nigeria’s overall positive trade balance 
overshadows its imbalance with China. So despite an unbalanced trade relationship, 
Chinese trade with Nigeria is not significant enough to create a situation of economic 
dependency.  
The data presented in this chapter supports the argument put forward by Chapter 
3, that dependency theory is not an adequate framework for understanding growing Sino-
African relations. African states are benefiting from increased engagement with China.  
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Chapter 5: Nigerian Agency 
 
Introduction 
Following the launch of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), 
which is the most visible manifestation of growing Sino-African relations, African states 
appear to have benefited from engagement with China, as demonstrated in Chapter 4. 
Shelton and Paruk argue, “FOCAC forms the central pillar in advancing China–Africa 
relations and is the arena for constructive diplomatic interaction. It provides the 
foundation for building a long-term ‘win-win’ China–Africa relationship” (2008: pp.2). 
The framework of the FOCAC has been adamant in its claims of a “win-win” relationship 
at play between China and African states (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s 
Republic of China, 2006; FOCAC, 2006b; Shelton and Paruk, 2008). Like other scholars 
in this area, Shelton and Paruk note that the literature has largely focused on Chinese 
objectives and activities in Africa, and perceived impacts on African economic and social 
as well as western interests on the continent (2008; see also Alden, 2007; Brautigam, 
2009). The literature focuses extensively on the benefits to China but very little research 
empirically examines the benefit to African states. Further still, the literature has yet to 
acknowledge what might be the interests and motivations of African states in relation to 
China. This chapter attempts to fill this gap in the literature by presenting a case study of 
Nigerian motivations for increasing engagement with China. This chapter first explains 
the methodology used to gather and analyze the primary data for this study, and presents 
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the overarching themes in response to the question: why is Nigeria engaging with China? 
The chapter then discusses the three main motivators and objectives behind Nigerian 
agency in this relationship, as identified by this study: first, how Chinese courtship and 
respectful attitude attracts Nigerian counterparts; second, Nigerian intent to learn from 
China’s recent economic and technological advancements; and finally, Nigerian goals to 
maximize and exploit the economic opportunities afforded by engagement with China. 
Case Study Methodology 
To begin to understand African agency and find answers to the questions posed, I 
conducted a case study of Nigeria. A case study is a tradition of qualitative inquiry and 
research usually reserved for unknown and unfamiliar phenomena, to provide in-depth 
understanding of an event, process or individual(s) (Cresswell, 2007). The methodology 
employed to answer these questions was qualitative data gathering through interviews, 
and analysis of government policies and trade data.  The major contribution of this study 
is examination of the issue from an African perspective, going beyond the jargon of 
“South-South solidarity,” the “supremacy (or legitimacy) of sovereignty,” “non-
interference” or an “alternative to the failed Western model” as put forward by China’s 
African Policy document issued in 2006 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, 2006) 
and by others (Behar, 2008; Manji and Marks, 2007). Since this study is interested in 
what Africans think and want, the logical data would be public opinion surveys. 
However, while surveys like Afrobarometer point to Africans’ attitudes regarding the 
Chinese, they are not suited for identifying the factors that motivate African agency and 
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African objectives in increasing engagement with China. This study seeks to understand 
the active engagement of Africans with Chinese representatives.  
The majority of this research required fieldwork in Nigeria, and methodology 
applied a strategic case-study approach relying heavily on extensive interviews 
performed during the months of July and August of 2011. Approximately 130 interviews 
(formal and informal) were conducted during this period. (Respondent demographics are 
discussed in greater detail in the section on sampling selection). I conducted formal 
interviews of a semi-structured nature using guiding questions open to follow-up, and in-
depth probing was employed during the interview process (Hatch, 2002). A portion of the 
methodology incorporated secondary sources as well as primary resources, including 
China-related policy documents issued by Nigerian government agencies. These data 
were used to establish context and corroborate facts provided by interview respondents.  
The scarcity of data and the novelty of the issue area made a case study approach 
the best option for this project (Stake, 2010). Qualitative research allows for inquiry into 
what is not known (Stake, 2010). It also provides a framework for understanding a 
usually single phenomenon at a deeper and more detailed level. In addition, the 
exploratory nature of this study makes both a qualitative approach and case study 
methodology appropriate. Creswell defines a case study approach as a process wherein 
“the investigator explores a bounded system (a case) or multiple bounded systems (cases) 
over time, through detailed, in-depth data collection involving multiple sources of 
information, and reports a case description and case-based themes” (2007: pp. 73). 
Regarding the research, what is particularly salient about Creswell’s definition is the key 
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phrase “in-depth”, as this study is tasked with acquiring an understanding of Nigeria’s 
China policy, which calls for an in-depth look at the relationship between China and 
Nigeria. The added benefit of a case study methodology is its holistic approach to data 
gathering; it allows the investigator to incorporate various techniques and sources of 
information to understand the phenomena under investigation and, for the purposes of 
this study, to interpret Nigerian motivations (Merriam, 2009).  
Why Nigeria? 
The selection of Nigeria as the research site relates to both the political and 
economic nature of the country. Nigeria’s oil resources influence its characterization as a 
resource-rich country (Brautigam, 2009). China is in Africa to acquire resources to fuel 
its economy and thus is engaging with resource-rich countries, including Nigeria. Nigeria 
is a source of oil for China, which factors significantly into China’s resource grab 
(Brookes, 2007; World Trade Atlas, 2011). China’s relationship with Nigeria differs 
somewhat from its associations with most African states; in its early stages, China’s 
engagement with Nigeria was marked by the exchange of information and technology; 
Chinese know-how contributed to local industrial development (Brautigam, 2003). Alden 
notes that Nigerian traders and manufacturers still claim they adopt Chinese practices in 
manufacturing (2007). Additionally, the influx of Chinese goods into Africa, particularly 
inexpensive textiles, have hurt Nigeria’s textile industries eliminating several thousand 
jobs and also resulting in added-value impacts associated with the sale of finished goods 
(Akinrade & Ogen, 2008). Local businesses have been active in urging the government to 
adopt--or at least promote--the protection of domestic industry (Alden, 2007). So while 
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this relationship shows some of the expected outcomes of Sino-African relations, it also 
makes evident the significance of the role that Africans play in this relationship.  
Nigeria’s story of Chinese engagement is different than the rest of Africa. Its large 
population base, projected by the United Nations Population Fund to reach 162.5 million 
by 2011, can theoretically support domestic industry while at the same time consuming 
large quantities of Chinese goods (UNFPA, 2011). Nigeria also has significant political 
influence in Africa that if appropriately managed, can be exploited by China in other 
African countries. In some ways, Nigeria presents a challenging case because of its 
cultural complexities as well as its complicated political history, but this argument can 
likely extend to include some other African states. Nigeria is, however, distinctive in its 
relatively stronger and more independent government, and thus more likely to resist a 
situation of dependency on trade with China. Nigeria’s particular differences in relation 
to other African nations might have a bearing on the findings of this case study and may 
limit its applicability to Africa as a whole. However, I argue that the findings of this 
study can speak to and acknowledge agency on the part of other African states in 
choosing to engage with China, and hopefully spur discourse and further scholarship 
along these lines. 
Sampling Method 
In determining interviews in Nigeria, I followed Cresswell’s logic of purposeful 
sampling to identify “information-rich” individuals (2002). As such, I made specific 
efforts to locate individuals who directly engaged with China, particularly in business or 
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government forums. Chinese foreign policy in Africa has been characterized as 
“economic diplomacy,” as Chinese engagement has been led by business initiatives 
backed by the Chinese government (Alves in Alden et al, 2008). The Nigerian recipients 
of this diplomacy are business representatives and government officials. I chose 
government officials and business representatives because they are the driving force 
behind Nigerian policies that are either adopted or abandoned. These individuals have the 
most expertise and the greatest interaction with the Chinese who are engaging with 
Africa.   
For the purposes of this study “engagement with China” is generally defined as 
any sort of interaction with China and Chinese people. For business people and 
entrepreneurs, the term "engagement" will generally refer to import and export 
partnerships. For instance, Nigerians who sell Chinese goods and services in Nigeria, or 
Nigerians who sell African goods to the Chinese. For government officials, 
"engagement" refers to any and all actions that are carried out between Chinese and 
Nigerian personnel, institutions and agencies, among others.  
In addition to interviews with various officials, efforts were made to interview 
attendees of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) ministerial conferences 
and other FOCAC events to determine the objectives for Nigerian delegates and if and 
how they are being realized. FOCAC, according to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the 
People’s Republic of China, is “a platform established by China and friendly African 
countries for collective consultation and dialogue and a cooperation mechanism between 
the developing countries” (FOCAC, 2004a). Since its inception in Beijing in August of 
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2000, the policies and agreements resulting from FOCAC have centered around four 
significant ministerial conferences. Since 2000, four major FOCAC ministerial 
conferences have been held. The first conference was held in 2000 in Beijing, the second 
in 2003 in Addis Ababa, the third, also known as the Beijing Summit, convened in 2006 
and celebrated of the 50th anniversary of diplomatic relations between the PRC and 
African countries. The fourth and most recent conference was held in Egypt in 2009. At 
these conferences, government and business representatives from China and Africa, as 
well as other interested international actors, convene to deliberate on trade agreements, 
business contracts, and aid contributions.  
At the start of the data collection process, critical-case sampling was used to 
identify individuals who can best illustrate Nigerian agency in Chinese. Government 
officials were selected based on the offices in which they work. Chinese engagement in 
Nigeria has been particularly evident in infrastructure development, information 
technology, petroleum and commerce. Federal ministries with responsibilities in these 
sectors as well as government agencies and parastatals were identified from a 
government-issued registry. Wherever possible, interviews were conducted with officials 
from relevant government agencies and various areas of Chinese engagement (identified 
by the PRC’s Africa policy document58, accessed Joint Press Communiques between 
PRC and Nigeria
59
 and the Programme for China-Africa Co-operation in Economic and 
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Social Development following the launch of FOCAC
60
). A variety of other individuals 
were identified and interviewed, including department directors, bilateral relations 
officers, and information officers responsible for managing relations with China.  
To identify interview respondents, I arrived at government agencies and requested 
to speak with information and public relations personnel or bilateral relations and China 
specialists, preferably directors. This helped limit but not eliminate the predictable 
administration run-around. Often a series of unofficial interviews took place before I was 
able to locate a government employee able to provide me with an official interview. 
Many offices required an official request for information and access that was sent to the 
office of the federal minister for approval before any sort of audience would be granted 
even from those on the lowest rung of the ladder. In every case, the requests were 
formally approved.  Sometimes the approval did very little to improve the demeanor and 
assistance offered by certain government officials. At other agencies, access was outright 
denied despite the fact that the Nigerian government had just recently passed a Freedom 
of Information Bill that on its own merit should have granted access to government 
employees and information. In stark contrast, in other agencies and departments, the 
letter of approval went a long way, opening doors and making information and data 
typically withheld from the public available to my research. Contracts, agreements, 
reports and data figures were shared.  
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Similarly, I walked into the local markets and asked around for traders that 
travelled to China to acquire the goods and with persistence was able to locate a number 
of traders who then recommended me to other traders. I made visits to the Chinese 
embassy in Abuja and talked to the Nigerians who were waiting to collect their approved 
visas and interviewed some traders and contractors. I also stopped by Chinatown in 
Lagos, the commercial capital of Nigeria and spoke with Nigerian traders who had set-up 
shop within this predominantly Asian setting. In Lagos, I made a stop at the Nigerian 
Institute for International Affairs (NIIA) and spent some time with Nigerian political 
scientists and academics who influence the policy-making process in Nigeria.
61
 Through 
the NIIA, I was able to locate and speak with a Nigerian scholar recently returned from 
China, where his doctorate program had been sponsored by the Chinese government. On 
the drive to Niger and Burkina Faso, I came across a gold mine in Zamfara State that 
receives technical aid from China and spoke with a Nigerian employee as well as the 
Chinese national who ran the mine and had worked in Africa for about 10 years. On a 
flight from Lagos to Kaduna State, I met a Chinese national who had just arrived in 
Nigeria (and in Africa for the first time) to work as a mid-level for a Tianshi group based 
out of Kaduna, whose Nigerian independent contractors I had interviewed a week earlier. 
I had a chance to meet and speak with his Chinese boss on the same flight. In many ways 
locating and identifying subjects to interview, in such a short frame of time was pure luck 
but it was also the result of a dogged drive to get the necessary data and maximize my use 
of very limited time. Sometimes I was able to grow my subject pool using snowball 
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sampling to identify more individuals to interview, but often because I lacked the 
necessary cushion time-wise to rely on snowball sampling, it was necessary that I kept 
visiting new offices, new government agencies, talking to contractors, businessmen and 
asking almost everyone I met about Nigeria’s relationship with China.  
Of the nearly 130 formal and informal interviews conducted for this project, 62 
were formal; the approved interview protocol was employed and respondents signed 
informed consent documents. A listing of the official interview respondents is available 
in Appendix F. Government representatives made up about 35 percent (22 respondents) 
of the formal interviews. Among those interviewed were directors and bilateral relations 
officers from the Federal Ministry of Tourism, Culture and National Orientation, the 
National Planning Commission, the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Federal 
Ministry of Trade and Investment. The list of interview respondents also included five 
prominent politicians: a current federal minister in the Nigerian Cabinet, a senator in the 
Nigerian National Assembly, a former Nigerian ambassador to China, a former Nigerian 
presidential advisor who had also previously served as a Federal Minister in the Cabinet 
and a former presidential candidate.  
Business and industry representatives accounted for approximately 47 percent (30 
respondents) of the formal interviews, varying from small to mid-size traders who import 
Chinese manufactured goods to bankers (and bank managers) from the Nigerian Export-
Import Bank, the Bank of Industry and the Central Bank of Nigeria. Academics and non-
governmental policy specialists comprised the remaining 19 percent (12 respondents). 
These respondents included economists from the African Development Bank, political 
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scientists from the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, and directors from business 
and investment promotion agencies with ties to the Nigerian government.  Examples 
include the Nigeria-China Friendship Association, the Nigerian Investment Promotion 
Commission and the Nigeria-China Business Council. 
This study attempted to collect ethnographically representative data, to account 
for differences in socio-economic, geographic and cultural variables. Varying levels of 
business representatives, as mentioned earlier allowed for socio-economic diversity in the 
data collected. Interviews were primarily conducted in three major Nigerian cities: Zaria, 
Abuja and Lagos. This means that respondents geographically represented north, central 
and southern Nigeria. In addition, some effort was made to ensure cultural diversity 
among the interview respondents, and included representation from the three major 
people groups of Nigeria: Hausa, Yoruba and Igbo.  
Interview Protocol 
Interviews were formal interviews of a semi-structured nature. The interview 
protocol made use of guiding questions open to follow-up and in-depth probing into 
issues raised during the interview process. The interviews were scheduled at 30-45 
minutes, but duration varied, based on the amount of information provided by the 
participants. The official interview protocol (see Appendix B) was split into two separate 
categories, (1) government officials and (2) business and industry representatives. 
Interviewees who did not fall into government official or business and industry 
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representative categories were interviewed with the questions from the latter categories’ 
protocol. 
Data Analysis 
After the interviews, transcripts of interviews provided the data. When, at the 
respondents’ request, interviews were not voice recorded, research notes were coded for 
themes. Codes are labels, or characteristics affixed to the collected data, and used to 
organize and catalogue the data to allow analysis. All of the data were coded by hand 
using descriptive and analytic coding strategies. Descriptive coding provides for storage 
of the interview information in a manner that allows investigators to determine patterns 
and explanations and to identify theories (Morse and Richards, 2002). Analytic coding 
allows for the generation of themes and categories from the collected data.  According to 
Morse and Richards, analytic coding can reveal thematic content, exploration of new 
concepts and provide opportunities for comparisons or development of new themes 
(2003). As such, both descriptive and analytic codes were identified. These codes were 
then further scrutinized and categorized into three analytical groupings: intent, 
relationship and effects. Using the identified groupings and codes, themes were generated 
to describe the phenomena being studied.   
Verification procedures 
Determining validity in qualitative studies differs from quantitative studies. Issues 
of reliability and generalizability, central to the issue of validity for quantitative studies, 
play a lesser role in qualitative studies. Here validity is instead a reflection of "accuracy," 
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"trustworthiness," "authenticity," and "credibility" (Creswell, 2007). Some studies are 
able to use multiple investigators to cross check reliability of themes generated from the 
listing of codes. This particular study, however, has only one investigator and as such 
needed to make a conscious effort to validate the accuracy of its findings.  
This research relied heavily on triangulation, rich and thick descriptions, 
presentation of discrepant information and peer debriefing to assure the validity of the 
findings. Triangulation of the information provided by the different data sources is the 
most significant way to prove validity. Information and references that were strongly 
repeated across every interview prove the validity of a given theme. In addition, the 
findings have been triangulated against other (secondary) sources including newspaper 
articles, journal articles and other studies on China in Africa, a process necessary to 
corroborate the information revealed by the research, in particular to verify specific 
events or figures. Rich and thick descriptions of the themes, corroborated by extensive 
use of quotes from interviews also serve to further assure of the validity of the findings 
and the themes generated in this study. Discrepant or outlying information has also been 
presented with descriptions of the context surrounding it to further enhance 
understanding of the phenomena under study. Finally, this project made use of peer de-
briefers to ensure that the published findings "resonate" with others beyond the primary 
researcher. These peer de-briefers included academics and political scientists at the 
Nigerian Institute of International Affairs. 
Ethical considerations 
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Addressing ethical considerations, especially when dealing with interview 
subjects is necessary. This study would be not be categorized as a harmful study; no 
damage of any kind came to respondents as a direct result of participation in this study. In 
addition, participants were provided with the option for self-identification in the reporting 
of findings in this study. Most participants chose not to be personally identified; 
therefore, reference is made to representative groups in lieu of using names. Government 
officials, although approved by their ministries to participate, spoke in their official 
capacity and not as private citizens; to that end, these respondents preferred to speak 
anonymously. These requests were respected and identities withheld. Approximately 20 
percent of the official interview respondents consented to being identified in this study. 
Even then, respondents were only identified when deemed necessary by the researcher.  
Most respondents were identified in an occupational capacity as opposed to being 
identified by name. 
Research Findings 
The major findings of this study were encapsulated in an early interview with 
Nigerian businessman and entrepreneur Lawal, who also invests in telecommunications 
equipment
62
.   Mr. Lawal noted that it was necessary to do business with the Chinese in 
order to survive in today’s economy and to remain competitive. To date, however, his 
business arrangements with the Chinese have not been as profitable as hoped, partly 
because he was still learning how to best engage with Chinese counterparts. He noted that 
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the Chinese provided goods at varying quality levels to match the purses of Nigerian 
purchasers, and he had paid for cheap goods but not quality goods. Though he had 
previously lost money, he stated that he would continue to engage with the Chinese--and 
on a greater scale--because he feels it is necessary for future success. His experience and 
words resonated across different facets of Nigerian life. Nigerians, at all levels and in 
varied capacities, both publicly and privately, echoed these sentiments. Even though net 
benefits may not be visible presently, Nigerians are choosing to engage with China 
because they see engagement as the way forward for individuals and for the country. 
Despite missteps, learning allows for adjustments to be made, and with the involvement 
of China, quicker steps in the direction of progress. In the words of Mr. Lawal, 
“sometimes, China is the only option.”63 Chinese engagement with Nigeria is creating 
opportunities for Nigerians in Nigeria. 
This section presents a discussion of the themes laden in the data collected as they 
pertain to motivations and objectives of Nigerians in increasing engagement with China. 
This study unearthed three major themes. They are: 
1) Nigerians are engaging with China because of China’s courtship and 
respectful attitude towards Nigeria. 
2) Nigerians want to learn from China. 
3) Nigerians want to maximize their economic benefit. 
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The rest of this chapter describes these themes in greater detail, and discusses how they 
manifest in specific groups, in particular the Nigerian government, the private sector 
(business and industry) and where relevant, the consumer sector and academia. It is 
important to note that this chapter is most concerned with the perceptions of Nigerians 
and so quotes that best represent the expressed views of the respondents were 
incorporated into the write-up. These perceptions whether or not they are couched in fact 
or stem from misinformation and rumored fabrications, influence Nigerians’ 
understanding of their relationship with China and what they believe Nigeria stands to 
gain. 
The following sections first identify the role that the Chinese play and how the 
differences in the nature of Chinese engagement attract Nigerians, and then explore 
Nigerian objectives to learn from China to develop the Nigerian economy. 
Chinese Courtship and Respect 
The first and most dominant theme in the findings is Nigerians’ motivation to engage 
with China because of mutual respect, in contrast to engagement with the West. 
Nigerians note that China has presented a respectful alternative, although scholars at the 
Nigerian Institute for International Affairs
64
 warn that it is perhaps misleading to portray 
China as an alternative to the West, arguing instead that what China provides Nigeria 
(and Africa at-large) is a strategic opportunity. However, how this strategic opportunity 
has been promoted and presented by the Chinese, and its stark differences from how 
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Western counterparts (the U.S., Great Britain, France and Germany) engage with 
Nigerians was a strong theme that emerged in almost every interview. What makes this 
theme all the more fascinating is that the interview questions contained no reference to 
the West--the comparison between China and the West was a natural development 
initiated by interview respondents. Although this section does not directly discuss 
Nigerian objectives, it identifies factors that make the Chinese attractive to Nigerians, 
which this study would argue are just as important as Nigerian objectives, as they pertain 
to the Nigerian government, business and industry representatives.  
It falls to Nigeria’s federal government to provide and pursue opportunities that 
will foster growth and development. Engagement with China--while originally a 
government-driven phenomenon
65
--has since transformed into a consumer and business-
driven relationship. However, government’s role remains important to Nigeria-China 
relations; in many ways, the government is the quintessential facilitator of the dyadic 
relationship between entities from both sides. As such, it is important to identify the 
motivators that compel Nigerian foreign relations with China. When asked why Nigeria 
is seeking engagement, the first answer from most government officials was that Nigeria 
must engage with China; everybody must engage with China because of its growing 
economic and political significance on the global stage
66
. As the world disengages from 
the bipolar power system that characterized the Cold War, the ensuing collapse of the 
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Soviet Union, and since U.S. participation in two costly foreign wars, it appears that the 
world is moving towards a multi-polar system. China’s economic prominence and firm 
political position make it a new contender for power and influence in global politics. In 
light of these factors, it is important to understand the leading motivator of Nigeria’s 
diplomatic engagement with China.   
The role of Chinese courtship in Nigerian Agency 
As noted in Chapter 2, most of the literature on Chinese engagement in Africa, 
Nigeria included, approaches the issue from the Chinese perspective and is quite correct 
in its inherent position that China is a major driver in the development of new 
relationships. A major finding of this study is the relevance of the Chinese factor in 
driving Nigeria-China relations and subsequently Nigeria’s China policy. The Chinese 
have made it clear that they want to engage with Nigeria; their active pursuit and 
courtship of increased interaction with Nigeria has advanced development of relations. 
According to a government official, “China is engaging Nigeria seriously. They 
understand us. They know our problems. They know we have the market. ...If you 
consider all the potentials of Nigeria as a nation, as a giant in the making, there is no 
country that can just brush us aside without looking for our friendship, without looking 
for our market and without looking for our collaboration at the multilateral level.” He 
further explains, “China is interested in engaging with virtually every country. But it has 
singled out Nigeria because of our own peculiarities. We share a lot of things in common. 
China is the biggest country in Asia. Nigeria is the biggest country in Africa. Now it 
[China] has emerged as the second largest economy in the world. What it requires to 
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grow industrially in terms of fuel and energy, keeps on expanding every day. Nigeria 
produces one of the best oils in the world. The peculiarities of Nigeria, the endowments 
of Nigeria, what we have, our market, we are a bride to any country - any developed 
country - because we have the market. We are strategically located. We are a regional 
power in the West Africa sub-region.  We are very influential. We’ve done a lot of things 
that would attract any developing or developed country. Let me emphasize this, 
especially our market. I tell you one thing, sad enough, we are not a productive country, 
I’m not sorry to say this. We are a consumer nation.”67 All these factors and more have 
made Nigeria a necessary strategic partner for China and there is little question as to 
Chinese intents to have this relationship grow over the long-term. 
China’s Africa policy document talks about the need for collaboration amongst 
developing countries like China and Nigeria (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s 
Republic of China, 2006). According to the findings of this research there is little 
question that the Chinese have actively pursued a relationship with Nigeria. In describing 
the relationship between China and Nigeria, interviewees ranging from marketplace 
traders to high–level government officials and political pundits all described engagement 
between Nigeria and China as a “cordial relationship.” This relationship has developed 
through channels such as FOCAC, (the Forum of China Africa Cooperation), which has 
successfully resulted in additional partnerships between Chinese and Nigerians, in 
tandem with the Nigeria-China Joint Commission for Cooperation. The Nigeria-China 
                                                          
67
 Phone interview with Nigerian US Consulate officer, April 6, 2011, Washington DC.  
Note: these exact points were raised by many government officials and recurrent points throughout 
interviews with government officials, but best stated by this officer. 
132 
Joint Commission for Cooperation is perhaps the best policy document the Nigerian 
government has created describing any explicit policy on Chinese foreign relations. 
Signed in 1976, this document served to mark the formal agreement of recognition of 
each state and helped define the parameters of engagement between them. Following the 
guidelines set in the Joint Commission, large delegations of Nigerian and Chinese 
governmental representatives, typically from every federal ministry and their Chinese 
equivalents, meet frequently for “joint commissions” that fall under the purview of the 
Nigerian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). In league with the Nigerian National 
Planning Commission and the Federal Ministry of Finance, the MFA compiles, organizes 
and collates Nigerian objectives and goals to cultivate better and more fruitful 
negotiations with the Chinese. The joint commissions have recently met more frequently, 
alternating locations between China and Nigeria. In these meetings all aspects of 
engagement are discussed, from the service agreements on which airlines will operate 
routes from Nigeria to China, to desired levels of cooperation in agriculture and food 
security, to cooperation in health, education, science and technology. The Nigerian 
government is not alone in its efforts to coordinate increased engagement. Agencies such 
as the Nigerian-China Friendship Association, NICAF, and the Nigeria-China Business 
Council (NCBC) are playing a more active role in the development of Nigeria-China 
relations. NICAF was founded by former Nigerian Ambassador, Victor Nwaozichi 
Chibundu, who has previously served in China. NCBC is a business-driven private-sector 
partnership with the Nigerian government that organizes trade missions to China and 
hosts Chinese missions to Nigeria
68
. Spearheaded by the efforts of the government as 
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well as these agencies, Sino-Nigerian trade is expanding (Okoh, 2011), as well as 
assuring economic and political ties. A news report illustrates,  
 “Speaking in Abuja when they visited Nigerian Investment Promotion 
Commission (NIPC), the CICIR
69
 President said that the trade volume 
between Nigeria and China reached $7.5 billion last year. 
He said that Nigeria is the fourth trade partner of China in Africa and the 
second exporter market in the continent. He said that by November 2010, 
the total contract investment by China to Nigeria reached $13.3 billion, 
adding that some of the investments are concentrated in the oil & gas 
sector” (Williams, 2011). 
Expanding trade and political relations between China and Nigeria are predicated 
on Nigeria’s acceptance of the One China Policy, which has always been a pre-requisite 
for Chinese engagement with other countries. This requirement was clearly stated in 
China’s Africa policy document (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of 
China, 2006) as well as by representatives of the Nigerian government as a policy to 
which Nigeria is committed. However, China recognizes Nigeria's sovereignty and even 
though it demands recognition of the People's Republic of China
70
, it has not constrained 
Nigerian economic interests in Taiwan, also a trading partner of the PRC. In recognition 
of the One China Policy, the Nigerian government has no official political dealings with 
Taiwan; instead, Nigerian engagement with Taiwan is limited to economic and business 
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arrangements that are the prerogative of a sovereign Nigerian state and do not technically 
renege on commitment to the One China Policy.  
China’s recognition and respect for Nigeria’s sovereignty and the right of 
government to make decisions and carry out policy that is not necessarily in tandem with 
China’s own policies has made China an attractive partner, despite a number of 
ideological differences between China and Nigeria. For instance, China is communist 
while Nigeria is capitalist; China’s communism does not permit religion, while Nigeria is 
a deeply religious country. Such fundamental differences mean that the Nigerian 
government does not always share the same views as the Chinese government and 
therefore does not always agree with China. In spite of the occurrence of incongruence 
and incompatibility on policy objectives (sometimes economic and other times political) 
the Chinese have continued to relate with Nigeria in a manner that shows respect for 
Nigeria’s sovereignty. The visibility of this respect, even in the face of disagreement, sets 
China apart and improves the state of relations between both countries and their levels of 
engagement. China’s overt acceptance of Nigerian sovereignty and non-bullish attitude 
plays a strong role in attracting Nigerians to pursue relations with China. 
One of the more prominent political motivators for increasing Nigerian 
engagement with China is China’s expressed support for UN reforms. In particular, great 
discourse has been devoted to allotting a seat on the UN’s Security Council to an African 
state, and Nigeria is strongly vying for that position. Although no concrete development 
towards this end has materialized, especially within the UN, Nigerian government 
representatives are hopeful for this outcome and avow China’s support for an African 
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seat on the UN’s Security Council. The issue at stake is the frequent omission of Africa 
and African states’ interests in strategic decisions made by the Security Council71. 
Change is necessary, especially in light of the fact that African countries are sovereign 
states, like the states that comprise the Security Council. As the source of a variety of raw 
materials with increasing significance in the global market, it is important that African 
interests are protected in the global arena. Concerns of under-development and 
dependency only begin to shed light on the need for a more leveraged effort to protect 
and pursue African interests; a seat on the UN Security Council would provide this 
opportunity. 
Nigerian motivations for engaging with China differ as one begins to look at 
specific federal ministries and agencies that pursue objectives specific to their fields. For 
instance, the Ministry of Tourism and Culture looks to promote Nigerian culture in China 
and Chinese culture in Nigeria to increase cultural exposure and exchange
72
. Increased 
personal engagement and interaction between Nigerians and Chinese can only serve to 
further entrench the growing relationship between the two. Every three years, 
representatives from China and Nigeria meet to discuss what specific actions will be 
undertaken over the next three-year period with regards to cultural and tourist interaction 
between China and Nigeria
73
.  The Ministry of Science and Technology is engaging 
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Chinese assistance in their bid to promote technological advancement in Nigeria
74
. The 
Raw Materials Research and Development Council (RMRDC)
75
, and the Nigerian 
Institute of International Relations (NIIA) both note that they are seeking engagement 
with China because it provides training and higher education opportunities for their staff 
and affiliates
76
. The Ministry of Trade
77
, Standards Organization of Nigeria
78
 and 
National Agency for Food & Drug Administration and Control (NAFDAC)
79
 are seeking 
China’s collaboration in improving the process of monitoring of goods that enter Nigeria 
from China and upgrading the system of product regulation. These entities are not alone: 
Chinese Embassy reports
80
 (as well as news articles, FOCAC reports and interviews) 
indicate that many agencies, professional journalists, members of the judiciary and others 
have established partnerships with the Chinese. Through the exchange of information, 
techniques and technology, they are working towards improving service offerings to 
Nigerian citizens. In a variety of ways, China exemplifies a different model, and Nigerian 
agencies are taking action to learn from it and apply it to the benefit of Nigerians. 
Business Representatives 
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Nigerian government agencies note that they are able to pursue their own agenda 
and objectives in this growing relationship, because of Chinese courtship and the nature 
of their engagement with the Chinese. Similarly, Nigerian businessmen and market 
traders note that they too have been sought by Chinese entities. Chinese Trade expos and 
trade promotion agencies working with the Chinese government
81
 send official 
invitations to Nigerian traders that make the process of sourcing goods in China quick 
and easy.
82
 These expos feature many different kinds of manufacturers, enough to meet 
the needs of most traders, and participants could attend the expo, meet suppliers, place 
orders and return to Nigeria to receive them. The Chinese had more than streamlined the 
business process, it was quick, easy and efficient, and they were inviting Nigerians to be 
a part of it. Similarly, Nigerians are inviting and encouraging the Chinese to trade with 
them. The Lagos Chamber of Commerce and Industry organizes an annual international 
trade fair, and working with the Chinese embassy they are increasing trade relations with 
China.
83
 
It is a logical progression to see that China’s courtship of Nigeria as well as the 
development of a partnership promoting mutual respect and mutual benefit has played out 
into more favorable business conditions between Nigerian and Chinese business entities. 
This view is also supported by Alves’ (2008) claim that Chinese foreign policy in Africa 
(and thereby Nigeria) is perhaps best described as a form of “economic diplomacy.” 
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Dambisa Moyo (2009) made a similar observation when she noted that Chinese 
engagement in Africa is significantly more businesslike in nature than that of the West. 
The literature review, as well as the results of this research, supports the position that 
Chinese engagement in Nigeria and in Africa is spearheaded by enterprise and industry. 
Through promoting these economic values to Nigerians (and Africans), the Chinese have 
quite clearly gone to great lengths to improve the conditions of conducting business in 
Africa, and have made the business environment at the very least more attractive than the 
customary Western one. This is evidenced in Chinese contractors’ bids away from 
Western competitors.  It is also evidenced in statements by Nigerian business and 
government representatives, expressing their views that the Chinese believe in the 
Nigerian economy, markets, and Nigerian businessmen. Chinese faith and confidence in 
the Nigerian businessmen has welcomed and motivated Nigerian businessmen to 
increasingly engage with China. 
The Role of the West in Increasing Sino-Nigerian Engagement 
The attractiveness of the Chinese to their Nigerian counterparts is not entirely of 
China’s making.  While the Chinese have done a lot to entice Nigerians, the case can be 
made that a history of bad business practices and exploitation at the hands of Western 
partners have also served to push Nigerians towards China. Though not specifically 
addressed in the interview questions, the idea that China could provide an alternative to 
Western options was recurrent in most of the interviews and a natural development in 
discussions regarding the draw of the Chinese.   
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Popular culture has made Nigeria synonymous with the negative labels corruption 
and scams. A noteworthy example is the recent and continued fallout from the indictment 
of high level Halliburton executives and U.S. politicians on charges of corruption and 
bribery stemming from a Nigerian-led investigation into Halliburton’s conduct in 
Nigeria. The subject of the Halliburton case was introduced by several interviewees for 
this study who noted Nigerian corruption with equally culpable western counterparts has 
earned Nigeria and Nigerian businesses stigma and detrimentally impacted the ability of 
Nigerian business representatives to engage with western counterparts, with very limited 
impact to their western counterparts.  
The data collected by this study show that dishonest behavior has seeped into 
Nigeria’s business practices with the West, and corruption has become habitual and 
unavoidable. In addition, corruption is not only a Nigerian practice, but it exists on both 
sides of the table—in other words, how can one be corrupt if there is no one else to 
engage in corrupt behavior? Clearly, the years of rampant corruption made easy in 
Nigeria by government instability and persistent military rule has created a business 
relationship between Nigeria and the West where corruption has become customary and 
inherent. These conditions are not conducive to true and sustainable business and 
economic growth and development. The repercussions of such detrimental practices are 
the aversion and reluctance to trade with Nigerians—not only to Nigerians but also to 
western counterparts. It is quite likely the habit of corrupt business practices between the 
West and Nigeria has been the motivation for the business standards and calls for 
increasing transparency in trade and economic agreements.   
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According to the respondents in this study, the opportunity to engage with China 
seems a chance for a fresh start. This is not to say that no corruption takes place between 
China and Nigeria. Chinese tendencies towards a lack of transparency in business deals 
and agreements provide the right conditions for corruption. However, what this study 
brings to light is that, in spite of the negative environment, engagement with China 
affords Nigerian businessmen and entrepreneurs the chance to conduct legitimate, honest, 
corruption-free business should they choose. Despite the past, China can serve as a clean 
slate. While corruption may still exist, it is avoidable and unnecessary for business. 
This finding appears to contradict a good portion of the literature which makes 
reference to the Chinese penchant for corruption, and the relative ease for corruption 
brought about by secretive, non-transparent Chinese trade arrangements. This issue of 
corruption accusations leveled against the Chinese in Africa, especially from the West,
84
 
was noted by an interview respondent who said, “...this is the thing that the westerners 
are accusing China of…that the Chinese don’t do business ethically, but they 
[westerners] have demonstrated over and over again themselves that they are not doing 
business in Africa and in Nigeria particularly ethically. […]No, they (the West) can’t 
accuse China 100% and get away with it. Honestly, Chinese, they can do business 
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ethically. It depends on how you approach them.”85 So while corruption is quite feasible 
in Nigeria/China relations, the opposite is also a readily accessible option. 
In addition, the Chinese were noted by respondents to behave more professionally 
than Westerners and this difference is a draw for Nigerians seeking to engage with China.  
P. Ter, a supplier of Chinese-produced educational software and computer systems 
remarks, “You write emails, they [Chinese] reply [to] you. You know, this issue of 
advance fee fraud that is prominent in Nigeria has made European and American 
companies so apprehensive, such that when you see a profile of a U.S. company or an 
American company and it meets your requirement and you make inquiries, they don’t 
respond for fear of being defrauded. But the Chinese companies don’t keep silent. You 
make an inquiry, they will respond to you. And of course, I’m not holding forth for 
fraudsters but I believe that in business if somebody makes an inquiry you respond but 
you have to be careful. So one big advantage or one issue that draws some of us close to 
them [the Chinese] is the ease with which they respond to our inquiry. You don’t need to 
go begging them, it’s like they also want you. With the Europeans and American 
companies it’s like you have to go begging them.”86 
Another attractive component to Chinese trade is the affordability of Chinese 
products versus Western goods. (This point is discussed to a greater extent in upcoming 
sections of this chapter.) A major difference between the Chinese and the West is that the 
Chinese sell technology and the West does not.  A government official put it best, “We 
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are engaging with China because it could be cheaper for us. Chinese engineering is 
cheaper than western engineering. They have made giant strides in agriculture. They have 
made giant strides in trade expansion. They have taken giant strides in industrialization. 
We are engaging with them because we see them as an alternative to western technology 
for which they will attach certain conditionalities before you can access. China is willing 
to share. Yeah, China is willing to share with Africans, especially Nigerians.”87 A 
Nigerian businessman points out the same advantage, “Chinese willingness to sell 
technology, which is very, very difficult to get from Europe or Western world. So as long 
as you are ready to pay, the Chinese are easily willing to sell their technology. In fact I 
have procured technologies more than once, more than twice I would say. Just purely the 
technology. Right now I am even discussing with my partners on behalf of someone, a 
company. They just wanted technical men to come over, rehabilitate the plant and run it. 
That is sale of technology. In Europe, it was always difficult. They always tied it to their 
supply of the equipment and the personnel, unlike China. In fact, I think I would not be 
very wrong to say that their [the Chinese] willingness to sell that technology openly 
contributed to my interest in China a great deal.”88 By selling technology to Nigerians, 
the Chinese are succeeding in outperforming, out-supplying, and upending their Western 
competition. 
A recurrent comment in research interviews was that the Chinese path to 
development and industrialization was significantly shorter than the Western path to 
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development. This shorter option is attractive to Nigeria as it seeks to quicken its rate of 
development. China’s recent rapid development has provided a new way of addressing 
development, and it makes sense that other countries like Nigeria would be interested in 
learning from China and following in a similar path. According to respondents, part of 
the rationale for looking to China as a model of development is the Nigerian belief that 
Western states have made distinct efforts to curb African and Nigerian development. The 
same cannot be said of China, which is visibly investing in infrastructure development in 
Nigeria. There is little question that the history of relations between Western countries 
and Nigeria has left a bad taste and has also adversely affected current and potentially 
future Nigeria-Western relations. This confining situation has pushed Nigerians to pursue 
other opportunities, other partnerships that may actually give Nigeria room to grow, to 
move forward and progress as a nation. China presents itself as one such opportunity and 
its marked departure from Western patterns of engagement is attracting Nigerian 
counterparts. This section has illustrated the importance of Chinese courtship of 
Nigerians and how that has influenced increasing engagement between both states.  
Learning and Development 
A major objective, which this study posits as the most significant objective 
driving Nigeria's engagement with China at governmental, public and private levels, is 
learning. China presents a novel picture of a state that has rapidly industrialized and has 
alleviated and successfully addressed issues of poverty amongst constituents. Nigerians 
are looking to learn from the Chinese model, not to duplicate it, but to borrow from the 
ideas and logic behind China’s recent rapid economic and social development. According 
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to academics at NIIA, “Nigeria is willing to pay the price if we get what we need and 
want,”89  and economic growth and progress akin to that of China is a central goal for the 
Nigerian government and people. A representative for the Nigeria China Business 
Council (NCBC) notes that there is a strong belief that learning from China will improve 
Nigeria. When discussing the effects of the increasing engagement with the Chinese on 
Nigerians, he had the following to say, 
“Well I’ll say it’s been positive; in the sense that the goods that are being 
made in China are affordable to Nigerians. Secondly, Nigerians don’t 
receive the kind of discrimination and racism they receive from western 
nations. Thirdly, Nigeria recognizes the fact that China is an emerging 
market economy, just as Nigeria is, and we share a lot of similarities, in 
terms of culture, behavior and understanding. We believe that learning 
from China from the same background, Nigeria can improve. They are 
very strong in small scale enterprises, Nigeria is learning from that. With a 
population of over 1.5 billion, they have food security; we believe with 
our teeming population we should borrow relief from the Chinese. We 
also believe we can learn from their humility, the Chinese are very 
humble.  
[…]Nigeria is a nation that is growing; that wants genuine partners, that is 
desirous of countries that will share their aspirations through 
understanding, dialogue and commitment. That we’ve seen with the 
Chinese. We’ve had cases where people condemn their products for low 
standards, but those issues are being dealt with. We also are noticing that 
apart from the little problems with standard, that their heavy industries 
coming to Nigeria and they are doing very well.”90 
Many of the interview respondents noted their belief that Nigeria is very resource-rich 
even beyond its oil reserves but much needs to be done to increase chances to exploit 
these other opportunities in towards development. Borrowing technology from China, 
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taking cues from China’s humble approach to international relations and engagement, and 
ruthlessly pursuing business opportunities, are some of the practices that Nigerians want 
to adopt.  
Nigerians are seeking knowledge from the Chinese in many areas: economic 
development, agriculture, healthcare, education, and capacity building through 
technology transfer, and adaptation and infrastructure development
91
. With regards to 
economic development and growth, the particular area of interest for Nigerian 
businessmen and policymakers is small and medium enterprise (SME) development. A 
banker at the Nigeria Export Import Bank (NEXIM) notes that Nigerian SMEs likely 
have the most to gain from increasing engagement with China
92
.  Western capitalist 
models of development for the most part were built on economies and industries of scale, 
which are the products of specialization. Such large-scale projects have been 
predominately unsuccessful in Africa and Nigeria. Reasons for persistent 
underdevelopment throughout Africa have been pursued by many scholars and policy 
specialists. Theories with a rationale similar to dependency theory have been introduced, 
but lasting and sustainable solutions have yet to be discovered. This chapter is not 
concerned with contributing to the debate on addressing and solving the issues of 
underdevelopment in Nigeria and in Africa, but what remains indisputable is that 
continued attempts for industries of scale have mostly failed. A number of factors 
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including, but not limited to, external pressure, lack of dependable logistical support, and 
unreliable infrastructure have contributed to these failures.  This has led to the “need to 
look to Asia for new blueprints on development.”93 
Accordingly, engagement with China provides a paradigm shift in the approach to 
economic development, one that may be better suited for Nigeria’s economic culture and 
many budding entrepreneurs. Almost every person is somehow self-employed in the 
informal sector, whether or not they have a regular 9 to 5 occupation
94
. Not only do small 
and medium enterprises thrive, they are more successful in an environment and economic 
culture that does not appear to be conducive to industries of scale
95
. This is a significant 
similarity shared by China and Nigeria; although China is presently known as the 
manufacturing capital of the world, it has built aspects of its economic progress on the 
foundation of small and medium enterprises. China’s significant advantage and key factor 
in its path to development has not been greater resources but the ability to better organize 
and harness their resources, and herein lies the lessons Nigerians are so eager for.  
A major area of concern for Nigerian development as discovered by this research 
was food production and agricultural production. Based on my travels and research on 
Nigeria, food security is not a problem. From the coastal fishing of southern Nigeria to 
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the rice paddies and millet fields of the north, adjacent to the semi-arid Sahel region, food 
is readily available. Yet as I observed in my extensive travels, all the fresh food came 
from what would be typically categorized as subsistence farmers or small-scale 
commercial farmers, small to medium size producers. Although food supply in Nigeria is 
not problematic for domestic consumers, production is highly inefficient, which limits 
gains and potential income in agriculture that could be accrued by the country. The 
Nigerian government is noted in Nigerian newspapers and news articles for its food aid, 
especially to other African countries; however, food production as a major source of 
national income has yet to be adequately developed and for Nigeria, opportunities 
abound. Issues of global food security are making Africa’s vast arable land a hot 
commodity. Nigeria has a unique opportunity to capitalize on this resource. For example, 
the Chinese requested cassava chips from Nigeria to be used as biofuels in China. 
Cassava is widely grown in Nigeria in excess of domestic market demands, and the hardy 
crop grows everywhere, lining highways throughout the country. Yet according to 
Nigerian officials in the federal ministries of Foreign Affairs and Trade and Investment, 
Chinese demands have yet to be fulfilled. 
China is not the only market eager for Nigerian agricultural products. North of 
Nigeria is Niger, a dry and dusty country consisting mainly of a southern section of the 
Sahara Desert. Northern Nigeria has been described as semi-arid and when compared to 
the lush jungles of the south and the delta regions of the country, it has a much dryer 
climate. However, in the Nigerian state of Sokoto, one of the northernmost states, there is 
some water and surprisingly quite a bit of agriculture, enough to even grow rice. Crossing 
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the border into Niger is a shocking experience. In the few short miles it takes to leave 
Nigeria and enter into Birn’nkoni, gone are the farms and the green and the motor 
vehicles. In the much poorer Niger, donkeys drawing carts blink away the dust and the 
sand that coats everything. Here the petty Nigerian traders are the big men about town 
and products from Nigeria bear high costs.  
Nigerian farmers have an exceptional opportunity to provide fresh produce, not 
only to Niger but to other countries in West Africa, taking advantage of the simplicity of 
travel and inter-country trade put in place by ECOWAS. However, Nigerian agriculture is 
not developed enough to capitalize on these opportunities. With continued challenges in 
transportation logistics due to a suffering infrastructure system, potential additional 
income is unremittingly lost. Nigerians interviewed noted the need to invest in the 
development of the agricultural sector and Chinese technical training in agriculture and 
agricultural research is expected to play a decisive role towards this end. Chinese experts 
are travelling to Nigeria to train and Nigerians are going to China to learn and exchange 
knowledge. 
Perhaps the greatest element of learning as the core motivator in Nigerian agency 
in China-Nigeria relations is in its implications for capacity building. As previously 
argued, the Chinese option provides African states and Nigeria a new opportunity to 
make a selection, to play an active and decisive role in the pursuit of their best interests 
and the determination of their future. Through domestic and external efforts, Nigerians 
are hoping they will finally be able to identify successful policy solutions that can propel 
the country towards sustainable development. Nigeria’s decision-making power, now 
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asserted through increased and strategic relations with China has, politically speaking, 
afforded greater recognition and respect not only in Nigeria but also on the global stage. 
The Chinese have found a different means to address the issues of extreme poverty. 
Nigeria (as well as the rest of Africa), in the light of the blatant failure of aid to deal with 
the poverty problem in the developing world, is taking note, not to emulate but to learn 
from China, employing simpler technologies that address the seminal causes of poverty 
rather than complex policy prescription drawn up from perceived symptoms of global 
poverty. Nigeria’s increased sense of self-determination allows for Nigerian-generated 
solutions to Nigerian problems. Nigerians by nature have a better understanding of 
domestic problems and thereby a better foundation from which to decipher solutions that 
can produce both short and long term benefits for all Nigerians. The necessary human 
development for such a solution is coming with some assistance from the Chinese. 
Chinese training and education is equipping Nigerians to better manage their own 
economy, while Chinese competition is spurring domestic (Nigerian) competitors 
towards higher productivity and better business models. Nigerians are learning how to be 
successful and self-supporting--or at least, self-promoting--from the Chinese. 
Economic Benefit 
The last theme uncovered by this research is that Nigerians increasingly engage 
with China because of the economic benefit it brings to them, specifically profitability 
and affordability. This last portion examines the relevance of engagement with the 
Chinese especially as increasing trade with China has become arguably the most visible 
indicator of growing ties between China and Nigeria. 
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Federal Government 
The previous section discussed Nigerian intent to learn from the Chinese 
experience in order to grow and develop the Nigerian economy. In order to make 
significant progress it is important that the Nigerian government pay special attention to 
revitalizing infrastructure. As a result, the government is looking to China to play a role 
in the development of Nigerian infrastructure
96
.  Corporate Nigeria 2010/2011
97
 notes 
“Nigeria is tackling the problem of transforming transport infrastructure that does not 
meet the needs of a modern economy. Although the sector is under-developed, significant 
progress is being made by the Federal and State Governments in building and 
rehabilitating infrastructure, with the help of funding from international organizations, 
private sector input and new policy initiatives” (pp. 168). The article goes on to state, 
“…construction is ongoing across the major state roads in many of Nigeria’s 36 states. 
With the help of the World Bank and the African Development Bank (AfDB), major 
connecting roads that link Nigeria to its neighboring countries are being reconstructed” 
(Corporate Nigeria, 2010: pp. 169). Many of the contracts for rebuilding roads are going 
to Chinese companies
98
. The Chinese are very successful in winning contracts because 
they are almost always the lowest bidder and also more adept at putting together contracts 
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that appeal to decision-makers
99
. Consequently, the Chinese can be seen all across 
Nigeria funding and building, roads, stadiums, dams, power plants, sky scrapers, and 
more. They are building roads, expressways, and bridges everywhere in Abuja, the 
capital city of Nigeria. Abuja is a young city that is growing rapidly, with the help of 
Chinese construction companies, the most visible of which is probably the China Civil 
Engineering Construction Corporation (CCECC). One of the CCECC’s most prominent 
projects is the construction of a light rail network to improve public transportation 
options for people that work and live in Abuja. The project began in May of 2009 and is 
expected completion is December of 2014. Just as the Chinese are crucial to construction 
and infrastructure development in Abuja, they are also important in the rest of the 
country, in particular in key trading towns such as but not limited to Kano, Jos, and 
Kaduna. Current infrastructure development and consequently economic and social 
development in Nigeria is heavily dependent on the efforts of Chinese entities. 
The government is also pursuing engagement with China to improve the 
communication infrastructure, noting that the Chinese provided Nigeria with their first 
communication satellite NigComSat-1.  When the satellite developed problems, China 
was again the source for a replacement (NigComSat-1R) and an additional satellite.
100
 
These satellites have helped improve communication infrastructure in the country, 
although the mobile networks in Nigeria remain over-burdened by heavy demand and 
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constant traffic. By further developing the infrastructure in Nigeria, the Nigerian 
government hopes to foster conditions that will promote sustainable economic growth. 
Business Representatives & Entrepreneurs 
Chinese-manufactured products have flooded the Nigerian marketplace 
throughout the country, and Nigerians are the engine behind the mass dispersal of 
Chinese goods. Purchases are made by crate loads from ports or from Chinatown, broken 
down into smaller units, then sold by a third party to yet another party in even smaller 
units, until shoppers make contact with the actual traders that finally sell the goods.
101
. 
Businessmen note that they prefer doing business with China because China 
provides them with exactly what they need and want in terms of levels of quality; they 
note it is easier to acquire low quality goods but upon request higher quality goods are 
made available. In addition, the flexibility of Chinese suppliers allows Nigerians to 
purchase within their means. The affordability of Chinese products for Nigerian 
consumers has also resulted in increased comparative profitability and net income of 
Nigerians engaged in the purchase and sale of Chinese products. Nigerian entrepreneurs, 
businessmen and industrialists--just like consumers--are doing business with China 
because it is an economically viable endeavor that has netted exponential returns despite 
the fact that Chinese products are typically considered inferior to Western products, or 
are cheaply-made copies. A part of this study’s research found that Chinese products 
were just as reliable and sometimes even of equal quality as Western-branded products. 
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Interestingly, according to Nigerian market traders, Nigerian manufactured products were 
more durable and of better quality; however, logistical and infrastructural limitations 
have kept locally produced goods from reaching Nigerian markets in adequate quantities 
and affordable prices. This point was echoed by government officials in the Federal 
Ministry of Trade and Investment, as well as Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
corroborated by executives in the Nigeria-China Business Council and academics at the 
Nigerian Institute of International Affairs. 
Chinese technology has proven itself a good fit for the Nigerian market in terms 
of viability and price, and Nigerian businessmen are taking advantage of this opportunity 
to shore up their earnings. Profitability is clearly a major reason for doing business with 
China but it is not the only reason. A number of factors in the characteristics of business 
arrangements with China have combined to attract and nurture business relations, even in 
cases where other (non-Chinese) suppliers might offer better products to the Nigerian 
market. 
A noted motivator for Nigeria's China policy is the relative ease of business in 
engaging with China. This theme was prominent in every single interview. Clearly the 
Chinese have seen that “Nigeria is a consumer nation102” and are packaging their goods 
and services to meet the demands of this consumer base. A Nigerian entrepreneur put it 
well, stating, “In all cases, when you engage in business with somebody there are benefits 
accruing to you, okay. But I think most especially in the case of Nigeria, two factors I 
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consider quite important. Number one, the ease of doing business with them. Ease in the 
sense that probably until recently, the Chinese tended to believe more of us than the 
Europeans. By the way, all of my working life, we’ve dealt a lot with, in all our dealings 
we’ve dealt a lot with the Europeans or the western world rather, let me put it that way. 
But towards the tail end of my working career, we have had cause to deal with China and 
the ease with which that business was conducted I think attracted me personally and even 
encouraged me to be on my own.” This sentiment is echoed by another entrepreneur who 
said, “For our company, we are more interested, rather we are interested in doing 
business with this Chinese firm because of the ease we got in doing business with them.” 
In tandem with the response of ease of business as a major appeal factor for 
Chinese firms, interviewees reported that Chinese products were affordable and made 
accessible to Nigerians. Nigerian businessmen noted that with the Chinese, they were 
able to earn value for money. Granted it wasn’t always a positive outcome, just as good 
quality was available for purchase, so also was bad value. Traders could purchase goods 
in qualities and quantities that matched their spending thresholds. Mr. Lawal explained, 
“I mean as a businessman I have interests in dealing with China because they have good 
products. Good cost, low-cost prices that improves my competitive position in the 
market.  So it’s not for the country, it’s for my business and myself. They have good 
products. They have good cheap products. Well, not cheap, good affordable products.”103 
When asked to elaborate, he goes on to state, “Because their products are good, are well 
priced. Which means if you want to compete, as against the European products, you need 
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good prices. European products are very expensive, you know that. And, but Chinese 
products are relatively cheaper. So your margin and your competitiveness is enhanced if 
you procure from Chinese firms. High turnover and high profit margins, that’s our 
objectives as the business is concerned. And the Chinese facilitate that, as I said. They 
have the goods and they have the good prices. So it makes us competitive. So we can 
achieve our volume and we can achieve our profit margin.”104 
Another recurring motivator was that business with the Chinese employed simpler 
business processes and Chinese counterparts were considerate and accommodating of 
their Nigerian colleagues and business partners. Mr. Ter shared his experience as an 
exclusive supplier for some Chinese agencies, "About a year ago, we wanted to represent 
some companies in sole agency capacity. We market their products, which they 
manufacture and of course at a good price. That we got from the Chinese firms. They 
were very willing to make us their sole agents without any pre-condition. Of course we 
had a target to meet, but beyond that there were no preconditions... As a starting company 
that was quite good for us."
105
 When asked about the progress of this business venture, 
Ter added, "Of course it has been hectic. Particularly in our own field, we are introducing 
new products.  It’s been quite hectic. There have been a lot of demands from them too, to 
meet up our target. We have not met our target as a matter of fact, basically because we 
were introducing new products in the Nigerian market. But they were always very 
understanding, always telling me ‘yeah we will support you, we will support you; we 
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know it’s not easy, it’s not easy.’ In fact, one of the products, the laboratory equipment, 
the manufacturers told us that it took them 6-10 years to break into the Chinese market 
themselves. So they are not expecting magic from us. They also know that it will take us 
quite some time. So far, so good."
106
 
This ease of business for Nigerians is not only arising from enterprise business. 
The Chinese government has also implemented policies (immigration, economic and the 
like) that facilitate Chinese and Nigerian to engagement and partnership. This support 
from the Chinese government in streamlining the business process is evident and has 
become a strong attraction for Nigerians. In interviews and informal conversations 
regarding Nigeria’s engagement with China, it was reiterated that the process of making 
travel arrangements to go to China is simpler and more successful than making travel 
arrangements to visit the West. Once Chinese consular visa requirements are met, then 
visas to travel to China are issued. There are fewer hoops for Nigerians to jump through. 
For example, according to the interviews, a visa to the United States for business 
purposes requires those seeking to travel to have certain levels of education. This makes 
the U.S., by and large, inaccessible--regardless of the business skill or capital of the 
applicant. The business-savvy market trader who may possess little formal education is 
essentially denied admittance. China’s visa requirements do not call for higher education, 
a good grasp of English or Chinese. The alternative of procuring visas to travel to the 
West, even when formal and informal requirements are met, visa applications can be 
denied for any reason, and reasons do not have to be disclosed to the applicant. In short, 
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travelling to the West is a hassle. A businessman explains, “Once you have the 
requirement for visa to go to China, you are given the visa no excuse. As long as you 
meet their requirements. It’s not the same with American companies; it’s not the same 
with European companies. You fill the visa form, you’ve met all the requirements and 
you’re still denied visa. Reasons of course they are not obligated to disclose. We are not 
querying that. But, sometimes some of us wonder why you have a requirement, 
somebody meets the requirement and you do not, you will not give him what you made 
the requirements for.” Recently, however, reports indicate that as a result of abuses of the 
system by criminally-motivated Nigerians, the Chinese government has been more 
restrictive with the issuance of visas, especially to Nigerians who have never visited 
China, until in league with Nigerian counterparts they are able to more directly address 
the issue of system abuse
107
. 
Nigerian businessmen note that Chinese manufacturers and suppliers offer 
attractive conditions and in certain situations have been the only option, let alone the only 
viable one. Mr. Lawal illustrates, “And of course there are times you can only deal with 
them. I tell you one example I have now. I want to buy promotional items, pens and biros 
[…] customized as gift items. Only Chinese can do that. I mean, they are good at things 
like that. So where I go for things like consumables, promotional items, the Chinese are 
good at it.” Nigerian traders go to China because of the vast options for business and 
extensive catalogs and offerings presented by the Chinese. The region of Guanzhou is 
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home to most of the China-based, China/Nigeria business arrangements. Trade expos 
there often serve as a one-stop shop even for the businessmen looking to diversify their 
business offerings.  
The Chinese are noted as very responsive to their Nigerian counterparts, quick to 
communicate, flexible and considerate of special circumstances in their negotiations. 
They are seen as reliable as well as good communicators.  A lot of these factors of 
attraction were brought up in contrast to Western business practices and discussed in an 
earlier section of this chapter. Based on interviews, is quite clear that the difficulty of 
doing business with the U.S. and Europe, and the comparative ease of doing business 
with China is pushing Nigerians to choose China. 
Consumers 
A short stroll into a Nigerian marketplace makes obvious rather quickly the 
motivations of Nigerian consumers in increasing Nigerian engagement with China. The 
affordability of Chinese imports ordinarily classified as luxury goods has considerably 
increased the relative spending power of the average Nigerian. Thanks to the Chinese, it 
doesn't matter that the power company, the Power Holding Company of Nigeria (PHCN) 
has frequent outages because now even the hairdresser at the corner market has her own 
generator to provide consistent service to patrons. Thanks to the Chinese, most Nigerians 
own at least one mobile phone, many have multiple phones, or pricier multiple SIM card 
carrying phones so that they can take advantage of offers from various mobile service 
carriers. Whether or not Nigerians make a conscious decision to buy Chinese products, 
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the influx of Chinese-made goods is driving down market prices
108
. Not only are 
traditional goods flying off the shelves, even non-traditional Asian and Chinese-oriented 
goods, like Malaysian manufactured ginseng-infused instant coffee and portable 
electronic acupuncture machines are gaining traction in the Nigerian marketplace
109
. In 
many ways the consumer society in Nigeria looks a lot like the U.S., where quite a bit of 
spending goes to the latest toys and gadgets. High definition plasma and LCD televisions 
are all the rage, even though most television stations and service providers have yet to 
provide high definition service
110
.  
It is important to note, however, that the entry of the Chinese into the Nigerian 
marketplace was not and is not an isolated event. As the BRIC economies (Brazil, Russia, 
India and China) grew and developed industrially and economically, it became necessary 
to find new markets in which to sell goods and increase income generation. Accordingly, 
with its remarkably large market, Nigeria has been a key African destination for some of 
these countries’ products111. 
Chinese manufactured goods in particular have made an impression on the lives 
of Nigerian consumers. The affordability of Chinese products has dropped market prices 
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of most goods to a fraction of what they were just years ago
112
. Nigerians are noting that 
Chinese-manufactured products have increased standards of living without increasing the 
cost of living. With non-essential goods accessible to every Nigerian and in spite of 
quality concerns, Nigerians are keen to embrace the opportunity Chinese imports provide 
to live a better life. Scholars at NIIA note that the Nigerian disposition is to accept 
beneficial economic relations from everyone including China
113
.  Even concerns that 
Chinese products are undercutting and destroying domestic Nigerian industry are not 
keeping Nigerians from spending money on goods bearing the “Made in China” label. 
Clearly, Nigerian consumers are the big winners. A Nigerian notes that, across the board, 
"cheap Chinese [products] have been good for the African consumer." Especially 
members of the lower socio-economic classes can only afford things made in China and 
in an interesting turn, “China becomes the saving grace of so many,” as noted by an 
interview respondent. It is important to note that Nigerian culture and society tends 
towards immediate satisfaction and  a ‘keeping up with the Jones’s’ mentality; these 
demands are best met by cheap Chinese products that do not require long-term planning 
or saving. Nigerians in the marketplace talked about the days when the only option 
available was to buy second-hand goods, but today cheap Chinese imports allow them to 
purchase and own brand new products. This adds a level of prestige and self-respect that 
hasn’t been lost on Nigerian consumers; as such, the demand for Chinese products 
continues to grow at an exponential rate. 
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Conclusion 
Although a significant amount of information came out of the interviews that 
were conducted, it is quite clear that this study is only scratching the surface of China-
Nigeria relations and subsequently Nigeria’s China policy. The central research question 
posed by this study is: Why do Nigerians choose to engage with China? The underlying 
current through all the identified themes is that engagement with China offers Nigeria 
and Nigerians a new opportunity for progress, and that is why Nigerians choose to 
engage with China. The significance of these themes is their demonstration of intent and 
agency on the part of Nigerians engaging with China. Further still, they lend support to 
the central argument of this study: that Africans are willing and active participants in 
their engagement with China, and that Nigerians are making state-centric realist decisions 
in search of their perceived best interests. Afrobarometer surveys on public opinion in 
Africa indicate that, despite the growing literature asserting that Chinese engagement in 
Africa is detrimental to Africans, most Africans hold the Chinese in positive regard 
(Gadzala & Hanusch, 2010). Approximately 58 percent of Nigerian Afrobarometer 
respondents indicated that to some degree they believe that China is helping Nigeria. 
Only 10 percent of respondents reported that China was no help; 33 percent noted that 
they did not know (Afrobarometer, 2008). 
Nigeria is also engaging China in part because of the level of competition that 
China has created in the world economy. In addition, China’s disposition towards Nigeria 
makes Nigerian pursuit of engagement an almost natural development. Although China is 
using Nigeria to pursue its own national interests, Nigerian government officials note that 
162 
Nigeria is doing the very same with China and continues to do so, in part due to China’s 
assistance in capacity-building and the financing of key projects in Nigeria. The Nigerian 
government sees China as an alternative source to the West for technological 
advancement. This view is sound; the Chinese government is more generous with 
technology than its Western counterparts (Alden, 2007; Brautigam, 2009). Important 
questions have arisen concerning the shelf-life of these technologies, since rapid 
advancement makes even today’s technologies obsolete. Because of this process of 
obsolescence, the continued viability of the technology that China brings into Nigeria is 
under scrutiny by Nigerian regulatory agencies and consumers. In addition, Chinese 
hardware and equipment presents a compatibility problem because of language barriers; 
this research has discovered that the equipment coming from China is sometimes labeled 
in Chinese with Chinese language manuals that are not accessible to even the average 
educated Nigerian. However, regardless of these challenges, what matters is that China’s 
offer of technology starkly differs from the West’s. As a result, Nigerians are logically 
going to China to obtain what the West has withheld. 
The continued development of business relationships makes the PRC even more 
lucrative for Nigeria because of the relative freedom of access to what Nigerian people 
need and demand. Although the relationship is government and business driven, Nigerian 
leadership looks to China to source its needs: military, technological, economic and 
otherwise. It is relatively easy for Nigerians to trade and have access to China because of 
the comparative freedom of entry and competitive affordability of China. This is not to 
say no concerns exist; there are significant concerns regarding the quality and safety of 
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Chinese products. But in spite of these concerns, the opportunities that China presently 
provides outweigh the costs of engagement with China. Nigerians and Africans alike are 
also motivated by the easy disbursement of Chinese funding, loans and investments. The 
Chinese have made use of barter techniques in many agreements, where services or 
access to raw materials is traded, and thus not all transactions require exchange of money, 
especially money from Nigerians. Nigerians are undaunted in their approach to China for 
funding for ambitious projects. China’s non-interference policy has meant that, typically, 
contracts focus on the heart of the business deal and are not contingent on governance 
conditions or the implementation of outside-generated policy prescriptions. The point 
remains that the Chinese are not concerned with African governance or perceived 
standards of humanitarianism or democracy, but instead China’s steadfast belief in 
sovereignty means that it falls to Nigerians to determine for themselves what standards 
are appropriate and apply them accordingly. 
Chinese engagement with African states, especially as facilitated by FOCAC, has 
allowed African states, public and private actors and business representatives to meet and 
interact whereas they might not otherwise do so. While this may not be an obvious 
motive for engaging with China, it is actually of great consequence to Africa and 
Nigeria’s growth. China has perhaps unwittingly presented African states with an 
opportunity to collaborate and coordinate their efforts. The potential for collaboration is 
astounding, especially if appropriately exploited by African actors. A number of Nigerian 
lower-level government officials have noted this opportunity and though it wasn’t 
brought up in interviews with higher level officers or politicians, the fact that some 
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officials feel Nigeria can act on these opportunities, portends the possibility for 
corresponding action. 
The Chinese element in Nigerian lives is increasingly significant, and while China 
presents some very real opportunities to the Nigerian populace, it also presents some very 
real threats. However as this chapter has focused mainly on the perceptions that inform 
Nigerian motivations and agency in increasing engagement with China, it has not 
addressed current Chinese engagement in Nigeria, and areas of concern with regards to 
growing engagement with China have also not been addressed. These include the influx 
of counterfeit products in China, reports that Nigerian minerals such gold and wolfromite 
are being illegally mined and exported by Chinese entities without appropriate 
permissions or remuneration to the federal government as required by law. Interview 
respondents agree, China’s engagement in Nigeria must be appropriately managed. It 
falls then to the Nigerian government to maximize opportunities and minimize threats. 
Ultimately, the drivers of Nigerian governmental agency in engagement with China can 
be categorized under opportunities and threats. 
Offering this chapter as the final word on the motivations of Nigerians in their 
increasing engagement with China would be naive. This chapter presents some of the 
major discoveries of a study that was conducted in a short span of time. It is quite likely 
that further research might find greater weight for other motivating factors not mentioned 
in this study.  In addition, while broad, this study is hardly comprehensive; the 
motivations for other specific categories of Nigerians are not discussed. Regardless, as a 
nation, Nigerians have embraced the Chinese option, not just as an alternative to the West 
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but also as ancillary to engagement with the West and other nations. To pursue Nigeria’s 
own self-interest and objectives, Nigerian actors are hoping to learn from China, taking 
advantage of the relative affordability of Chinese products and technology, the assistance 
training and education readily offered by the Chinese government, the ease of engaging 
the Chinese, the short-term successes of current Nigeria-China relations and the 
additional leverage and that a strategic partnership with China has afforded the Nigerian 
government in the international arena. 
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Chapter 6: Understanding Africa’s China Policy 
 
This chapter discusses the findings of this study and its implications to Sino-
Nigerian relations as well as Sino-African relations, and concludes with 
recommendations for future research. China is gaining headway into Africa and fast 
becoming an important trading partner for many African states. This new economic 
development has resulted in increased competition for African resources and attention in 
the economic and political spheres from Chinese and Western interests. This competition 
requires that Africa become an active participant in the determination of her future that 
potentially could bring a new era of successful development for African states, and a new 
environment in which to pursue their own best interests. Nigerian leaders express their 
intent to do just that. Although much information was discovered through this research, it 
is quite clear that this study is only scratches the surface of China-Nigeria relations and 
subsequently Nigeria’s China policy. The central research question posed by this study is: 
Why do Nigerians choose to engage with China? The easiest answer is because China 
chooses to engage with Nigeria. However, an answer that simple fails to paint an accurate 
picture of the dynamics that influence Nigerians’ decision to engage with China. The 
underlying theme in this dynamic is that engagement with China offers Nigeria and 
Nigerians a new opportunity for progress. Nigerians choose to engage with China 
because it is in their best interests. 
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The Nigerian government does not have an explicit policy document on China 
that outlines objectives in engaging with China. There is no doubt that this is a major 
shortcoming and a potential hindrance to maximizing the accrued benefits to Nigeria of 
engaging with China. This author contends that the absence of a policy document makes 
it difficult to analyze and evaluate the outputs of this relationship because no explicit 
objectives exist. However, Nigeria and China have signed an agreement, the Nigeria-
China Joint Commission for Cooperation, which details the nature of relations between 
the two countries. While such documents might speak to the nature and characteristics of 
Nigeria-China relations, it cannot be said definitively that these documents address 
Nigeria’s objectives in engaging with China, in the same ways that an explicit policy 
document might. An explicit foreign policy document issued by the Nigerian government 
would speak directly to the central concerns of this study: what is Nigeria’s foreign 
policy is toward China? What the objectives are of state leaders and governmental 
administrations that choose to engage with China over other actors? What does Nigeria 
stand to gain? Creating a foreign policy document detailing Nigeria’s policy goals and 
objectives serves a few strategic purposes. First, Chinese engagement in Africa has been 
implied as being detrimental to African governance and policy-making (Tull, 2006; Tull, 
2008; Kagan, 2006). However, the presence of explicit Nigerian policies on China would 
instead demonstrate deliberate governance and policy-making, and, the level of detail in 
such policies would indicate increased Nigerian intent. Second, the articulation of a 
policy would require at least a strategic SWOT (strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and 
threats) analysis of the opportunities that engagement with China provides. Such analyses 
require attention to fine details and could pave the way for making calculated decisions 
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on policy-based objectives and aims. Fieldwork and research have made it clear that 
Nigeria has plenty of brilliant minds that are capable of conducting and have already 
conducted such analyses and come up with policy recommendations to move the country 
forward. Unfortunately the final decision is in the hands of politicians whose primary 
aims may not be nation-centric because of overwhelming pressure to use their position to 
increase personal gains. Finally, understanding policy goals and objectives provides a 
foundation for future evaluation and analysis of the outcomes of Nigerian-Chinese policy 
initiatives in Nigeria. The relevance of policy documents as primary source documents 
lies in their ability to serve as indicators of Nigerian participation and intent in Chinese 
engagement in Nigeria. Policy documents such as foreign policy missives on China, 
official reports and statements on China and Chinese enterprises in Nigeria will be 
helpful as a launching pad in the articulation of Nigeria’s China policy. Future research 
can begin to assess the impact of Chinese engagement in Nigeria with these documents as 
a foundation. 
Nigerian traders and businesses choose to create partnerships with China 
primarily because the Chinese are more likely to treat them as partners. This receptivity 
has been missing in Nigeria’s relations with the West. After many years of ill-treatment 
and disrespect by the Western countries, who were seen as exploiting Nigeria’s wealth 
while sullying its international reputation and stifling significant attempts at economic 
growth, Nigerians are attracted by a new-found respect and legitimacy in dealing with 
China. Chinese engagement with Nigerians is distinctive because the Chinese have made 
a point of displaying vested interest in the development of Nigeria. Discussions of mutual 
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benefit are more than political propaganda, the Chinese are not seen as presenting 
challenges and setting up roadblocks to Nigeria’s progress. In addition, the Chinese are 
making quality products affordable and accessible to the consumer culture prevalent in 
Nigeria. The Chinese have made business simple and more profitable for the Nigerian 
traders and businesses, leading to partnerships with Chinese suppliers and manufacturers. 
This is not to say that trade with China has not created areas of concern. While it is true 
that there has been mutual benefit to Nigeria and China as a result of bilateral trade, it is 
also true balance of trade data would present China as clearly the big winner in Nigeria, 
although the benefits of cheap Chinese products to the spending power of the average 
Nigerian may overshadow the trade imbalance. 
China is largely importing raw materials from Nigeria while subsequently selling 
finished goods and products to Nigerians. This sort of scenario has been described in 
political science as indicative of dependency, a situation in which developed countries 
grow economically through manufacture of finished goods while the economies of the 
developing countries that export raw materials are dependent on the exports from 
developed countries because of their inability to produce finished goods. Additionally, as 
indicated in Chapter 4, which tested dependency theory, it does not appear that what is at 
play in China-Nigeria relations is dependency but rather state-centric realism, a pursuit of 
self-interest by both China and Nigeria, both developing states. China stands to benefit 
from Nigerian raw materials as well as political influence in Africa; while Nigeria 
welcomes Chinese products, it is not dependent on them. China presents Nigeria with 
options and opportunities but is not Nigeria’s only option or opportunity. Chinese 
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engagement is a portion of a larger picture of the Nigerian economy and Nigerian foreign 
relations and while the Chinese are likely Nigeria’s largest trading partner in terms of 
volume, it does not hold the spot monetarily—that spot is occupied by the United States. 
This iteration of the relationship between Nigeria and China is still quite new, and labels 
like ‘dependency’ may be premature, especially in such a dynamic relationship. 
However, it is important to remain critical about the state of China-Nigeria relations and 
to continue research into the nature and characteristics of Chinese engagement beyond 
this study. A situation of dependency may yet develop and the Nigerian government 
needs to play an active role in managing its relationship with China. 
While the Chinese are going to great lengths to promote the development of 
Nigeria-China relations, it is hard to say definitively that one nation is driving relations 
more than the other. On one hand the Chinese are courting the Nigerians, accommodating 
them and providing them with lucrative deals and options. At the same time, however, it 
is clear that Nigerians are leaping at the chance to conduct business and it is logical to 
make the claim that Nigerians’ receptiveness to the new opportunities afforded them 
through engagement with China is also in its own way perhaps a retroactive driver of 
Chinese-Nigerian relations. Nigerians and Chinese are increasingly collaborating in many 
different areas. This research has pointed out cultural, economic and political 
collaboration. However, collaboration extends beyond those areas and is increasingly 
specific. Nigerian and Chinese government are working together on establishing and 
monitoring manufacturing standards. This is important as counterfeit products, especially 
goods like food stuffs and medication put the rest of society in danger.  
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This research has attempted to determine just what Nigeria wants from China. 
Based on the findings of this study, Nigerians are keen to learn from China and borrow 
from China’s example to improve their present situation and develop economically and 
socially. Systematic problems with the Nigerian government and political system still 
keep Nigeria from taking full advantage of the new opportunities made available by 
Chinese engagement. Issues of inadequate leadership, corruption, lack of infrastructure, 
undependable energy supply; these are persistent barriers to faster rates of sustainable 
development and progress in Nigeria. These are issues that the Nigerian government 
needs to address expediently.  It is clear that China-Nigeria relations are not always 
beneficial, or always fruitful interaction, but Nigerians are well aware of China’s 
increasing global importance and the need not only to actively engage China but to take 
advantage of the opportunities presented by China. 
Nigeria (and Africa) not easily moved from the West 
Although Chinese engagement in Nigeria is growing, the West continues to hold a 
marginal advantage in Nigeria especially with regards to sustainable opportunities. To 
begin with, there is a fundamental ideological contradiction between Nigeria and the 
People’s Republic of China. Nigeria is a growing democracy patterned after the 
democratic system employed by the United States of America. This has allowed the 
Nigerian government to adopt a Bill of Rights, to promote and protect the recognized 
rights of the Nigerian citizen. This Bill of Rights afforded to every Nigerian citizen is not 
accommodated in the communist PRC system and this contradicts the Nigerian policy of 
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citizen diplomacy that is becoming a major component of Nigerian foreign relations.
114
 
Secondly, engagement with China is noted as a tedious affair because there is a lot of 
“unnecessary activity.” Relations between parties in both states are plagued with ancillary 
tasks and a significant amount of red tape because the systems of both countries are 
incompatible and supplementary action must be taken to allow activities to take place. 
For instance Nigerians in China are being harassed by the Chinese authorities for 
practicing their religion. In response to the causalities this has caused Nigerians, the 
government has to make specific efforts to request that the Chinese government 
recognize and respect Nigerians right to practice their religion
115
. 
Although there are some cultural and social similarities between China and Africa 
at the general levels, these commonalities do not applicably extend to Nigeria. Nigeria is 
culturally capitalist and individualist, the second portion of that descriptive is arguably 
not applied to most African culture. Chinese investments are heavily government-
controlled, Chinese investments both at home and aboard are mostly tailored by 
government. The Nigerian counterparts are usually private individuals with private 
enterprises, not necessarily controlled by the Nigerian government. There are 
fundamental differences therefore in the way that both governments approach business 
and investment. The role of the Nigerian government in the business dealings of 
Nigerians is limited especially when compared to the role that the central Chinese 
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government plays in Chinese enterprise. The Chinese need for government intervention 
in business relations, is not characteristic of Nigerian or Western dealings. Government 
intervention to create harmony and orchestrate business agreements and contracts on the 
scale of the Chinese would be considered unnecessary and superfluous by Nigerians. 
These additional steps and additional players increases the cost of the business 
relationship, the number of necessary approvals for projects or contracts can make the 
business process wasteful, in terms of time and money.  
Nigerians are increasing engaging with the Chinese because of the availability of 
opportunities, but under the right conditions, arguably business with Western companies 
can and should be simpler. The following excerpt from an interview helps illustrate this 
point. 
Respondent 1: Nigeria was compelled to move towards the east out 
of impatience and disappointment, but cost-
effectiveness [sic], if we have a sincere approach 
from the West that's where we'll move far.  
Interviewer: What will it take to develop a sincere approach from 
the West? 
Respondent 1: The West has to shift from seeing Africa as a 
colony. We are an independent people. It is only 
then that it [The West] will understand in real 
perspective, what Africa needs now. 
Respondent 2: In the light of hundreds of years of a Master-servant 
relationship- 
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Respondent 1: In this era of a global village, era of 
communications, the windows are open. It is just 
the political will that is needed.
116
 
Irrefutably, Africa and Nigeria are not easily parted from the West; there is a shared 
history and a deeper understanding and knowledge of the other that will always remain a 
competitive advantage for western interests in Africa.  However, for the West to make 
use of this advantage it needs to change its approach to African countries and to Nigeria. 
Interestingly, following the establishment of a formal strategic partnership between China 
and Nigeria, recent tours to Nigeria of high level Western government officials have 
sought to do the same. Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States have sent 
high profile representatives to underpin the importance of their relationships with 
Nigeria. While the U.S. sent Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, Germany sent Chancellor 
Angela Merkel, and the UK, Prime Minister David Cameron. Perhaps generating the 
political will is underway to change the dynamics of the relationship between Nigeria and 
the West, as well as Africa and the West. 
China in Nigeria: good or bad? 
A question posed by most of the literature on recent Chinese engagement in 
Africa, including Nigeria, is whether Chinese engagement in Africa is good or bad. The 
argument can be made that the wrong question is being asked. After all in the words of an 
interview respondent, “there is no sincerity in international politics.” This echoes Waltz’s 
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(1979) argument that the fundamental aim of states is self-interest and survival. China is 
in Africa and in Nigeria in pursuit of its own best interests and it is up to African state 
actors to pursue the best interests of their respective countries in their engagement with 
China. The argument has been raised that there is no significant difference in Chinese 
engagement in Nigeria as compared to that of the West. The difference of Chinese 
engagement is that it provides Nigeria and African states with additional options and 
opportunities. A Nigerian political scientist warns against portraying China as an 
alternative to the West in Africa, noting that the right perspective is to view China as an 
opportunity and accordingly to make the best of it
117
. At the end of the day, the future of 
African development lies in the psychological liberalization of the African, an objective 
not attained by government policies or well-written action plans. 
Managing China 
“People are not very comfortable with China but China is a force and must be managed 
appropriately!” –Nigerian government employee.118 
In order to maximize its benefits from China, the Nigerian government and other 
African states need to manage their relations with China, paying particular attention to 
protecting and promoting their national interests. It would however, be unwise to 
characterize China as a big bad monster. China is rapidly growing economically and in 
political power and influence, everybody is engaging with China in order to pursue their 
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own interests and it would behoove African actors to do the same. The key for Africa is 
to take a different approach to its foreign policy. African countries have been noted as 
being receptive and rather passive in their foreign relations, and if they are to really 
benefit from the opportunities presented by China, they need to be at the table 
determining the nature of their relations with China. 
Limitations and Recommendations 
This study is tasked with understanding the motivations of Africans, in particular 
Nigerians, that choose to engage with China. However, the findings of a case study of 
Nigeria can hardly be construed as indicative of the situation in Africa. Since Nigeria is 
part of Africa, there is some logic to the validity of Nigerian motivations being construed 
as African motivations. Yet the uniqueness of Nigeria in Africa, and the interesting 
details which make for a fascinating study represent both the strengths and weaknesses of 
this research. To speak to Africa’s China policy, further research and interviews will need 
to be conducted with information-rich individuals who can speak to conditions across the 
continent. Examples of such individuals would include policy-makers and economists at 
regional and continental agencies, such as the African Development Bank, the Africa 
Investment Bank, the African Union, the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS) and the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), to name a 
few. The expertise of the individuals working at these larger-scale agencies might help 
shed light on Africa’s China policy beyond Nigeria’s China policy. In the same vein, if 
there are some regional and continental policies that pertain to Africa that may be brought 
to light by any of these agencies, it is important to note that they may not be applicable to 
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a particular African state—Africa is not an inanimate object, nor is it ever a solitary actor. 
In the light of all this, it is important to denote that the findings of this study are valid 
only to Nigeria and not to Africa. Should any future research look at regional and 
continental organizations, it must also concede that findings may not be directly 
applicable or representative of any given African country. 
The findings of this qualitative case study are not necessarily novel or ground-
breaking but there is little doubt that the findings of this research are somewhat relevant, 
not only to the expansion of information and knowledge but to the study of political 
science and the manner in which states and governments interact. As mentioned earlier 
the manner in which China has engaged Africa is new and more business-like and this 
study corroborates that claim. The findings of this study have validated some of the 
claims published by scholars and journalists on China and Africa (Nigeria specifically) 
relations. This is valid because it moves general understanding and critique of this 
relationship beyond conjecture but offers up some hard evidence to support and bolster 
what is known and said about China and Nigeria. This study also has implications that 
extend beyond academia. Any governments and groups interested or affected by Chinese 
engagement in Nigeria have a vested interest in the findings of this study. For instance 
Western governmental agencies or businesses that are interested in engaging with 
Nigeria, or are looking to be more successful and lose fewer contracts to the Chinese, can 
through this study identify the characteristics that make the Chinese attractive to the 
Nigerians and adapt accordingly. This study has also highlighted the need for a 
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coordinated Nigerian effort to maximize benefit and better exploit the opportunities that 
engagement with China has made available. 
This qualitative case study portion of this project has focused rather significantly 
on the perceptions regarding Nigerian objectives and motivations in increasing 
engagement with China. By focusing on motivations and objectives, the responses 
provided for the most part have the expectation of a positive outcome. This is because 
people, expectably, when discussing intent in decision-making, focus on self-benefit and 
what they expect to gain and not costs or expected losses. This tendency gives the 
impression that this study paints China in a good light. To be clear, it is not the intent of 
this study or this researcher to do so. The data unearthed by this study shows that the very 
same respondents who hope for an eventual positive outcome for Nigeria from 
engagement with China are also aware and outspoken about the negative aspects of 
engagement with China and its current and potential threats. Future scholarship into the 
details of China’s current engagement with Nigeria, with the data collected will 
demonstrate that as with all economic relationships there are gains and losses and China 
in Nigeria is no different. 
Concerns might also be raised about being able to tell when interviewees were 
telling the truth as opposed to when they were feeding lines to the researcher. Especially 
in the case of government officials, common sense would dictate that when asked why 
Nigeria engages with China, they would respond that it was because it was good for 
Nigeria to engage with China. Such a response would be politically appropriate and can 
be considered self-preserving because it is a response that wouldn’t jeopardize their jobs 
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and offices. In addition, when considering the issue of inherent and systematic corruption 
in the government, it is logical to assume that corrupt government officials would 
immediately resort to feeding political spin, soft non-specific responses to the questions 
posed. While there were some instances when government officials were not informative 
or accommodating, they usually made it obvious by rushing through or denying 
interviews outright, but such situations were rare. By and large, over the course of this 
particular study, the government officials were forthcoming and provided in-depth 
answers, offering anecdotes and special examples to illustrate their arguments. Responses 
to questions were thoughtful, earnest and specific enough to be controversial. In many 
instances respondents gave in to their convictions, speaking passionately, at times 
seemingly with no concern for political or diplomatic finesse or tact. Interviewing many 
government officials across different ministries, and at varying levels, from the policy 
experts on the lower end of the power structure to the department directors and then 
political figureheads (politicians), as well as laypeople helped limit the influence of bias 
and propaganda in the findings of this study. Incorporating views across different spheres 
of Nigerian society and triangulating their responses helped preserve the accuracy of this 
study. 
It is also necessary to note that most of the participants interviewed for this study 
were male. It is difficult to say definitively what sort of an influence that would have on 
the findings of this study but it is important to admit that this is an area where there is 
limited perspective being offered. General political science beliefs in the feminist 
tradition hold the view that a female perspective might afford a different lens for 
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examining an issue and may bring to light other phenomena that might not have been 
identified by a male perspective (Ring, 1987). Future research would need to take 
particular care to identify and interview women who engage with China, either in the 
capacity of government or business and perhaps otherwise. This supports the general 
argument of verification process and quality control efforts that the triangulation of 
information received, would result in the development of the most accurate codes and 
findings that tell the true story of the phenomena being studied and provide a reliable 
picture of Chinese and Nigerian relations and Nigerian intentions in this interaction. 
Other un-represented or inadequately represented groups include state level 
government officials, Nigerian consumers, non-governmental organizations (such as 
human rights activists), young professionals
119
 and rural Nigerians. Although this 
research did make a conscious effort to interview many different people across different 
socio-economic profiles and industries to get a better grasp of China-Nigeria relations 
and to understand Nigeria’s current China policy, future studies into Nigeria China 
relations can benefit from expanding the diversity of perspectives. This study is a step in 
the right direction but there is still more that needs to be done. Future scholarship in this 
area needs to conduct case studies of other African countries to understand better China-
Africa relations and to establish organized information that can be used in comparing 
Chinese engagement across African countries to compile a more accurate composite and 
comprehensive picture of China in Africa that is supported by empirical evidence.  
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Future Research 
A perspective not adequately addressed by current literature is the position that 
growing Sino-African relations can be viewed as political and economic interdependency 
as a result of China’s push to establish a new international economic regime that dilutes 
the influence of the West (particularly the U.S.) in the world market. The Chinese have 
taken strategic steps to attract African states and have been successful in persuading them 
to collude not only in dyadic arrangements but at the international institutional level. 
China’s currying the favor of African states has afforded it some additional 
maneuverability at the United Nations. Africans have expressed a desire to emulate 
China’s quick road to development; Western industrialization has taken longer to 
implement, and time is not something that most African states can afford to squander, 
especially in the light of the dire state of current conditions in Africa. Mugabe’s reference 
to a “Look East Policy” is perhaps the most popular of many explicit examples of African 
state actors’ intentions to imitate the Chinese. Undoubtedly, increasing use of terms like 
‘South-South Solidarity’, ‘mutual development and cooperation’, and the identifiable 
relations of China and African states has fostered affinity between the two sides.  
It is possible that China is attempting to create a new international economic 
regime on the foundations of an interdependent relationship, as opposed to the dependent 
relationship traditionally formed with African states. This argument builds upon the 
initial arguments presented by Carmody and Owusu, who maintained that China and the 
U.S. have engaged in geopolitical competition over Africa and its resources with different 
end games in sight (2007). While making comparatively limited references to U.S. 
objectives in Africa, the authors propose that China is endeavoring to use African states 
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to reset the processes of the global economic system. They argue that Chinese short-term 
stratagem intends to meet the needs of the growing domestic industry as well as the 
demands of an increasingly materialistic (daresay capitalist) Chinese consumer base. 
Simultaneously, Chinese long-term stratagem is to advance the industrial capacity of 
African states to secure a secondary, comprehensive supply for leaner times when 
Chinese industry fails to meet domestic consumer demands. This evidence of this 
strategy is apparent in China’s significant investment in infrastructure in African states 
(Mutukwa, 1977; Alden, 2007).  
With the end of the Cold War and current U.S. involvement in two expensive 
wars, China’s influence is growing as the Chinese economy flourishes. Lumumba-
Kasongo claims that uncertainty is growing at the global level, and theories applied to 
international relations fall short of addressing current events in general, and in particular, 
Africa’s demand for global change (1999). With increasing globalization, the nature of 
relations between states is shifting. Advances in communications and information 
technology are changing the face of international relations. Chinese efforts to establish a 
new economic and geo-political regime clearly indicate a need to diminish uncertainty. 
International regimes are useful for reducing uncertainty, minimizing transaction costs 
and preventing market failures (Keohane, 1984).   
Future research can explore the position that Chinese-African relations are 
developing as a result of mutual vulnerability and a growing interdependence. As defined 
by Waltz, “‘interdependence’ describes a condition in which anything that happens 
anywhere in the world may affect somebody, or everybody, elsewhere” (Waltz 1979, 
139). Additionally, Chinese development of an interdependent relationship with Africa 
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fits the neoliberal institutionalism literature on interdependence. According to Keohane 
and Nye (1977), interdependence poses a situation in world politics where reciprocal 
effects occur among actors from different countries. Growing Sino-African relations can 
be examined using Keohane and Nye’s characterization of a complex interdependent 
relationship.  
Special attention needs to be paid to the role of the Forum on China-Africa 
Cooperation (FOCAC) Forum as the platform for multi-level, multi-focus China-African 
relations. FOCAC is taking on the appearance of an international institution; it is more 
than a formal organization. Institutions affect state behavior and international institutions 
and regimes facilitate cooperation between sovereign power-seeking states (Keohane, 
1984). FOCAC has and continues to serve as a facilitator of Sino-Africa relations. The 
amalgamation of individual and collective interests has allowed for the development of 
an international institution in FOCAC and an international regime made up of China and 
African states. The platforms FOCAC establishes and the role it plays in promoting 
partnerships between African and Chinese entities occur at all levels--from individual 
market traders to government representatives and agencies. As African and Chinese 
interests continue to converge and complement each other, collaboration in an 
international regime can help promote and protect these interests in the global arena. 
 China, through FOCAC and its African foreign relations, may be attempting to 
develop a new international economic regime. Collusion between African elites and 
China through the development of an international regime affords all parties the 
opportunity to achieve objectives that would be out of reach without the cooperation of 
other states in an international regime. As Chinese ideology is not always in tune with 
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that of the U.S., the current hegemon and general Western ideologies, it makes sense that 
China would seek out the support of African states and other developing countries to 
establish an international political economy well suited to its particular interests and 
accommodating of Chinese ideologies (Keohane, 1964; Carmody and Owusu, 2007). Just 
as there is significant focus on the Chinese perspective of this relationship it is also 
important that future studies continue to examine in great detail the role of African states 
in order to more accurately identify the global implications of this growing engagement. 
Current literature on Sino-African relations, as well as this study has 
demonstrated the need to pursue further systematic research into this iteration of 
international relations. This study has only begun to scratch the surface of Nigeria-China 
relations. There remain another 51 countries in Africa, most of whom have relations with 
China that have yet to thoroughly investigated. Undoubtedly China is Africa to stay and 
African states are not only permissive but are also actively engaging the Chinese. It 
remains to be seen whether African states will adequately manage this new relationship 
to maximize on the benefits that the Chinese opportunity presents. 
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Appendix A: Abbreviations & Acronyms 
 
AERC African Economic Research Consortium 
AfDB African Development Bank 
AU African Union 
BOI Bank of Industry 
BRIC Brazil, Russia, India and China (identified as newly industrialized economies) 
CCECC China Civil Engineering Construction Corporation 
CICIR China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations 
ECLA United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America 
ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States 
ECP Emerging Capital Partners  
EFCC Economic and Financial Crimes Commission 
FDI Foreign Direct Investment 
FOCAC Forum on China-Africa Cooperation 
GDP Gross Domestic Product 
GNI Gross National Income 
IGO Inter-Governmental Organization 
ITC International Trade Centre 
LCCI Lagos Chamber of Commerce and Industry 
MDGs Millennium Development Goals 
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MFA Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
₦ Naira, Nigerian currency 
NAFDAC National Agency for Food and Drug Administration and Control  
NCBC Nigeria-China Business Council 
NEPAD New Partnership for Africa’s Development 
NEXIM Nigerian Export-Import Bank 
NICAF Nigerian-China Friendship Association 
NIIA Nigerian Institute of International Affairs 
NIPC Nigerian Investment Promotion Commission 
NGO Non-Governmental  Organization 
PHCN Power Holding Company of Nigeria 
PRC People's Republic of China 
RMRDC Raw Materials Research and Development Council  
SME Small and Medium Enterprise 
SON Standards Organization of Nigeria 
UN United Nations 
UN 
COMTRADE United Nations Commodity Trade 
UNCTAD United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
UNFPA United Nations Population Fund 
USD US Dollars 
WTO World Trade Organization 
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Appendix B: Interview Protocol 
 
Interview Questions for Government Officials 
1. How would you characterize the nature of the relationship between your government 
and China? 
2. Why do you think that China is interested in engaging with your country? 
3. In your own words, what have been the effects of Chinese engagement in your 
country? 
4. Why do you think your country is engaging with China? 
5. Is there a foreign policy document issued by your government on their interaction 
with China? 
6. What do you think are the objectives being sought by the government and how do 
you think they can be realized? 
7. What has been the result so far? Do you think these objectives been met? Please 
provide examples. 
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Interview Questions for Business and Industry Representatives 
1. As a business and industry representative, why do you think your country is interested 
in engaging with China? 
2. How would you characterize the nature of the relationship between your organization 
and China? Do you have any trade agreements with Chinese firms? 
3. Why is your organization engaging with China? 
4. What are the objectives being sought by your organization and how do you plan on 
realizing them? 
5. What has been the result so far? Have these objectives been met? Please provide 
examples. 
 
Follow-up Questions added during Fieldwork Period: 
6. What are the unique advantages that engagement with China presents? 
7. What are the unique disadvantages of engagement with China? 
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Appendix C: Informed Consent Form 1 
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Appendix D: Informed Consent Form 2 
 
227 
Appendix E: Informed Consent Form 3 
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Appendix F: List of Official Interview Respondents 
 # Name* Occupation Category Date** 
1 Lazarus 
Yerima 
Industrial Engineer & Entrepreneur 
that works with Chinese 
manufacturers and suppliers, and 
also sells Nigerian semi-processed 
minerals and other products to 
Chinese purchasers. Also attended a 
FOCAC conference. 
Business 01/06/11 
2 Peter Ter Small Business Owner, IT software 
and hardware supplier 
Business 01/10/11 
3 B.D. Lawal Medium-Large Business 
owner/Telecommunications Investor 
Business 04/05/11 
4 Foreign 
Service 
Officer 
Political Division, Nigerian 
Embassy Washington DC, 
(previously assigned to the Nigerian 
Foreign Service Pacific Division 
which includes China) 
Government 04/06/11 
5 Civil Servant Deputy Director in National Agency 
for Food and Drug Administration 
and Control (NAFDAC) 
Government 07/12/11 
6 Banker NEXIM (Nigeria Export-Import 
Bank) 
Business 07/13/11 
7 Banker NEXIM (Nigeria Export-Import 
Bank) 
Business 07/13/11 
8 Civil Servant Bilateral Relations & Public 
Relations officer in National Agency 
for Food and Drug Administration 
and Control (NAFDAC) 
Government 07/14/11 
9 Civil Servant Policy Specialist, Planning and 
Policy Analysis division of the 
Federal Ministry of Science and 
Technology 
Government 07/14/11 
10 Civil Servant Department director in the Federal 
Ministry of Science and Technology 
Government 07/14/11 
11 Civil Servant Associate Director, Policy & 
Planning Analysis division, Federal 
Ministry of Science and Technology 
Government 07/15/11 
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 # Name* Occupation Category Date** 
12 Civil Servant Recently retired, prior responsibility 
in construction and policy-making in 
housing and urban development 
Government 07/16/11 
13 Market 
Trader 
Owns 3 shops (down from 10) and 
employs 8 workers in the open 
market, and makes 6 trips each year 
to China, Thailand and Indonesia to 
buy "mother care" products,  and 2 
trips per year to USA and United 
Kingdom. Respondent was 
approached and interviewed outside 
the Chinese consulate  in Abuja. 
Business 07/18/11 
14 Chibueze 
Okereke 
Businessman/Contractor  
interviewed outside the Chinese 
consulate in Abuja. 
Business 07/18/11 
15 Market 
Trader 
Textile trader in Wuse Market who 
buys drapes/curtains from China 
Business 07/18/11 
16 Market 
Trader 
Kitchen appliance trader in Wuse 
Market, products sourced from 
China 
Business 07/18/11 
17 Civil Servant Director in Directorate of Technical 
Co-operation in Africa (DTCA), the 
Technical Aids Corps (TAC) which 
sends Nigerian professionals, 
teachers, doctors, judges, executives 
etc to volunteer in African, 
Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) 
countries (very similar to the US’ 
Peace Corps). 
Government 07/19/11 
18 Civil Servant Bilateral Relations officer in Nigeria 
Information Service 
Government 07/19/11 
19 Civil Servant Bilateral Relations officer in Federal 
Ministry of Information and 
Communications 
Government 07/19/11 
20 Banker Central Bank of Nigeria (at time of 
interview was 2 weeks retired from 
this job) 
Business 07/25/11 
21 Civil Servant Bilateral relations desk at the 
National Planning Commission 
Government 07/26/11 
22 Market 
Trader 
Men's apparel trader in Wuse 
Market, travels to China 3 times a 
year 
Business 07/26/11 
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23 Market 
Trader 
Women's shoes and bags and wares 
trader in Wuse Market, travels to 
China 4 times a year. Showed an 
official invitation to China Import-
Export Fair 
(www.cantonfair.org.cn). Has 
attended the fair 3 times, and meets 
Chinese suppliers there. 
Business 07/26/11 
24 Civil Servant Director of External Affairs, Federal 
Ministry of Tourism, Culture and 
National Orientation 
Government 07/27/11 
25 Civil Servant UNESCO office in  the Federal 
Ministry of Tourism, Culture and 
National Orientation 
Government 07/27/11 
26 Economist  Former Resident Representative, 
African Development Bank 
Other 07/27/11 
27 Economist  Current Resident Representative, 
African Development Bank 
Other 07/27/11 
28 Market 
Trader 
Furniture and Office equipment 
trader in Wuse Market, travelled to 
China twice, first time in 2010. 
Business 07/28/11 
29 Market 
Trader 
Travelled once to China, buys 
instead from Chinatown in Lagos 
due to recent visa issues 
Business 07/28/11 
30 Market 
Trader 
Home applicances trader, travels to 
China 3-4 times a year depending on 
demand. Has been travelling to 
China since 2003 
Business 07/28/11 
31 Business 
Owner 
Medium-Large Business owner of 
Door Supply Company 
Business 07/28/11 
32 Civil Servant Bilateral Relations desk at the 
Federal Ministry of Trade and 
Investment 
Government 07/29/11 
33 Trade 
Promoter/ 
Lobbyist 
Director of the Nigeria-China 
Business Council (NCBC), a private 
sector organization that partners 
with the Nigerian government to 
organize trademissions to China and 
receive trade missions from China 
Other 07/29/11 
34 Civil Servant Department of Investor Relations at 
the Nigerian Investment Promotion 
Commission, a para-statal agency. 
Government 08/10/11 
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35 Foreign 
Service 
Officer 
Regional relations director at the 
Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
Government 08/11/11 
36 Chinese 
national 
Manager of a mining operation in 
Zamfara State. Chinese national that 
has worked in Africa for over 10 
years, working in many African 
countries including Cote D'Ivoire, 
Zambia, Democratic Republic of 
Congo, Zimbabwe and South Africa, 
as well as Nigeria (list of countries 
is not conclusive). 
Business 08/10/11 
37 Foreign 
Service 
Officer 
Foreign service officer in the 
Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
Government 08/11/11 
38 Civil Servant Executive in the Nigerian 
Investment Promotion Commission 
Government 08/12/11 
39 Foreign 
Service 
Officer 
Foreign service officer in the 
Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
Government 08/12/11 
40 Senator Senator in the Nigerian cabinet who 
serves on the Health committee and 
travelled with a delegation to China 
to address issues of counterfeit 
medicines from China entering 
Nigerian marketplaces. 
Government 08/12/11 
41 Financial 
Investor 
Nigerian financial investor with 
some business dealings with the 
Chinese as well as some exposure to 
Chinese investments in the Nigerian 
economy. 
Business 08/13/11 
42 Jerry Gana Previously served as the Federal 
Minister for multiple ministries 
incuding the Federal Ministry of  
Agriculture and Natural Resources 
and the Federal Ministry of 
Information and Communications. 
Now works in the private sector. 
Government/  
Business 
08/13/11 
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43 Business 
Consultant 
Nigerian national that attended 
university in China and studied 
Chinese, works as a liason for 
Nigerian and Chinese companies, 
offering translation services among 
others. An independent contractor 
that works on a short-term contract 
basis, often travelling to China for 
work projects. 
Business 08/14/11 
44 Academic Academic at the Nigerian Institute 
of International Affairs (NIIA). 
Interviewed in a panel discussion 
format with other academics. 
Academic 08/16/11 
45 Salesperson Independent contractor for a 
Chinese supplier of acupuncture 
equipment that uses a tianshi format 
similar to a pyramid scheme where 
the salespersons are paid by 
commission with bonuses for 
milestones reached as well as for 
new salepeople brought to the 
company. 
Business 08/11/11 
46 Salesperson Independent contractor for a 
Chinese supplier of acupuncture 
equipment that uses a tianshi format 
similar to a pyramid scheme where 
the salespersons are paid by 
commission with bonuses for 
milestones reached as well as for 
new salepeople brought to the 
company. 
Business 08/12/11 
47 Salesperson Independent contractor for a 
Chinese supplier of acupuncture 
equipment that uses a tianshi format 
similar to a pyramid scheme where 
the salespersons are paid by 
commission with bonuses for 
milestones reached as well as for 
new salepeople brought to the 
company. 
Business 08/12/11 
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48 Salesperson Independent contractor for a 
Chinese supplier of acupuncture 
equipment that uses a tianshi format 
similar to a pyramid scheme where 
the salespersons are paid by 
commission with bonuses for 
milestones reached as well as for 
new salepeople brought to the 
company. 
Business 08/12/11 
49 Salesperson Independent contractor for a 
Chinese supplier of acupuncture 
equipment that uses a tianshi format 
similar to a pyramid scheme where 
the salespersons are paid by 
commission with bonuses for 
milestones reached as well as for 
new salepeople brought to the 
company. 
Business 08/12/11 
50 Academic Academic at the Nigerian Institute 
of International Affairs (NIIA). 
Interviewed in a panel discussion 
format with other academics. 
Academic 08/16/11 
51 Academic Academic at the Nigerian Institute 
of International Affairs (NIIA). 
Recently returned from completing a 
doctorate degreee in China. 
Academic 08/16/11 
52 Trade 
Promoter/ 
Lobbyist 
Executive at the Nigerian 
Association of Chambers of 
Commerce, Industry, Mines and 
Agriculture (NACCIMA) in Lagos. 
Business 08/17/11 
53 Academic Academic at the Nigerian Institute 
of International Affairs (NIIA). 
Interviewed in a panel discussion 
format with other academics. 
Academic 08/16/11 
54 Salesman Nigerian employed by Chinese 
company that sells automated 
banking machinery. 
Business 08/13/11 
55 Academic Academic at the Nigerian Institute 
of International Affairs (NIIA). 
Interviewed in a panel discussion 
format with other academics. 
Academic 08/16/11 
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56 Academic Academic at the Nigerian Institute 
of International Affairs (NIIA). 
Interviewed in a panel discussion 
format with other academics. 
Academic 08/16/11 
57 Academic Academic at the Nigerian Institute 
of International Affairs (NIIA). 
Interviewed in a panel discussion 
format with other academics. 
Academic 08/16/11 
58 Pat Utomi Published Nigerian scholar and 
politician with a backgrounds in 
economics and development and 
business owner with dealings with 
China. 
Academic/ 
Business 
08/17/11 
59 Ambassador 
Victor 
Chibundu 
Founder and chief executive of the 
Nigeria-China Friendship 
Association (NICAF). Respondent 
was a former Nigerian ambassador 
to China and established 
organization to help promote private 
non-government relationships 
between Chinese and Nigerian 
entitities. 
Other 08/18/11 
60 Banker Bank of Industry (Nigeria).  Business 08/18/11 
61 Chinese 
national 
Chinese national just arrived in 
Nigeria to work as a manager for a 
Tianshi project that contracts with 
independent Nigerian salespersons 
to sell acupuncture machines. First 
time out of China and first time in 
Africa. 
Business 08/19/11 
62 Chief Ojo 
Maduekwe 
Former Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
current Nigerian Ambassador to 
Canada 
Government 08/20/11 
 
* Names are provided where permitted by interview respondents according to IRB 
regulations and informed consent form. 
** *Interview dates do not follow chronological order as the interviews are listed in 
numerical fashion based on order of informed consent forms signatures. 
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China's African Policy 
 
 
 
2006/09/20  
 
 
 
 
China's African Policy 
January 2006 
Foreword 
The first few years of the new century witness a continuation of complex and profound changes in the 
international situation and further advance of globalization. Peace and development remain the main themes 
of our times. Safeguarding peace, promoting development and enhancing cooperation, which is the common 
desire of all peoples, represents the irresistible historical trend. On the other hand, destabilizing factors and 
uncertainties in the international situation are on the rise. Security issues of various kinds are interwoven. 
Peace remains evasive and development more pressing.  
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China, the largest developing country in the world, follows the path of peaceful development and pursues an 
independent foreign policy of peace. China stands ready to develop friendly relations and cooperation with 
all countries on the basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence so as to contribute to peace, 
stability and common prosperity around the world.  
The African continent, which encompasses the largest number of developing countries, is an important force 
for world peace and development. China-Africa traditional friendly relations face fresh opportunities under 
the new circumstances. By this African Policy Paper, the Chinese Government wishes to present to the 
world the objectives of China's policy towards Africa and the measures to achieve them, and its proposals 
for cooperation in various fields in the coming years, with a view to promoting the steady growth of China-
Africa relations in the long term and bringing the mutually-beneficial cooperation to a new stage.  
Part I:  
Africa's Position and Role  
Africa has a long history, vast expanse of land, rich natural resources and huge potential for development. 
After long years of struggle, the African people freed themselves from colonial rule, wiped out apartheid, 
won independence and emancipation, thus making significant contribution to the progress of civilization.  
Following their independence, countries in Africa have been conscientiously exploring a road to 
development suited to their national conditions and seeking peace, stability and development by joint efforts. 
Thanks to the concerted efforts of African countries and the Organization of African Unity (OAU)/the African 
Union (AU), the political situation in Africa has been stable on the whole, regional conflicts are being 
gradually resolved and economy has been growing for years. The NEPAD has drawn up an encouraging 
picture of African rejuvenation and development. African countries have actively participated in the South-
South cooperation and worked for the North-South dialogue. They are playing an increasingly important role 
in international affairs.  
Africa still faces many challenges on its road of development. However, with the persistent efforts of African 
countries and the continuous support of the international community, Africa will surely surmount difficulties 
and achieve rejuvenation in the new century.  
Part II:  
China's Relations with Africa  
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China-Africa friendship is embedded in the long history of interchange. Sharing similar historical experience, 
China and Africa have all along sympathized with and supported each other in the struggle for national 
liberation and forged a profound friendship.  
The founding of the People's Republic of China and the independence of African countries ushered in a new 
era in China-Africa relations. For over half a century, the two sides have enjoyed close political ties and 
frequent exchange of high-level visits and people-to-people contacts. Our bilateral trade and economic 
cooperation have grown rapidly; cooperation in other fields has yielded good results; and consultation and 
coordination in international affairs have been intensified. China has provided assistance to the best of its 
ability to African countries, while African countries have also rendered strong support to China on many 
occasions.  
Sincerity, equality and mutual benefit, solidarity and common development-these are the principles guiding 
China-Africa exchange and cooperation and the driving force to lasting China-Africa relations.  
Part III:  
China's African Policy  
Enhancing solidarity and cooperation with African countries has always been an important component of 
China's independent foreign policy of peace. China will unswervingly carry forward the tradition of China-
Africa friendship, and, proceeding from the fundamental interests of both the Chinese and African peoples, 
establish and develop a new type of strategic partnership with Africa, featuring political equality and mutual 
trust, economic win-win cooperation and cultural exchange. The general principles and objectives of China's 
African policy are as follows:  
- Sincerity, friendship and equality. China adheres to the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, respects 
African countries' independent choice of the road of development and supports African countries' efforts to 
grow stronger through unity.  
- Mutual benefit, reciprocity and common prosperity. China supports African countries' endeavor for 
economic development and nation building, carries out cooperation in various forms in the economic and 
social development, and promotes common prosperity of China and Africa.  
- Mutual support and close coordination. China will strengthen cooperation with Africa in the UN and other 
multilateral systems by supporting each other's just demand and reasonable propositions and continue to 
appeal to the international community to give more attention to questions concerning peace and 
development in Africa.  
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- Learning from each other and seeking common development. China and Africa will learn from and draw 
upon each other's experience in governance and development, strengthen exchange and cooperation in 
education, science, culture and health. Supporting African countries' efforts to enhance capacity building, 
China will work together with Africa in the exploration of the road of sustainable development.  
The one China principle is the political foundation for the establishment and development of China's 
relations with African countries and regional organizations. The Chinese Government appreciates the fact 
that the overwhelming majority of African countries abide by the one China principle, refuse to have official 
relations and contacts with Taiwan and support China's great cause of reunification. China stands ready to 
establish and develop state-to-state relations with countries that have not yet established diplomatic ties with 
China on the basis of the one China principle.  
Part IV  
Enhancing All-round Cooperation Between China and Africa  
1. The political field  
(1) High-level visits  
China will maintain the momentum of mutual visits and dialogues between Chinese and African leaders, with 
a view to facilitating communication, deepening friendship and promoting mutual understanding and trust.  
(2) Exchanges between legislative bodies  
China favors increased multi-level and multi-channel friendly exchanges on the basis of mutual respect 
between China's National People's Congress (NPC) on the one hand and parliaments of African countries 
and the Pan-African Parliament of the AU on the other, for the purpose of deepening understanding and 
cooperation.  
(3) Exchanges between political parties  
The Communist Party of China (CPC) develops exchanges of various forms with friendly political parties and 
organizations of African countries on the basis of the principles of independence, equality, mutual respect 
and non-interference in each other's internal affairs. The purpose of such exchanges is to increase 
understanding and friendship and seek trust and cooperation.  
(4) Consultation mechanisms  
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Mechanisms such as national bilateral committees between China and African countries, political 
consultation between foreign ministries, joint(mixed) committees on trade and economic cooperation and 
mixed committees on science and technology should be established and improved, so as to institutionalize 
dialogue and consultation in a flexible and pragmatic manner.  
(5) Cooperation in international affairs  
China will continue to strengthen solidarity and cooperation with African countries on the international arena, 
conduct regular exchange of views, coordinate positions on major international and regional issues and 
stand for mutual support on major issues concerning state sovereignty, territorial integrity, national dignity 
and human rights. China supports African nations' desire to be an equal partner in international affairs. 
China is devoted, as are African nations, to making the UN play a greater role, defending the purposes and 
principles of the UN Charter, establishing a new international political and economic order featuring justice, 
rationality, equality and mutual benefit, promoting more democratic international relationship and rule of law 
in international affairs and safeguarding the legitimate rights and interests of developing countries.  
(6) Exchanges between local governments  
China's Central Government attaches importance to the exchanges between local governments of China 
and African countries, vigorously supports twin province/state and twin city relationship aimed at facilitating 
bilateral exchanges and cooperation in local development and administration.  
2. The economic field  
(1) Trade  
The Chinese Government will adopt more effective measures to facilitate African commodities' access to 
Chinese market and fulfill its promise to grant duty-free treatment to some goods from the least developed 
African countries, with a view to expanding and balancing bilateral trade and optimizing trade structure. It 
intends to settle trade disputes and frictions properly through bilateral or multilateral friendly consultation, 
mutual understanding and mutual accommodation. Efforts will be made to encourage business communities 
on both sides to set up China-Africa Joint Chamber of Commerce and Industry. When conditions are ripe, 
China is willing to negotiate Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with African countries and African regional 
organizations.  
(2) Investment  
The Chinese Government encourages and supports Chinese enterprises' investment and business in Africa, 
and will continue to provide preferential loans and buyer credits to this end. The Chinese Government is 
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ready to explore new channels and new ways for promoting investment cooperation with African countries, 
and will continue to formulate and improve relevant policies, provide guidance and service and offer 
convenience. African countries are welcome to make investment in China. The Chinese Government will 
continue to negotiate, conclude and implement the Agreement on Bilateral Facilitation and Protection of 
Investment and the Agreement on Avoidance of Double Taxation with African Countries. The two sides 
should work together to create a favorable environment for investment and cooperation and protect the 
legitimate rights and interests of investors from both sides.  
(3) Financial cooperation  
To further develop China-Africa cooperation in the area of finance, the Chinese Government will support the 
effort of Chinese financial institutions to increase exchanges and cooperation with their counterparts in 
African countries as well as regional financial institutions in Africa.  
(4) Agricultural cooperation  
China intends to further promote its agricultural cooperation and exchanges with African nations at various 
levels, through multiple channels and in various forms. Focus will be laid on the cooperation in land 
development, agricultural plantation, breeding technologies, food security, agricultural machinery and the 
processing of agricultural and side-line products. China will intensify cooperation in agricultural technology, 
organize training courses of practical agricultural technologies, carry out experimental and demonstrative 
agricultural technology projects in Africa and speed up the formulation of China-Africa Agricultural 
Cooperation Program.  
(5) Infrastructure  
The Chinese Government will step up China-Africa cooperation in transportation, communication, water 
conservancy, electricity and other infrastructures. It will vigorously encourage Chinese enterprises to 
participate in the building of infrastructure in African countries, scale up their contracts, and gradually 
establish multilateral and bilateral mechanisms on contractual projects. Efforts will be made to strengthen 
technology and management cooperation, focusing on the capacity-building of African nations.  
(6) Resources cooperation  
The Chinese Government facilitates information sharing and cooperation with Africa in resources areas. It 
encourages and supports competent Chinese enterprises to cooperate with African nations in various ways 
on the basis of the principle of mutual benefit and common development, to develop and exploit rationally 
their resources, with a view to helping African countries to translate their advantages in resources to 
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competitive strength, and realize sustainable development in their own countries and the continent as a 
whole.  
(7) Tourism cooperation  
China will implement the program of Chinese citizens' group tour to some African nations and, grant more 
African countries, as they wish and as far as feasible, Approved Destination Status for out-bound Chinese 
tourist groups. China welcomes citizens from African nations for a tour of the country.  
(8) Debt reduction and relief  
China is ready to continue friendly consultation with some African countries with a view to seek solution to, 
or reduction of, the debts they owe to China. It will urge the international community, developed countries in 
particular, to take more substantial action on the issue of debt reduction and relief for African nations.  
(9) Economic assistance  
In light of its own financial capacity and economic situation, China will do its best to provide and gradually 
increase assistance to African nations with no political strings attached.  
(10) Multilateral cooperation  
China is ready to enhance consultation and coordination with Africa within multilateral trade systems and 
financial institutions and work together to urge the UN and other international organizations to pay more 
attention to the question of economic development, promote South-South cooperation, push forward the 
establishment of a just and rational multilateral trade system and make the voices of developing countries 
heard in the decision-making of international financial affairs. It will step up cooperation with other countries 
and international organizations to support the development of Africa and help realize Millennium 
Development Goals in Africa.  
3. Education, science, culture, health and social aspects  
(1) Cooperation in human resources development and education  
The Chinese Government will give full play to the role of its "African Human Resources Development 
Foundation" in training African personnel. It will identify priority areas, expand areas of cooperation and 
provide more input according to the needs of African countries so as to achieve greater results.  
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Exchange of students between China and Africa will continue. China will increase the number of government 
scholarships as it sees fit, continue to send teachers to help African countries in Chinese language teaching 
and carry out educational assistance project to help develop Africa's weak disciplines. It intends to 
strengthen cooperation in such fields as vocational education and distance learning while encouraging 
exchanges and cooperation between educational and academic institutions of both sides.  
(2) Science and technology cooperation  
Following the principles of mutual respect, complementarity and sharing benefits, China will promote its 
cooperation with Africa in the fields of applied research, technological development and transfer, speed up 
scientific and technological cooperation in the fields of common interest, such as bio-agriculture, solar 
energy utilization, geological survey, mining and R&D of new medicines. It will continue its training programs 
in applied technologies for African countries, carry out demonstration programs of technical assistance, and 
actively help disseminate and utilize Chinese scientific and technological achievements and advanced 
technologies applicable in Africa.  
(3) Cultural exchanges  
China will implement agreements of cultural cooperation and relevant implementation plans reached with 
African countries, maintain regular contacts with their cultural departments and increase exchanges of artists 
and athletes. It will guide and promote cultural exchanges in diverse forms between people's organizations 
and institutions in line with bilateral cultural exchange programs and market demand.  
(4) Medical and health cooperation  
China is ready to enhance medical personnel and information exchange with Africa. It will continue to send 
medical teams and provide medicines and medical materials to African countries, and help them establish 
and improve medical facilities and train medical personnel. China will increase its exchanges and 
cooperation with African countries in the prevention and treatment of infectious diseases including HIV/AIDS 
and malaria and other diseases, research and application of traditional medicine and experience concerning 
mechanism for public health emergencies.  
(5) Media cooperation  
China wishes to encourage multi-tiered and multi-formed exchange and cooperation between the media on 
both sides, so as to enhance mutual understanding and enable objective and balanced media coverage of 
each other. It will facilitate the communication and contacts between relevant government departments for 
the purpose of sharing experiences on ways to handle the relations with media both domestic and foreign, 
and guiding and facilitating media exchanges.  
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(6) Administrative cooperation  
China will carry out exchange and cooperation with African countries in civil service system building, public 
administration reform and training of government personnel. The two sides may study the feasibility of 
setting up a mechanism for personnel and administrative cooperation.  
(7) Consular cooperation  
China will hold regular/irregular consular consultations with African countries during which the two sides may 
have amicable discussions on urgent problems or questions of common interest in bilateral or multilateral 
consular relations in order to improve understanding and expand cooperation. The Chinese side will work 
with Africa to facilitate personnel flow and ensure the safety of their nationals.  
(8) People-to-people exchange  
China will encourage and facilitate the exchanges between people's organizations of China and Africa, 
especially the youth and women, with a view to increasing the understanding, trust and cooperation of 
people on both sides. It will encourage and guide Chinese volunteers to serve in African countries.  
(9) Environmental cooperation  
China will actively promote China-Africa cooperation in climate change, water resources conservation, anti-
desertification, bio-diversity and other areas of environmental protection by facilitating technological 
exchange.  
(10) Disaster reduction, relief and humanitarian assistance  
China will actively carry out personnel exchange, training and technological cooperation in the fields of 
disaster reduction and relief. It will respond quickly to African countries' request for urgent humanitarian aid, 
encourage and support exchange and cooperation between the Red Cross Society of China and other 
NGOs on the one side and their African counterparts on the other side.  
4. Peace and security  
(1) Military cooperation  
China will promote high-level military exchanges between the two sides and actively carry out military-
related technological exchanges and cooperation. It will continue to help train African military personnel and 
support defense and army building of African countries for their own security.  
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(2) Conflict settlement and peacekeeping operations  
China supports the positive efforts by the AU and other African regional organizations and African countries 
concerned to settle regional conflicts and will provide assistance within our own capacity. It will urge the UN 
Security Council to pay attention to and help resolve regional conflicts in Africa. It will continue its support to 
and participation in UN peacekeeping operations in Africa.  
(3) Judicial and police cooperation  
China is prepared to promote exchange and cooperation between Chinese and African judicial and law 
enforcement departments. The two sides may learn from each other in legal system building and judicial 
reform so as to be better able to prevent, investigate and crack down on crimes. China will work together 
with African countries to combat transnational organized crimes and corruption, and intensify cooperation on 
matters concerning judicial assistance, extradition and repatriation of criminal suspects.  
China will cooperate closely with immigration departments of African countries in tackling the problem of 
illegal migration, improve exchange of immigration control information and set up an unimpeded and efficient 
channel for intelligence and information exchange.  
(4) Non-traditional security areas  
In order to enhance the ability of both sides to address non-traditional security threats, it is necessary to 
increase intelligence exchange, explore more effective ways and means for closer cooperation in combating 
terrorism, small arms smuggling, drug trafficking, transnational economic crimes, etc.  
Part V:  
Forum on China-Africa Cooperation and Its Follow-up Actions  
Launched in 2000, the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation has become an effective mechanism for the 
collective dialogue and multilateral cooperation between China and Africa and put in place an important 
framework and platform for a new type of China-Africa partnership featuring long-term stability, equality and 
mutual benefit.  
China attaches importance to the positive role of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation in strengthening 
political consultation and pragmatic cooperation between China and Africa, and stands ready to work with 
African countries to conscientiously implement the Beijing Declaration of the Forum on China-Africa 
Cooperation, the Program for China-Africa Cooperation in Economic and Social Development and the 
Forum on China-Africa Cooperation-Addis Ababa Action Plan (2004-2006) and its follow-up action plans. 
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China will work with African countries within the framework of the Forum to explore new ways to enhance 
mutual political trust, promote the comprehensive development of pragmatic cooperation, further improve 
the mechanism of the forum, and try to find the best way for furthering cooperation between the Forum and 
the NEPAD.  
Part VI:  
China's Relations with African Regional Organizations  
China appreciates the significant role of the AU in safeguarding peace and stability in the region and 
promoting African solidarity and development. China values its friendly cooperation with the AU in all fields, 
supports its positive role in regional and international affairs and stands ready to provide the AU assistance 
to the best of its capacity.  
China appreciates and supports the positive role of Africa's sub-regional organizations in promoting political 
stability, economic development and integration in their own regions and stands ready to enhance its 
amicable cooperation with those organizations. 
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Appendix H: Egyptian President Mubarak’s Ten Principles of Africa-China Cooperation 
(11/10/2009) 
 
The Egyptian president Mubarak addressed the Fourth FOCAC Ministerial Conference 
on November 8. He put forward the ten principles of deepening the Africa-China 
cooperation and realizing the sustainable development. 
I. Reiterate the principle of sticking to the equal treatment, sincere cooperation, 
mutual benefit and win-win progress, which was established when the FOCAC 
was just founded; 
II. Go on to promote the dialogue and consultation on Africa-China cooperation, 
strengthen the coordination of the both sides’ stands and protect the mutual 
benefits of African and Chinese peoples; 
III. Strengthen the bilateral, regional and multilateral cooperation, support the efforts 
of realizing peace and stabilization in the African continent, which is the 
foundation of realizing the all-around development of African countries; 
IV. Africa and China make joint efforts to consolidate the consciousness of 
democracy in the international relations, and combat the double standard 
practiced in the political and economic field; 
V. Change the marginalization of Africa and the developing countries in the current 
international policy making system, demand more rights to participate in the 
world economic and financial organizations and groups, especially in Group of 
Eight (G8) and Group of Twenty (G20), so as to guarantee the effective 
participation of Africa and the developing countries in instituting new economic 
and trade systems. 
VI. The developed countries should bear the responsibility of the current economic 
and financial crisis so it is necessary for them to keep the promise to eliminate the 
effect of the crisis on African countries, strengthen the capability of realizing 
development, eliminating poverty, and especially guaranteeing grain security; 
VII. Call for common efforts to end the Doha Round negotiation at the earliest time, 
develop along the direction of bringing beneficial to African countries and ending 
the trade protection policies taken by the developed countries, especially those of 
targeting the merchandise and agricultural products exported from African 
countries. 
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VIII. Stress that the development partners must realize their promises to reduce the debt 
of African countries and increase official aids or direct investment in Africa. 
These are all the promises made by the developed countries many years ago, 
which still remain to be performed to help with the implementation of Africa 
development programs and realize the United Nations Millennium Development 
Goals; 
IX. Insist that Africa is eligible to get the necessary aid in technology and funding to 
fight the effect caused by the climate changes. African countries have been mostly 
affected, though they are not the principal contributors to the climate changes. He 
stresses that the advanced industrial countries should follow the promise of 
reducing emission of green house gases and wishes that a fair and balanced 
initiative be concluded at the Copenhagen Climate Conference which will be held 
in the next month to support the capability of African countries to fight the effect 
of climate change and solve the problems of desertification, draught [sic] and 
flood hazard that some African countries are facing. 
 
The Fourth FOCAC Ministerial Conference was held in the coastal city Sharm El Sheikh, 
Egypt on November 8-9, with nearly a hundred ministerial-level officials form 49 
African countries including China attending the conference. 
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Appendix I: Joint Communiqué Between the People's Republic of China and the Federal 
Republic of Nigeria 
Abuja, 15 April 2002) 
 
At the invitation of President Olusegun Obasanjo of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 
President Jiang Zemin of the People's Republic of China paid a state visit to Nigeria from 
14 to 16 April, 2002.  
During the visit the two leaders discussed a wide range of issues, including the 
furtherance of bilateral relations ad well as regional and international issues of common 
interest. Both sides expressed satisfaction with the results of the visit.  
1. The two sides expressed satisfaction with the progress achieved so far in their 
friendly relations and cooperation which are anchored on the Five Principles of 
Peaceful Coexistence over the past 31 years since their establishment of 
diplomatic ties. The two sides reaffirmed as the basic principle guiding China-
Nigeria relations in the 21st Century, the four-point agreement reached by the two 
Presidents during President Obasanjo's visit to China in August 2001. These 
include sincere friendship and mutual trust, mutual benefit and common 
development, enhanced consultation and mutual support, and commitment to a 
long-term perspective and a future-oriented relationship. The two sides also 
reaffirmed their determination to build on past achievements while working 
together to push the existing friendly relations to greater heights.  
2. The two sides share the view that China-Nigeria bilateral cooperation in trade and 
economic activities with its huge potentials, remains a powerful driving force 
behind the development of China-Nigeria relations. They resolved to work 
together to further develop the cooperation in these areas. While implementing 
conscientiously the economic cooperation and trade agreements already signed, 
the two governments pledged to continue to encourage their companies and 
enterprises to step up exchanges and cooperation and create conditions to 
facilitate trade and investment between them. The two sides stressed the 
significance of mutual cooperation in oil and natural gas ventures and their 
readiness to encourage and support active participation of Chinese enterprises in 
Nigeria's energy development projects.  
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3. Both sides expressed their readiness to encourage their enterprises to carry out 
cooperation in the areas of infrastructural development including the railways.  
4. Both sides expressed their willingness to facilitate China-Nigeria cooperation in 
defence science, technology and industry.  
5. On agriculture, the Chinese side reiterated its readiness to assist Nigeria develop 
its massive agricultural potentials, especially in the area of production of rice and 
other grains.  
6. On international issues, the two sides agreed that China and Nigeria share 
extensive interests in maintaining world peace, facilitating the establishment of a 
just and equitable new international political and economic order, strengthening 
South-South cooperation and promoting the cause of universal prosperity, and 
that they have an important role to play in these endeavors. They expressed their 
readiness for continuous and enhanced consultation and cooperation in 
international affairs.  
7. Both sides expressed unflinching support for each other's efforts to safeguard 
national independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity. While are Chinese 
side values and appreciates the role of Nigeria, Africa's most populous country, in 
regional and continental matters, the Nigerian side reiterates the one-China policy 
that there is but one China in the world, the Government of the People's Republic 
of China is the sole legal government representing the whole of China, and 
Taiwan is an inalienable part of Chinese territory, and that Nigeria will only enter 
into private sector led trade and economic relations with Taiwan.  
8. Both sides expressed concern over the new challenges to developing countries 
brought about by globalization and urge the international community to adopt 
positive measures to ensure the economic security of developing countries by 
enhancing their developmental capacity.  
9. The two sides emphasized the important role of the United Nations in the 
maintenance of international peace and security and promoting global economic 
and social progress, a role no other international organisations could replace. Both 
sides are however in favour of reforms of the United Nations in such a way that 
the demand by its member states for democratisation of international relations 
would be met and that the organisation would more effectively fulfill its mandate 
under the UN Charter. In this connection, China supports greater representation of 
African States in the Security Council.  
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10. Both sides condemned terrorism in all its forms and manifestations and firmly 
support the international community in using every lawful means to fight the 
scourge. Both sides maintain that in combating terrorism, efforts should be made 
to address both its root cause and symptoms, and while international cooperation 
should be strengthened, the leading role of the UN and its Security Council should 
be further reinforced.  
11. The two sides viewed the pursuit of peace, stability and development, as well as 
the settlement of regional conflicts and eradication of poverty, as pressing 
problems facing African countries. The Chinese Government supports the African 
Union and other sub-regional organisations in Africa and believes they can be 
utilised to achieve peace and stability and promote the integration in Africa. The 
Chinese side supports the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD), 
and expressed the willingness to work together with the international community 
to assist Africa in more concrete and effective ways to achieve sustainable 
economic development.  
12. On the cooperation between China and Africa generally, and particularly the 
China-Africa Cooperation Forum and Mechanism, the two sides also expressed 
their readiness to implement the follow-up actions of the Forum through enhanced 
consultation and coordination, so as to contribute to the new partnership between 
China and Africa featuring long-term stability, equality and mutual benefit. 
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Appendix J: Joint Press Communiqué between the Government of the People's Republic 
of China and the Government of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 
(Beijing, 28 February 2008) 
 
At the invitation of President Hu Jintao of the People's Republic of China, 
President Umaru Musa Yar'Adua of the Federal Republic of Nigeria paid a state visit to 
the People's Republic of China from 27 February to 1 March 2008. President Yar'Adua 
and his entourage were warmly received by the government and people of China. 
During the visit, the two Presidents reviewed the sound growth of China-Nigeria 
relations since the establishment of diplomatic relations. They expressed satisfaction at 
the evolving strategic partnership and the momentum of the ties between their two 
countries in recent years, and decided to step up consultation between the two 
governments by launching a strategic dialogue in due course to promote the in-depth 
growth of bilateral relations. 
The two leaders acknowledged the steady rise in the volume of trade, economic 
and technical cooperation between the two countries and pledged to further deepen and 
expand their mutually beneficial bilateral cooperation. They agreed to promptly hold 
meetings of the joint commission between the two countries to take stock of 
achievements in bilateral trade and economic cooperation and plan future cooperation. 
President Hu Jintao pledged China's support for President Yar'Adua's programme 
of economic and social transformation of Nigeria as reflected in the Seven Point Agenda. 
On his part, President Yar'Adua applauded the remarkable achievements China has made 
in economic and social development and reaffirmed Nigeria's commitment to the one-
China policy. 
The two Presidents reviewed developments in Africa and stressed the vital 
importance of enduring peace and stability to the progress and prosperity of the continent. 
The Chinese side hailed Nigeria's long-standing role in the cause of peace in Africa and 
the Nigerian side applauded the contribution made by China in support of the efforts of 
the African Union in the peaceful resolution of conflict situations in Africa. In this 
regard, the two leaders called for greater support of the international community to 
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facilitate the early deployment of the African Union-United Nations hybrid peacekeeping 
force in Darfur. 
The Presidents underscored the essential nature of Africa-China cooperation. 
They reiterated that the two sides will continue to work to advance the new type of 
China-Africa strategic partnership featuring political equality and mutual trust, economic 
win-win cooperation and cultural exchanges and mutual learning, and expressed the view 
that the Forum for China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) and the policy measures the 
Chinese Government adopted to strengthen pragmatic cooperation with Africa have 
provided a viable framework and strong support for promoting the mutually beneficial 
cooperation between China and Africa. 
President Hu Jintao and President Yar'Adua agreed to maintain regular contacts 
between Nigeria and China. The two leaders affirmed that such consultations and 
dialogue at the highest level were imperative at this time when the two countries seek to 
continue to play a positive role in regional and global affairs. 
At the conclusion of the discussions, President Yar'Adua extended an invitation to 
President Hu Jintao to undertake a state visit to Nigeria. President Hu expressed thanks to 
President Yar'Adua for the invitation. 
 
 
253 
Appendix K: Programme for China-Africa Co-operation in Economic and Social 
Development from 1st FOCAC conference 
2000/11/17 
 
The Forum on China-Africa Co-operation - Ministerial Conference 2000 was held in 
Beijing, China from 10 to 12 October 2000. Ministers from China and 44 African 
countries exchanged views and are convinced of the imperatives for a dynamic, new 
strategic partnership between Africa and the PRC. The Ministers commit themselves to 
co-operating in all fields, especially social and economic development, on the basis of 
equality and mutual respect with a view to renewing, developing and expanding China-
Africa co-operation in the 21st century.  
 
1. Foreword  
1.1 The Ministers reviewed with satisfaction the results of the co-operation between 
China and African countries over the past 50 years. The Ministers believe that such co-
operation, not only directly benefits their peoples, but also enhances friendship and 
mutual understanding. The Ministers note that China and African countries have made 
great efforts in recent years to explore new forms of co-operation, particularly between 
enterprises. They, however, note that both Africa and China still have great potential, 
which should be properly managed and strategically directed for their mutual benefit.  
1.2 The Ministers also agree that, in view of the present unjust and inequitable world 
order. China and African countries should position themselves to influence the 
establishment of a new world order which will reflect their needs and interests. To this 
end, they agree to adopt a workable programme towards the creation of a new strategic 
partnership for sustainable development in the 21st century.  
1.3 The Ministers further observe that globalization currently presents more challenges 
and risks than opportunities to the vast number of developing countries and therefore 
express their determination to strengthen the existing co-operation between China and 
African countries in all fields. They also agree to earnestly explore new ideas and 
strategies to develop their respective economics and enhance their capabilities to 
participate in globalization.  
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1.4 In pursuit of the foregoing objectives the Ministers reiterate that China and African 
countries will honor the following principles of co-operation for their future 
development:  
1.4.1 equality and mutual benefit  
1.4.2 diversity in form and content  
1.4.3 emphasis on practical results  
1.4.4 pursuit of common progress  
1.4.5 amicable settlement of differences  
2. Inter-governmental Co-operation  
2.1 The Ministers maintain that the two sides should use and improve the existing 
bilateral consultation mechanisms to strengthen inter-governmental links, explore new 
areas of co-operation, closely monitor the progress in their existing co-operation and 
share experiences in order to enhance their mutually beneficial partnership. In light of the 
development and changes in their bilateral economic and trade relations, the two sides 
agree to continue to review and conclude agreements as necessary, with a view to 
encouraging preferential market access for products from African countries into China.  
2.2 The Ministers agree to promote the exchange of high-level visits and conduct regular 
inter-governmental dialogue and co-operation, so as to create a favorable climate for 
business contacts and trade between China and Africa. In addition, they undertake to 
promote positive interaction with relevant trade and commercial organizations and assist 
in the establishment of effective communication links between such organizations in 
China and Africa, in order to ensure that they play an active role in the development of 
our economies.  
2.3 The Chinese government undertakes to continue to co-operate with and provide 
development assistance to African countries, focusing on the promotion of local 
industries, sourcing of local materials and the creation of employment. Such development 
assistance should support national policies of African countries and be awarded in 
consultation with national governments. Projects will be aimed at the utilization of local 
expertise and materials, the creation of local employment and the development of human 
resources of African countries.  
2.4 To support African countries in their economic and social development, the Chinese 
side undertakes to continue providing assistance to African countries, within its capacity, 
in light of specific economic conditions of the recipient countries and within the 
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framework of South-South co-operation. This support will mainly take the form of aid 
grants, concessional loans and interest-free loans to be mainly used in areas determined 
by both sides.  
3. Trade and Investment  
3.1 The Ministers acknowledge progress in the area of trade and investment promotion 
and express their readiness to develop a strategy by creating an enabling legal and 
business environment, so that such co-operation will gradually play a leading role in the 
China-Africa economic partnership.  
3.2 The Ministers agree to conclude an appropriate legal framework on:  
3.2.1 trade promotion and capacity building;  
3.2.2 encouragement, protection and guarantee of investments;  
3.2.3 avoidance of double taxation;  
3.2.4 enhancement of co-operation in marine shipping and air transportation  
3.3 The Ministers agree to undertake joint efforts to improve trade and investment 
environment through such measures as granting each other preferential treatment in 
conformity with existing national laws, equitable treatment to all investors together with 
investment guarantees and just settlement of eventual disputes, in accordance with 
internationally accepted rules and practices.  
4. Trade  
4.1 The Ministers note the necessity to move towards balanced and enhanced trade and 
acknowledge the need to assist in improving the production capacity in Africa and in 
diversifying the composition of African exports. They pledge to collaborate and share 
experience in overcoming Africa's export dependence on primary commodities, single 
products and raw materials.  
4.2 The Ministers stress the need to harmonize their trade policies and to participate 
actively in trade negotiations, including within the framework of the WTO, in order to 
ensure that the multilateral trading system contributes to enhanced competitiveness, 
economic growth and sustainable development of their countries.  
4.3 The Ministers express the readiness of their business communities to vigorously 
explore and benefit from all opportunities offered by their respective markets, in an 
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enterprising spirit, while complying with internationally accepted norms and quality 
standards in their exported products.  
4.4 Noting with concern the imbalance in the two-way trade and the need to address it as 
soon as possible, the Chinese side undertakes to:  
4.4.1 encourage its enterprises to give preference to the import of African products in the 
light of market demand and conditions;  
4.4.2 strive to make its investment and trade centers in Africa a success, and to facilitate 
the establishment of similar centers of African countries in China, so that these centers 
will play an effective bridging role in facilitating exchanges and communications 
between enterprises of the two sides;  
4.4.3 establish a China-Africa Joint Business Council in co-ordination with the Chambers 
of Commerce of African countries and professional organizations, so as to put in place a 
dialogue and consultation mechanism with African enterprises and promote economic co-
operation and trade between them; and  
4.4.4 establish a China-Africa Products Exhibition Center in China to promote two-way 
trade and facilitate access for African products to the Chinese market.  
4.5 The Ministers state importance of providing better and preferential access to the 
Chinese market for African exports of commercial importance.  
4.6 The Ministers agree to ensure better access to each other's market, in the context of 
multilateral trade liberalization and progress made with due regard to regional integration 
arrangements in Africa.  
5. Investment  
5.1 The Ministers pledge to encourage mutual investment by their enterprises, the 
exchange of experience in business management, the setting up of joint ventures or sole 
ownership enterprises, including small or medium ones and the establishment of joint 
business for a, as key factors in the China-Africa economic partnership.  
5.2 The Chinese side will set aside special funds to support and encourage investment by 
well-established Chinese enterprises in African countries to set up joint equity or co-
operation projects adapted to local need in terms of job creation and transfer of 
technologies.  
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5.3 The Chinese side agrees to share with African countries its experience in the field of 
investment promotion relating to the establishment and management of free and special 
economic zones.  
5.4 The Minister agree to identify their complementarities in order to invest in common 
projects through bilateral and/or trilateral co-operation channels.  
5.5 They agree that the Joint Business Council to be established between their 
public/private seetors will be aimed at organizing regular business meetings among their 
economic operators and professional organizations as well as training seminars on doing 
business with special focus on their market specific aspects.  
5.6 The Minister express their readiness to develop further, as necessary, the finance 
schemes needed to implement mutual investment and economic partnership between 
China and Africa.  
6. Co-operation in Engineering and Other Infrastructural Projects  
6.1 The Minister positively appraise the co-operation between the two sides in 
engineering projects in African countries. The Chinese side will continue to encourage 
well-established Chinese enterprises to participate in economic and infrastructure 
construction and development projects in African countries. It also expresses its readiness 
to make available its modern and appropriate technologies, as well as managerial 
expertise, in various areas such as engineering contracting, technical and management co-
operation. It will also encourage these enterprises to enhance co-operation with their 
counterparts in Africa and employ, as well as train more local people, including the usage 
of locally available resources. In such co-operation, the Chinese side may also consider 
accepting various forms of payment such as payment in kind, to ease African countries' 
financial burden and help increase their export to China.  
7. Financial Co-operation  
7.1 Noting that co-operation between financial institutions of China and African countries 
has just started, the Ministers express their determination to encourage them to 
vigorously look into the possibility of co-operation in such forms as parallel and co-
financing arrangement. They believe that it is imperative to continue to enhance financial 
co-operation between China and the African Development Bank Group (ADB), the 
Eastern and Southern African Trade and Development Bank (PTA) and other multilateral 
financial institutions in Africa, in particular to implement the bilateral agreement on 
technical co-operation concluded between China and the ADB.  
8. Debt Relief and Cancellation  
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8.1 The Ministers note with concern that the heavy debt burden not only seriously 
hampers the economic growth of African countries, but also causes worsening social 
problems. They welcome the international efforts for debt relief or cancellation over the 
past few years and call on developed countries and international financial institutions that 
are main creditors to fulfil their commitments at an early date. The momentum on debt 
relief over the past years must be maintained and developed.  
8.2 The Chinese side notes that African debt to China does not constitute the bulk of the 
continent's debt stock and that China is herself a developing country and a net debtor. 
Notwithstanding this, the Chinese side expresses its readiness to help relieve the debt 
burden of African countries. In this connection, the Chinese side undertakes to reduce or 
cancel debt amounting to 10 billion RMB yuan owed by the heavily indebted poor 
countries and least developed countries in Africa in the coming two year. The details will 
be discussed through bilateral channels.  
8.3 The Ministers recognize that China, as a permanent member of the United Nations 
Security Council, is a significant partner in developing support around the issue of debt 
relief for Africa.  
9. Tourism  
9.1 The Ministers acknowledge that tourism is an important economic activity which has 
the potential for generation financial resources that will help Africa's accelerated 
economic growth, the creation of employment opportunities and the alleviation of 
poverty. They agree to co-operate in promoting tourism and undertake to encourage 
investment in the development of tourism infrastructure and capacity, with specific focus 
on the development of small, micro and medium enterprises.  
10. Migration  
10.1 The Ministers agree that their respective governments will facilitate the processing 
of applications for work permits and visas, in line with the existing legislation and policy 
pertaining to migration, and that deficiencies will be addressed within the framework of 
bilateral agreements.  
11. Agricultural Co-operation  
11.1 The Ministers express their readiness to share their respective countries' experience 
in various fields of agricultural development and fisheries.  
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11.2 Realizing the vital importance of agricultural development to climinating poverty 
and ensuring food security, the Ministers are determined to take all the necessary 
measures to ensure successful co-operation in this area.  
11.3 The two sides also agree to further explore effective ways of trilateral co-operation 
among China, African countries and the relevant international institutions such as the 
United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO).  
12.Exploration and Utilization of Natural Resources and Energy  
12.1 Cognizant of the importance of their respective natural resources, the two sides 
agree to co-operate in the use of such resources. China agree that Africa needs to 
beneficiate its agricultural, mineral and metallurgical resources, in order to generate 
industrial economic activities. In this regard, China agrees to promote investment in, and 
exploration and beneficiation of metallurgical resources and that such beneficiation 
should be done in Africa.  
12.2 The Ministers agree to facilitate the exploration and beneficiation of such resources 
on a reciprocal basis with due consideration to sound environmental practices.  
13. Scientific, Technological and Cultural Co-operation  
13.1 Aware of the importance of scientific, technological and cultural co-operation, the 
two sides commit themselves to:  
13.1.1 enhancing co-operation in the areas of basic and applied research, and 
development and transfer of technology;  
13.1.2 supporting the upgrading of Africa's indigenous technologies;  
13.1.3 working together for the extension of technologies already developed and 
employed, such as utilization of solar energy, disaster prevention, management and relief, 
as well as development of water resources, so as to make them serve the economic 
revitalization of both China and African countries; and  
13.1.4 increasing cultural exchanges, particularly the exchange of visits by high-level 
cultural delegations and sports and art groups, setting up more art exhibitions in each 
other's territory, and making a greater effort to study and promote each other's culture.  
14. Co-operation in Medical Care Public Health  
14.1 Recognizing the positive role of the Chinese medical teams in Africa and grateful 
for the efforts of the Chinese government in this regard, the African Ministers welcome 
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the commitment made by the Chinese side to send more medical teams to African 
countries and they promise to create suitable working and living conditions for these 
teams.  
14.2 The Chinese side agrees to give positive consideration to the requests of African 
countries and promises to continue to provide them with medical equipment, facilities, 
medicine and more training to local medical personnel, and promote co-operation in the 
use of traditional medicine and pharmacy, so as to ensure more fruitful results in such co-
operation.  
14.3 The two sides agree to conduct co-operation in such areas as reducing infant and 
maternal mortality rates, and preventing and treating HIV/AIDS, malaria, tropical and 
other diseases.  
15. Education and Human Resources Development  
15.1 The Minister agree to expand co-operation in education and human resources 
development. The Chinese side pledges to:  
15.1.1 grant more scholarships to African students to study in China, continue to send 
teachers to Africa to help local institutions of higher learning improve their disciplines 
and specialties, and set up channels of communications between universities of the two 
sides for the study of the Chinese and African civilizations; and  
15.1.2 establish an African Human Resources Development Fund and gradually increase 
financial contribution to the Fund for the training of professionals of different disciplines 
for African countries.  
15.2 The two sides agree to work out country-specific training plans through appropriate 
channels, identify specific co-operation projects and facilitate their implementation.  
16.Environmental management and Bio-diversity  
16.1 The Ministers support international efforts towards environmental management and 
sustainable human development. The two sides express their commitment to the key 
elements of the various environmental conventions and undertake to forge closer co-
operation and joint participation in capacity building for integrating environmental 
management in national development.  
16.2 In pursuit of this, China and Africa undertake to co-operate in all fields of 
environmental management, including pollution control, bio-diversity conservation, 
protection of forest eco-systems, fisheries and wildlife management in order to ensure 
economic and sustainable human development.  
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17. Trilateral Co-operation  
17.1 The two sides stress the importance of the development of trilateral co-operation to 
achieve the objectives contained in the present programme of co-operation and the 
promotion of Sino-African relation, notably within the framework of South-South co-
operation. They note that such an initiative will lead to the effective utilization of 
available financial resources for the further development of human and natural resources 
of the countries involved.  
18. Co-operation on Arms Control  
18.1 The Ministers express deep concern at the large influx of small arms and light 
weapons to conflict areas in Africa and agree that this constitutes a threat to peace, 
security/stability and development on the continent. They pledge to fully co-operate at 
international for a to prevent and combat the problem of illicit proliferation, circulation 
and trafficking of small arms and light weapons.  
19. Multilateral Co-operation  
19.1 Convinced of the pivotal importance of closer South-South co-operation under the 
current circumstances, the two sides agree to:  
19.1.1 strengthen co-operation and consultation at multilateral for a such as the UN 
System, UNCTAD, and the WTO, so as to safeguard the common interests of the 
developing countries; and  
19.1.2 co-ordinate positions in reforming multilateral economic and trade regimes and 
formulating relevant rules, with a view to increasing the collective bargaining capacity of 
developing countries, and make joint efforts towards the democratization of international 
relations and the establishment of a just and equitable new international economic order.  
19.2 The Ministers agree to work for the reform of the United Nations and particularly 
the UN Security Council that will be geographically representative. We call for the 
recognition of the legitimate place due to Africa in the Security Council, the 
organizations and specialized agencies of the United Nation system.  
20.Follow-up Mechanisms  
20.1 The Ministers agree to establish corresponding committees for follow-up actions of 
the Forum on China-Africa Co-operation at Ministerial level.  
20.2 The two sides agree to set up joint follow-up mechanisms at various levels. Under 
these mechanisms, the Ministers will meet in three years time to evaluate progress in the 
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implementation of the Programme, Senior Officials in two years time and Ambassadors 
resident in China on a regular basis. The Senior Officials Meetings and the Ministerial 
Conferences will be convened in China and Africa on an alternate basis within the 
framework of the Forum on China-Africa Co-operation. 
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Appendix L: Address by Mr. Olusegun Obasanjo, President and Commander-in-Chief of 
the Armed Forces of the Federal Republic of Nigeria at the 10th Plenary Meeting of the 
54th Session of The United Nations General Assembly 
Thursday, 23 September 1999 
 
A little over two decades ago I addressed this Assembly as head of a military 
Government in Nigeria. On that occasion the focus of my statement was the urgent need  
to terminate colonial rule in Namibia and Rhodesia, now Zimbabwe, and dismantle the 
racist apartheid South Africa. Today it is a great source of joy for me and my delegation 
that a distinguished son of Namibia is presiding over the affairs of the fifty-fourth session 
of the United Nations General Assembly. My delegation assures you, Sir, of its full 
cooperation and unwavering support throughout your tenure 
May I also convey through you, Sir, our deep appreciation to your predecessor, 
Mr. Didier Opertti of Uruguay, for the able and efficient manner in which he conducted 
the proceedings of the fifty-third session. 
Our appreciation also goes to the Secretary-General, Mr. Kofi Annan, for his 
visionary leadership and the invaluable work of the Secretariat under his stewardship. 
Permit me also to warmly welcome, on behalf of my country and delegation, the 
Republic of Kiribati, the Republic of Nauru and the Kingdom of Tonga, which have just 
joined this family of nations. 
I stand before this Assembly today very proud to be the leader of a Nigeria that 
has successfully managed the transition to democracy after a decade and a half of military 
rule. I would like to seize this opportunity to express the profound appreciation of all 
Nigerians for the international support and encouragement which combined so effectively 
with the relentless determination of Nigerians themselves to reconstruct and transform 
their country into a vibrant democracy. 
Our Administration has raised the hopes of Nigerians, and their expectations are 
correspondingly high. We are well aware of the enormity of the challenges that we face. 
But we are fully resolved to tackle our numerous social, economic and political problems 
head on. And, by the Grace of God, we will not fail. 
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Since assuming office some four months ago our administration has put in place 
an institutional framework for the purpose of reconciling competing interests and groups 
in our society. Our democratic institutions are now operating effectively within the 
system of checks and balances enshrined in our Constitution. Furthermore, we have opted 
for a policy of inclusiveness in all our political appointments, with a Cabinet, for 
instance, in which all registered political parties are represented, thus moving away from 
the divisive practice of winner takes all. 
Our Administration has initiated policies aimed at revitalizing the economy in 
order to create an enabling environment for investment and economic growth. We have 
also put in place an appropriate legal framework for the protection of foreign investments 
and repatriation of legitimate profits. 
Other measures that we have taken include a vigorous anti-corruption campaign; 
the promotion of transparency and accountability in public life; the abolition of decrees 
and regulations which hindered the inflow of foreign investment; the generation of 
opportunities for employment and income savings for domestic investment; and the 
privatization of key State enterprises, such as electricity and telecommunications; 
legislation and other measures to redress obvious cases of neglect and injustice done to 
ethnic minorities, particularly in the oil-producing areas of the Niger delta region, and to 
deal with the problems of the environment; investigation of past human rights violations, 
with a view to promoting and protecting fundamental freedoms; and strengthening the 
capacity of the law enforcement agencies to promote law and order, as well as security, 
and to deal more effectively with the problem of drug trafficking. 
Africa is indeed proud and glad to see the end of this century coincide with the 
total elimination of colonialism and the twin menace of constitutionalized racism in the 
southern part of the continent. The United Nations deserves our warm commendation for 
the crucial role it has played in this process. 
Let me also pay tribute to the thousands who lost their lives in the struggle for 
freedom so that those of us alive today can proudly say we have the destiny of the 
continent in our own hands. It is, however, a destiny which poses monumental challenges 
in our effort to improve the quality of life on our continent. We must strive to alleviate 
the grinding poverty and material deprivation that has persistently remained a feature of 
our political freedom. 
As we approach the dawn of the new millennium, the defining feature of our 
increasingly interdependent world is accelerated globalization, and the liberalization of 
production, trade, investment and finance. 
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But for us in the developing world the reality today is quite different. 
Globalization, in its various manifestations, is already experiencing a troubled 
relationship with the imperatives of development. 
It is rather tragic that Africa, the least developed of all the regions and the least 
able to cope with external shocks, has borne the brunt of the adverse effects of 
globalization of the world economy. There are grim statistics which indicate that the 
well-known marginalization of the African continent has turned into delinkage from the 
global scene. 
Since 1992 Africa's exports and imports as a share of world trade has declined 
from 4 per cent to 2 per cent. Africa's development is presently straitjacketed by a debt 
burden of around $300 billion. The continent is experiencing import compression, weak 
productivity and low output. On the average, factories that are still operating do so at less 
than 30 per cent of installed capacity. Africa's share in total foreign direct investment 
inflows to developing countries has dropped from 11 per cent in the late 1980s to less 
than 5 per cent in the second half of the 1990s, and to a meagre 1.2 per cent of world 
foreign direct investment flows in 1997. 
This trend has continued, despite the efforts of African countries to implement 
far-reaching economic reforms and maintain macroeconomic stability, particularly 
through the introduction of a more open and business-friendly investment environment, 
and the provision of incentives to attract foreign investment. 
In the quest for a better and fairer management of a globalized world economy, it 
is now incumbent upon us to direct our searchlight on the unsatisfactory evolution of the 
multilateral trading system. In participating in the historic Uruguay Round of Multilateral 
Trade Negotiations that ushered in the new rules-based trading system, the developing 
world had hoped that the new trading regime would enhance their trading fortunes, 
facilitate their effective integration into the world economy, and arrest their 
marginalization from the global trading system. 
Unfortunately, however, the vast majority of developing countries, particularly in 
Africa, have so far been unable to reap the benefits arising from their membership of the 
World Trade Organization. Africa's trade prospects continue to be hampered by the 
nonimplementation of the special and differential provisions that favour developing 
countries, and the increasingly protectionist measures that are being imposed against their 
export products. Besides, the paucity of technical and financial assistance that would 
have enabled the developing countries to take advantage of the limited market access 
opportunities that exist continues to deepen Africa's marginalization in the globalized 
world economy. 
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Without doubt, the biggest monetary and financial obstacle confronting 
developing countries is the chronic debt overhang. According to United Nations figures, 
the global debt of all developing countries stood at $567 billion in 1980, and $1.4 trillion 
in 1992. In that 12-year period these countries made foreign debt payments totalling $1.6 
trillion. Now, out of the 41 countries which the World Bank describes as heavily indebted 
poor countries, 33 are African countries, a group that some believe is richly deserving of 
its own special category: severely indebted low-income countries. Today in sub-Saharan 
Africa every man, woman and child owes $357. This is a continent where millions live in 
abject poverty, earning around $100 a year, or 27 cents a day. Some African countries 
now spend as much as four times on servicing debts as they do on education and health 
care. Some countries spend up to 40 per cent of their national budgets on debt servicing. 
Furthermore, it is reliably estimated that for every dollar given in official development 
aid, $3 go back to the rich countries in debt service payments. 
I make bold to assert that calling for debt relief for developing countries is not a 
plea for charity, but is an urgent matter of social and economic justice. It has to be 
redressed if there is to be peace and stability in the twentyfirst century. Therefore, we 
propose definitive debt cancellation, not just reduction or rescheduling of the debt service 
regime. Eligibility should be limited to unpayable debts, which for Africa means the bulk 
of the $300 billion current stock of debt. There should be debt remission that is not 
predicated on the institutionally harsh conditionalities of structural adjustment 
programmes. There should be recognition on both sides of the bargaining table that 
lenders and borrowers share joint responsibilities for debts incurred in circumstances that 
are morally questionable in the first place. Debt cancellation should benefit ordinary 
people. 
Nigerians rightly expect democracy to yield perceptible dividends in their lives. 
Our Administration will, however, find the task of meeting this expectation virtually 
impossible without substantial reduction of our debt burden, especially as we call on the 
same citizens to make the sacrifices that are implicit in the recent measures aimed at 
prudent management of our national economy. 
I wish to invite the attention of the Assembly to the related issue of illegal capital 
flight from Africa. It is an open secret that much of Africa's wealth has been illegally 
siphoned out of the continent by corrupt regimes and unpatriotic individuals working in 
collaboration with foreign partners. Nigeria and many African countries would be able to 
pay off large portions of their debts if only they could recover some of the capital 
illegally stashed abroad. We thus believe that now is the time to collectively deal with 
this issue. 
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In this regard, Nigeria calls for a concerted effort by the international community, 
through an international convention, for the repatriation to Africa and the developing 
world of all capital illegally transferred from these countries. Such an international 
convention or agreement is legally feasible and morally sustainable. It will compel 
participating banks to disclose the source of the illegal accounts they hold, repatriate 
them to the countries of rightful ownership and subject the guilty parties to the full 
weight of national and international law. 
It is with a heavy heart that I raise the issue of the HIV/AIDS pandemic 
throughout Africa. Our continent is bearing the brunt of this terrible disease that now kills 
around 2 million Africans annually, thus officially overtaking malaria as Africa's number 
one primary healthcare problem. This situation is even more frightening in that it has now 
left 6 million children orphaned in the eastern and southern parts of Africa. In West 
Africa the disease has been spreading just as rapidly. Unlike malaria, which is location 
specific, HIV/AIDS knows neither climatic nor regional boundaries. Global cooperation 
is an imperative if we are to succeed in dealing with this scourge. 
Among the immediate challenges facing Nigeria and Africa today is resolving the 
many conflicts raging on the continent. Today, as many as 19 sub-Saharan countries are 
engaged in armed conflicts. The negative impact of these conflicts in human, social, 
economic and environmental destruction does not need to be described here. Nigeria and 
indeed the entire West African subregion have devoted considerable human, material, 
political and diplomatic resources to the resolution of these crises in the subregion, 
starting with Liberia and subsequently Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau. Similarly, efforts 
are being made in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and in Angola towards peaceful 
resolution of their conflicts. 
Indeed, African leaders at the recent summit of the Organization of African Unity 
(OAU) in Algiers, and at the urging of the Nigerian delegation, agreed to declare next 
year as the Year of Peace, Security and Stability in Africa. By this declaration, we have 
dedicated ourselves to making the year 2000 the year when Africans direct all their 
efforts into effectively eliminating armed conflicts on their continent. We hope to build 
on the fresh momentum for peace occasioned by the budding peace initiatives in Congo, 
Sierra Leone, Eritrea, Ethiopia and Angola. 
We are also agreed on the overriding need to uphold codes of decency, ethics and 
minimum standards of decorum among African Governments and their leadership. Gone 
are the days when the OAU turned a blind eye to the excesses and abuses of power by 
member Governments.  Forceful and undemocratic changes of Governments will no 
longer be overlooked or tolerated. We intend to condemn in absolute terms all violations 
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of these codes and to ostracize their perpetrators. It is our duty and moral responsibility to 
treat our citizens decently and humanely. 
My country has always believed that the threat to international peace and security 
from any corner of the globe should be considered a threat to the peace and security of 
the world as a whole. While the maintenance of international peace and security remains 
the primary responsibility of the Security Council, the Charter provision for the 
complementary role of regional and subregional groups has also proved to be critical to 
the maintenance of peace at the regional and global levels. The establishment of the 
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Monitoring Group 
(ECOMOG) is a clear testimony of our commitment to subregional peace. As the record 
shows, ECOMOG succeeded in putting an end to the Liberian war in 1997, reinstating 
the democratically elected President of Sierra Leone in 1998, and bringing about the 
current Peace Agreement for Sierra Leone signed in Lomé in July 1999. 
The time has come, however, for the Security Council to assume its full 
responsibility, specifically in Sierra Leone and other conflict flash points in Africa. For 
too long, the burden of preserving international peace and security in West Africa has 
been left almost entirely to a few States in our subregion. The non-implementation of the 
Peace Agreement and Nigeria's continual burden in Sierra Leone is unacceptably draining 
Nigeria financially. For our economy to take off, this bleeding has to stop. The United 
Nations needs to do more in providing logistics and financial support to assist regional 
peacekeeping and peacebuilding efforts, as well as enhancing the welfare of refugees 
worldwide without discrimination. 
My delegation believes that it has never been the purpose of the United Nations 
Organization to prescribe democracy and change for its members and yet make little or 
no progress in the democratization of its own organs, such as the Security Council. My 
delegation accordingly urges the General Assembly, during this session, to conclude 
deliberations and reach agreement on the modalities for the reform and expansion of the 
Security Council so that the Millennium Assembly will adopt them next year — and not 
later. 
How can the United Nations continue to perpetuate and justify a situation where 
Africa is the only continent without a permanent seat in the Security Council? In order to 
promote reform and democratization of the Security Council, Africa, with 53 Member 
States, should be allocated at least two permanent seats — commensurate not only with 
the continent's size and population, but with its track record also of contributing to the 
maintenance of international peace and security. 
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I wish to reaffirm our belief that the United Nations is the most universal body 
ever designed for collectively resolving humankind's common problems. Our 
Organization has come a long way since its establishment 54 years ago. Although created 
in a different era and under different circumstances, and in spite of numerous constraints, 
the United Nations has continuously sought to adapt itself to the changes in the 
international political arena. It has been able to accomplish this to some degree, but it 
remains an institution whose working methods, procedures and administrative structure 
have in many respects become outdated. 
Yet the world as we know it today without the United Nations would be 
inconceivable. For it has come to symbolize hope for a better and more secure future for 
many, particularly in the developing areas of the world. Indeed, though a majority of our 
countries could not be members when the Organization was created, we are today its 
strongest defenders and advocates of the ideals for which it stands. We believe in the 
family of nations, and within that family the strong members have the responsibility to 
protect and strengthen the weaker members. 
At the close of the twentieth century and the beginning of the third millennium, 
there is a need for stock-taking and for proper assessment of the implementation of 
previous resolutions emanating especially from the major world summits and conferences 
which took place in this decade. Such an effort would bring us closer to the realization of 
the purposes and objectives of our Organization. In this regard, I stand before the 
Assembly and pledge Nigeria's continued contributions and positive commitment to the 
ideals of the Charter of the United Nations. 
 
